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Abstract
Thirty years after redefining the political landscape of Nicaragua, Sandinismo is both a 
unifying discourse and one driven by different interpretations by adherents. 
This thesis examines the complex legacy of Sandinismo by focusing on the still widely 
acclaimed notion of Sandinismo as an idiom of popular participation. A central point is the 
current unity of the movement, as it is perceived by Sandinistas, depends on a limited number
of common reference points over the last 100 years of Nicaraguan history, which are 
interpreted very differently Sandinistas and other groups, but which always emphasise the 
part Nicaraguans play in international relations and the overall importance of popular mass 
participation in Nicaraguan politics, rather than agreement on current, day-to-day politics. 
Through my analysis, this thesis questions the view often expressed in anthropological 
studies and the mainstream press on the development of the Sandinista movement since the 
1980s as being one of decay. Based on 18 months of fieldwork in Nicaragua in 2008/09 
among mainly urban Sandinistas and some non-Sandinistas in the cities on the Pacific coast, 
involving formal and informal interviews, the thesis concludes that Sandinismo continues to 
involve grassroot elements of popular participation and that Nicaragua interpretations of 
history across ideological groups have in common that the actions of individual Nicaraguans 
are seen as shaping historical changes, which in turn validates and lends importance to such 
grassroots elements.  
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This research investigates the project of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 
(FSLN). This is to be understood on a level of theory of how the world fits together for 
Sandinistas and how they see development can be achieved, as well as on the level of 
concrete actions taken. I try to see this both on the level of people who hold government or 
central activist positions and on the level of general sympathisers of the party who call 
themselves Sandinistas. The current positions are viewed in an international and historical 
context. 
Both Nicaraguan and the outside media have concentrated on certain aspects of the new 
FSLN government after 2006, and these portrayals all seem to focus on the divergences 
between the current government and the program of revolutionary transformation of the 
1980s over single political issues such as therapeutic abortion. None of these looks at 
Sandinismo in its totality. In this thesis I show that anthropologists have incorrectly assumed 
the Sandinista movement would disintegrate completely into identity politics, a view popularly 
represented by Babb (2004). 
The Sandinista movement includes people who believe in many ideologies (nationalism, 
social reformism, Marxism and anarchism, to name a few). Sandinismo did in the past 
include, and still includes, many of the individual aspects of identity politics in a way which 
may have led some anthropologists to believe it was the sole point of most Sandinistas’ 
engagement with politics. Related to the internal ideological difference within the Sandinista 
movement is an informal structure of different groups of Sandinistas who engage in concrete 
actions to change society. Most times this works without provoking conflict between different 
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groups of Sandinistas, and is not immediately noticeable to the outside observer.
Historical background
The Central American Republic Nicaragua experienced a revolution in 1979 led by the 
guerrilla group who claimed to follow the ideology of Sandinismo and was organised as the 
FSLN. The revolutionaries were Marxists, and they worked together with Cuba and the Soviet
Union. The United States funded a civil war against the government and maintained an 
economic boycott of the country, which crippled it severely. José Daniel Ortega Saavedra was
a leading figure of the FSLN before 1979, a member of the cross-political junta directiva that 
ruled the country (1979–84), and elected president (1984–90). In 1990, the FSLN lost the 
government in national elections to a coalition of parties more in line politically with the 
government of the United States. This group was led by Violeta Barrios Torres de Chamorro. 
In 2006, Ortega Saavedra was elected president of the country once again. It gave the post 
back to the FSLN for the first time since 1990. Different from the 1980s, the FSLN did not 
obtain a majority in parliament in the 2006 elections, and has had to rely on temporary 
coalitions with different Liberal parties. This has, in the eye of many international observers 
and at home, tainted their image of being a socialist party. In addition, during the last days of 
the previous Sandinista government, some property changed hands and made several of the 
FSLN members rich, which distanced them from their own subjects. 
 The Sandinista movement has not always been explicitly socialist. Augusto Nicolás Calderón
Sandino, the rebel leader (1927–33) the movement was named after, fought on the side of the
Liberals, and it can only be confirmed that his views were nationalist and anti-imperialist, but 
not that he was a Marxist, or anarchist or any other type of political radical. This is in spite of 
his socialisation as a political activist in the communist and anarcho-syndicalist petroleum 
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labor unions in Mexico. “Sandinismo” seems to have been re-branded as a 
socialist/nationalist movement with the creation of the FSLN in 1961. Their taking power 
through a revolutionary uprising in 1979 seems to have been jointly accepted by Soviet Union
and the United States during the administration of James Earl ‘Jimmy’ Carter. One could also 
argue the junta of five which led initially also included Barrios Torres de Chamorro, Ortega 
Saavedra’s future successor who followed US policy advice, and the attacks launched by the 
next president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, came after an internal change in 
Nicaraguan policies. 
Simultaneously the Soviet Union was involved in Nicaraguan politics starting in 1979, with 
strategies of national liberation fronts, from the beginning of taking power of the FSLN. 
Different from many other Soviet-allied countries, the Nicaraguan political system was never 
changed to the one party structure classical to the Soviet system. When the FSLN lost power 
and was replaced by a neoliberal government philosophy as its main principle, it was through 
regular elections rather than through a violent counter-revolution, the FSLN continued to be a 
very popular force, especially among the poorest sectors of society. Many Sandinista 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) sprang up, and labor unions continued to be 
dominated by Sandinistas and for a long time mass organisations the Sandinistas created in 
the 1980s continued to function. 
The Sandinista movement of 2007–11 under Ortega Saavedra faced a completely different 
reality than that of the 1980s and its policies will of necessity be different just because of 
external differences. The Soviet Union ended, and the United States was not financing 
militarily insurrections, and did not put in place an economic embargo of Nicaragua. Germany 
gave more than 2.5 times the aid bilaterally that the United States offered (OECD 200X), and 
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the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Cuba incorporated Nicaragua in their 
alternative trade network, Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra Américas 
(ALBA). In light of this, the government started an organisation with the stated goal of 
providing direct democracy through popular participation, the Consejos de Poder Ciudadano 
(CPCs). 
The theme of the investigation
My interest concerned mostly the foundational changes in FSLN Sandinismo ideology. The 
following shows some of the main issues I researched during my fieldwork. It was important 
for me to understand what it means to be a Sandinista for the individual and how that differs 
from being a Liberal or Conservative. This question related to many aspects of people’s 
personal identity and went well beyond who they voted for or of which party they were a 
member. It was not restricted to ideological differences, and the variety of opinions and 
ideologies within the Sandinista movement proved to be gigantic. 
I tried to find how the Sandinista public or Sandinista-supporting public related to the FSLN, 
what they expected from an FSLN government and how much Dependency Theory, Marxism, 
and anti-imperialism ideology were part of the general Sandinista viewpoint in comparison to 
the amount of neoliberalism and modernisation theory. I also wanted to learn how popular 
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participation in decision making processes worked under the Ortega Saavedra government. 
In this connection my main concern was whether the role of the different types of organising 
in non governmental groups, labor unions and CPCs which all are somehow linked with 
Sandinismo, were to legitimise those decisions of the President for which he had no 
parliamentary approval. Were these part of a long-term strategy to link the FSLN to the state 
beyond the current elections, or were these to extend the influence of and improved the 
communication from the base of society? It was also important to understand how the 
contribution in participative political processes by non-FSLN members was viewed. Were they
excluded systematically? 
As the current government was portrayed as anything but revolutionary in the international 
media, I wondered whether there would be a push for radicalisation from some lower level 
within the Sandinista movement. I could imagine the FSLN leadership would find itself two 
steps behind a population expecting “patria, socialismo o muerto” (“nation, socialism or 
death”, Chavez at Ortega Saavedra’s inauguration ceremony Rodríguez 2007b) or that the 
FSLN leadership would turn out to represent a minority of educated radical scholars in an 
otherwise Liberal population.1 If radicalisation would come from below, I wondered what parts 
of the program of the FSLN leadership it would go against and what channels would be used 
– CPCs, party apparati or government bureaucracy – and whether such attempts would be 
successful.2 
1 The discourse of Ortega Saavedra before the 2006 elections and immediately afterward was minimally radical. This 
changed before I returned to Nicaragua and so my initial ideas were somewhat outdated. I planned on including in my 
interviews some of the key terms from former times, such as ‘Sandinismo,’ and ‘imperialism,’ that were avoided by 
Ortega Saavedra around the elections. I wanted to ask respondents what they connected those terms to and how they felt 
about them, and then compare the responses of different informants. Because the words served as part of the official 
Sandinista government vocabulary at the time of my return, finding out how much people used such terminology worked
more as a test of the degree to which they aligned with the government. 
2 Similar to the previous question, I wanted to note reactions to key terms such as ‘Contras’ and ‘neoliberalism,’ yet again 
the word ‘neoliberalism’ had been given a negative connotation in the wording used in official government statements. 
Interestingly, no Liberal would ever mention ‘neoliberalism’ in a favorable light either. I recorded the degree to which 
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Given Nicaragua’s unique historical background of foreign interventions, I questioned how 
important international relations effected Nicaragua, and what importance generally is 
attributed to them. Given that the Sandinistas were back in power, it interested me in finding 
out how the international relations of the 1980s were seen today and what relevance was 
currently attributed to them.3
My ethnographic fieldwork
I focused on four main ethnographic projects which form part of my fieldwork (see table p.
28). In each chapter I indicate from which of these four projects I gathered the most 
information to form the basis of my understanding in that particular chapter. In addition I 
gathered much general information through my day-to-day fieldwork in León. 
The first project looked for Nicaraguans who had studied at the Wilhelm-Pieck school of 
political leadership of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ, Free German Youth) in East Germany
during the 1980s. The school was one of three schools in the Eastern Bloc that educated 
young people (ages 16–25) from around the world who were believed to be the next 
generation of political leaders in their respective countries. All students studied one year and 
then returned to their native countries to engage in the local struggle. Up to 10 Nicaraguans 
attended this school each year throughout the 1980s. In the early years they used false 
names due to security issues, and in the later years they promised not to exchange 
addresses. An East German who studied at the school asked me to try to find his classmates 
who attended from 1985–86. I put up posters throughout the town of León and went to 
former contra supporters and people still organized in the Partido Resistencia Nicaragüense (PRN) now participated in 
and cooperated with the current government.
3 The last question came up both as part of the ongoing politics in which a more Central place was attributed to Russia 
during my time in Nicaragua and when the Ruben Dario medal was given to former East German minister of education 
Margot Honecker in July 2008. When looking for former students from the Wilhelm-Pieck school of political leadership,
I wanted to assess the relevance of the international relations of the 1980s and its effect in ordinary conversations today. 
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Managua to be recorded on national television with my campaign to find all the Nicaraguans 
who studied there. I started the search in late July 2008, and received calls from former 
students for the next 10 months. Altogether I found 37 students, although some could not be 
verified. I usually travelled to whatever town or village they lived in with my video camera, and
sometimes stayed over night or stayed in touch for a longer duration of time. My questions to 
them concerned what they had done before going to the Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
(DDR, German Democratic Republic); why they went; what they remembered of the trip; what
they did after returning and what they did now; and what they thought of the current political 
situation in Nicaragua. 
The second project was to collect the life stories of the founders of the organisation ‘Amigos.’ 
Bayardo José Fonseca Galo, the uncle of my main informant, Carolina Fonseca Icabalzeta, 
was very active in the student movement prior to and during the 1979 revolution. He does not 
currently hold any important political position. He wanted to start an organisation of people 
like him who were politically active previously, but who now did not belong to the inner circles 
of the FSLN. The stated purpose of the organisation was to spread knowledge about 
Sandinismo and engage in social projects for the betterment of society–thereby advancing the
general cause of the party without directly getting involved in it. Fonseca maintained an 
extensive network of friends all over the country with whom he had close contact and who he 
wished to recruit to this new organisation. I accompanied him around Managua to interview 
some of those who had agreed to join, and was sent by Fonseca to El Rama and Chontales 
to meet up and interview others he was interested in recruiting. The primary questions I posed
to Fonseca’s contacts were: To what inner-party tendency did you belong before 1979; what 
was your role in the insurrection; what was your role during the 1980s; how did you survive 
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the 1990s; and what is your involvement or stance on the current situation? 
The third project involved working with the employees of the Nicaraguan Ministerio 
Agropecuario y Forestal (MAGFOR) on creating a new national information system for all of 
their data. From January 2009 to September 2009 I worked on an information system for the 
MAGFOR. This project involved engaging with the free software movement situated in 
Managua. I also taught courses on the use of open source software at the Universidad de 
Managua’s León campus (UdeM León). The free software movement provided the principal 
driving force behind the idea of the need for social/political change, but the project also 
involved engaging with the Sandinista bureaucrats who ran the ministry and the largely 
Sandinista agriculture professionals who formally organised the system through the NGO 
Servicio de Información Mesoamericano sobre Agricultura Sostenible (SIMAS). Through my 
interactions with this particular cross-section of Nicaraguan society, I gained a deeper 
understanding of middle-class professional Sandinistas’ views of Sandinismo, and the policy 
plans of those formally involved in government. I found it interesting to note and highlight the 
relations between the open source movement and this more technocratic use of IT, as they 
would initially seem to represent two competing political visions within Sandinismo. 
In addition to the three projects above, I tried to be present whenever a political event 
occurred, and tried to get in contact with the principal actors if they could be reached. In doing
this, I soon developed a network of contacts in the Sandinista administration of León as well 
as León as a whole.
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Chapter overview
Chapters 1-3: Introduction, Methodology and Literature Review
These chapters serve to introduce the theme of the thesis as well as the methodology and 
literature used.
Chapter 4: Development theories
This chapter introduces the theoretical background of the development theories that have 
been utilised both in Nicaragua and internationally since the 1950s.
Chapter 5: Recent political history of Nicaragua and the Sandinista movement
This chapter presents the political history of Nicaragua over the past 100 years with a 
particular emphasis put on those parts my Nicaraguan informants focused upon. This chapter 
is included as it is contains needed background knowledge to understand the subsequent 
chapters. This chapter is not in itself part of my ethnographic research. 
Chapter 6: Economic history of Nicaragua
This chapter presents a scientific account of the economic history of Nicaragua using the 
Dependency Theory-based model of Biderman (1983), but using a greater wealth of data 
sources bringing it up to current times. This chapter gives an overview of the actual economic 
situation of the country over the last century with a focus on the years since the earthquake 
that destroyed most of the capital, Managua, in 1972 and the governmental economic plans 
offered, regardless of whether these actually came to fruition.
Chapter 7: The politics of history
The histories of groups and single individuals form an important topic in everyday 
conversations in Nicaragua. As a foreigner I found knowing about Nicaraguan history to be 
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the most important factor in engaging people in conversation and in gaining a nuanced 
linguistic competence and a sensitivity to the importance of local notions of history. This also 
allowed me access as a serious researcher among Nicaraguan informants. 
From the outside, the recent history of Nicaragua inextricably gets tied up with regional 
politics, and social theory focusing on dependency and intervention by the United States. 
Within Nicaragua, discussions get conducted from an internal perspective. Several versions 
of history of Nicaragua exist for the last 100 years, each linked to an ideological group or 
subgroup. They all have in common the fact that foreign involvement gets played down, and 
all are emphatic that the main actors in each relevant historical period/event are Nicaraguans 
and not foreigners. 
In this chapter I show how the suppression of foreign involvement is achieved in the course of
everyday conversations. The difference among the various tellings of the country’s history 
maps quite neatly onto differences in political views (the basic contrast is Sandinista vs. 
non-Sandinista). At the same time differences exist among Sandinistas in how much criticism 
of one’s own movement/position one allows when talking about historical events. I found that 
this difference mainly turned on the criteria of age and class. 
For this chapter I was helped by the general political journalism, which gave me an insight 
into how non-Sandinistas tend to explain reality, and the interviews of old revolutionary 
fighters who started the organisation ‘Amigos.’ These old revolutionaries tended to be most 
thorough in their explanations of historic realities of Nicaragua. 
Chapter 8: Perceptions and expectations of economic development
This chapter presents how the economic plans and situations of the past are discussed today 
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by different types of informants. It shows an interesting connection: The changes to economic 
circumstances are connected to political shifts as described in the previous chapter, but those
groups causing these changes are not all judged according to the same criteria. 
While the Sandinistas in the 1980s were not successful with their economic policies, they are 
hardly ever judged by that. Instead, there is a focus on the success their policies could have 
led to, had they been continued uninterrupted without the Contra-war, financed by the United 
States. In contrast, the governments of the 1970s and 1990s are judged by the actual 
economic achievements of those periods. 
In this chapter I used my experience amongst Sandinista professionals, ministry workers and 
the founders of the organisation ‘Amigos,’ especially those living in Chichigalpa. Both groups 
were happy to engage in discussions about economic policy in the past, and the professionals
who still work were the most interested in relating it to the current government and what 
possibilities exist today. In both cases I gathered data in terms of the individual’s ideological 
viewpoint at the level of the country’s economy in general and at a more practical level as 
concerns their personal economy. 
Chapter 9: The forming of the politics under the FSLN
Currently many groups try to influence aspects of Nicaraguan society according to their 
interpretation of Sandinismo. In each major political event focused on by the Ortega Saavedra
administration during my fieldwork an emphasis was put on the importance of Nicaraguans 
and Nicaragua as an autonomous, self-contained system. Simultaneously an emphasis was 
placed how Nicaraguan society and in particular the Sandinista movement was seen as part 
of a global movement and things which happen in Nicaragua are directly related to events at 
a global level. Rather than Nicaragua being influenced by what important decision makers in 
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powerful countries are doing, the way it may be seen from abroad, Nicaraguans believe 
Nicaragua plays an active part in world current events. 
For this chapter I used all four types of investigative projects. Being in attendance when 
political relevant events took place as a journalist gave me one version, and interviewing 
completely unrelated people about that same issue in the subsequent days and weeks 
completed the initial picture of the situation. 
Chapter 10: Ways for Sandinistas to involve themselves in politics
The different types presented in the last chapter lead to different ways of trying to exert 
Sandinista power of different subgroups during the current Sandinista administration, without 
any clear hierarchy with respect to whose actions are more important. This is most likely quite
different from the 1980s, when the state is said to have been very centralist and hierarchical. 
Both now and then the ways power gets exerted is a collective processes. 
Looking at the Sandinista professionals and the founders of ‘Amigos’ showed me two very 
different groups engaged in this activity. A third group was the younger Sandinistas who 
worked with media activism and who had an entirely different approach. 
Chapter 11: Historic relations to Eastern Europe
Although Sandinista activities, understood as concrete actions undertaken by individual 
Sandinistas or groups to further what they believe is the Sandinista cause, range widely and 
are seldom controlled by Sandinista and President Daniel Ortega Saavedra, it is noticeable 
that the oligarchy of the country continues to exist and capitalism has not been abolished. 
Although these were previously very central goals of the Sandinistas, and many Sandinistas 
still talk about these goals, they seem incapable or unwilling to do anything about them. 
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This failure can partially be explained by Dependency Theory and that in most cases 
individual third world countries get trapped by the relative economic position in which they find
themselves. It however fails to explain the difference in local activity level (Nicaragua vs. other
countries in a similar situation) and how a rather absurd unique understanding of world events
can lead to different possibilities for the country. An example is when the Nicaraguan 
government supported Russia in the Georgia conflict, allegedly because they believed Russia
to be a reincarnation of the Soviet Union. It led to renewed economic and military help from 
Russia. 
I show the unique view of world events my Nicaraguan informants have, is the connection the 
country had to the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Although the economic relationship ceased to 
exist, I believe the results of the these educational products still influence how many of my 
Nicaraguan informants see the world today. While my Nicaraguan informants often talked 
about the education programs in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, it was with little focus on 
whether this changed/influenced Sandinismo. 
In this chapter I present many of the personal stories of those who went to the Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik (DDR, German Democratic Republic) that show how it had a lasting 
effect on their activities and how some are in positions of political power and are likely to 
shape the policies of the current government. 
Conclusion
For my informants, Sandinismo today consists of accepting a certain version of the past, one 
of seeing Nicaraguans as the center-piece of a great phase of world history, and of not 
leaving decisions to the Sandinista government, but involving oneself directly without much 
concern for the party apparatus. 
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Internal differences are large. Differences in strategy and interest among Sandinistas are 
seldom handled internally. Instead these are played out on a national stage as part of the 
national political dialogue. All this seems, for many Sandinistas, to make out the centrepiece 
of Sandinista ideology today. For these informants there is also an ideological connection 
between the Sandinismo of the 1980s and the current Nicaraguan government.
25
Chapter 2
Methodology
As my main methodology I employed participant observation. This is a wide-spanning method
and further qualities have to be specified. Different from other methodological approaches, 
the anthropological method of long-term participant-observation can determine changes and 
phenomena on a grassroots level, independently of whether manifested or represented in 
official party lines, statements and manifestos written by leading party figures, official written 
laws or newspaper articles written by opinion makers. Eckstein (1990) presents a good case 
for how studies with such an approach can extract further knowledge that would not be 
accessible to political scientists, economists, historians, or interview based historians. In her 
study of Mexican democratisation in the late 1970s and 1980s, Eckstein (1990, p. 214) 
employed three long-term periods of fieldwork in 1967–68, 1971–72 and 1987. This included 
around a 100 open-ended interviews and interviews with the same people over and over 
again. This allowed her to record how the formal democratisation in the official political sphere
did not lead to a similar development on the grassroots level, where the state in fact extended
its authoritarian rule. Similarly, in the case of Nicaragua, the anthropological approach I used 
gave me access to information about how Sandinistas structured relationships to one another 
and how the Sandinista project functions at a grassroots level in a way other social sciences 
could not have determined. 
Participant observation
In my previous stay I made contact with older men at a León center for former FSLN 
revolutionaries, a pensioned lady who worked part-time showing Sandinista attractions of 
León to tourists, a student and a 27-year-old Spanish language teacher and her husband who
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tried to teach himself Linux and who operated a few web sites. All of these people expressed 
a very positive view toward the Sandinista take-over the last time I spoke to them, and 
counted themselves as Sandinista without being actual members of the party. 
I planned to start out in León and get in contact with the local CPC, as they supposedly 
represented citizen involvement in politics, and through that contact, hopefully could touch 
base with the FSLN either in the city or a barrio. As a backup plan I used my other contacts in
the city to get to talk to someone. Initially I figured if I then moved on, western Nicaragua is 
not too large, so I could easily move back and forth between cities and continue to follow the 
development in other cities. From party politics in Europe I was accustomed to the idea that it 
is usually easier to make contact with the party apparatus in a smaller city; however, most of 
the power struggles can only to be observed in the capital. Depending on how things went, I 
planned on spending an extensive amount of time in Managua at a later stage. This ended up
working largely as planned. 
In the field I experienced the CPCs as representing only a certain subtype of participative 
politics. In most places only people in the 1980s involved in the Sandinista mass organisation 
Comités de Defensa Sandinista (CDSs) were active in them. Those involved were generally 
involved in many other forms of political organisation and only used the CPCs as one of 
several political fora. Simultaneously, my Nicaraguan informants found many other ways of 
involving themselves in participatory politics. In the case of Sandinista activists, this spelled 
out ways of shaping the policies of the government. It made no sense to view the CPCs as 
isolated or the sole space of political activity. Realising that, my focus changed towards 
participative politics among Sandinistas in general rather than specifically looking at the CPC. 
For this purpose I frequented most places of political activity, as well as the Sandinista party 
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headquarters of León and an Albergue in which Liberals and former Contras often gathered. 
Ethnographic basis of study
type of 
informants
number age range gender methodology 
used
location
former students
of the 
Wilhelm-Pieck 
school
37 ca. 40-50 male and 
female
mostly formal 
interviews
Managua, 
León, Estelí, 
Matagalpa and 
some outside of
cities
people around 
the organisation
'Los Amigos'
ca. 30 ca. 50-80 male and 
female, 
majority males
formal and 
informal 
interviews
Managua, 
León, Juigalpa, 
El Rama
free software 
movement/SIM
AS/MAGFOR
ca. 70 most under 30 mostly male informal 
conversations
Managua
journalism on 
politics
ca. 100 any male and 
female
formal and 
informal 
interviews
mostly 
Managua, 
León, some in 
other places 
such as 
Moyogalpa, 
Ciudad 
Sandino, 
Laguna Perla
Formal interviews
Part of my research aimed at interviewing people who formerly or currently held posts in the 
FSLN system. In León, I did this because I knew they would expect it of me and it built trust, 
and also because it was a good way of getting to know people. I was unsure who I would 
interview at the start, other than party officials. Once in the country, it became easy enough to 
find good interview partners. I had a video camera, so it was very clear when the interview 
was officially on and when it was not. As so often is the case, most interesting and valuable 
remarks were made while the camera was turned off, yet the camera served well to 
communicate my intentions of being interested in explanations of what took place around me. 
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The interviews of the members of the groups I focused upon were in many cases the main 
interaction I had with these informants apart from the few comments they made when the 
camera was turned off. 
Archival research
Those involved in the Sandinista movement spend much time telling and discussing history 
among themselves. The recurring themes of history tellings involved the time of Calderón 
Sandino and of the Sandinista rule during the 1980s. This is something that Sandinistas 
engage in within all periods of Sandinismo, and it is very noticeable in the current period. I 
believed it to be necessary to investigate whatever I could find out about these periods in 
written form. Part of this was simply looking at back issues of the main newspapers, which are
available on the Internet, and part of this pertained to looking at the books on Calderón 
Sandino and the purpose of the FSLN.
It is important to note that the newspapers of Nicaragua, La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario, 
cannot be counted as impartial and the information given is oftentimes contradicted by other 
articles in the same newspaper of another date. Both newspapers are strongly opposed to 
president Ortega Saavedra. Nevertheless, oftentimes the newspapers are the only source of 
information on important issues. The more academic journal Envío has oftentimes published 
more reliable information from both foreign and Nicaraguan scholars. Generally the line of the
journal was critical but generally with a positive undertone towards the Sandinista movement. 
Most recently the line has changed somewhat and the editorial line is now strongly opposed 
to the current FSLN government. Other media have also provided written material through 
their websites. Some of these are clearly FSLN-dominated. This is true in the case of the 
website ElPuebloPresidente.com or the radio station La Primerisima. While I did make use of 
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the information found in these sources due to lack of any viable non-partidarian source of 
information – a practice I observed was also practiced by other social scientists writing about 
Nicaragua – I tried to make sure not to claim that contested articles were necessarily factual.
Ethical concerns
As a main guide for ethical questions while conducting my fieldwork I used Samfunn og 
vitenskap by Engelstad (1998). Engelstad focuses on research ethics mostly concerning 
situations where the search for truth conducted by investigators comes into conflict with other 
values. The actions a researcher performs often do have consequences beyond what was 
initially expected, so the researcher has to reflect on how his impacts on the lives of 
informants. While this is something that can be expected by all responsible members of 
society, the responsibility of the professional researcher extends beyond this. 
Science has a privileged role in society and because social interaction is the material that 
social scientists study, such researchers need to be especially careful about the way they 
influence their environment. The result is the investigator has the responsibility in concerns of 
research ethics and is obliged to know the appropriate laws and familiarise himself with the 
appropriate norms (Engelstad 1998, pp. 429–430). 
One of the most common issues among social scientists is not to ‘report the truth’ (Engelstad 
1998, p. 431). The most obvious way of not telling the truth is by reporting completely false 
data, but what is much more common is to change data just a little or to leave certain surveys 
out in order to get it to fit one’s theoretical models. In anthropological research this could be a 
possible issue as the anthropological method does not clearly state what part of the 
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anthropologist’s everyday life is part of his research and what is not. This means the 
anthropologist essentially has to decide what he finds to be relevant and what not. It is, 
therefore, in his hands to actively try to find examples which do not fit into his theories in 
everyday life. The adherence to this principle is, however, a question of degree. In the case of
this particular research, this could especially have relevancy in that I was involved in politics 
and oftentimes had concepts of my own. The danger was that I would try to make these fit 
simply by recording data just in those moments that covered situations seeming to fit my own 
agenda. My experience from previous fieldwork provided the best way of avoiding this is by 
simply being aware of just what concepts I have and devoting extra space and time to those 
informants who have ideas significantly different from my own preconceptions. I tried to apply 
this insight by not only mingling with people I politically agreed with, and giving those I do not 
agree with enough space to respond for themselves. Different from my fieldwork for my MPhil 
degree in Douglas, Arizona, my own opinion on different subjects shifted somewhat more in 
the case of Nicaragua over time and I would agree with different people on different issues. It 
made it somewhat easier to not gain a completely partial view. In the descriptions of my 
interactions in this thesis I try to give the reader enough detailed explanation about the 
surroundings to let them make up their own mind about the conclusions I reach. 
Another common issue is not recognising that even though an informant agrees to participate 
in the researcher’s study, the informant still has certain rights (Engelstad 1998, pp. 432–433). 
For one, the researcher should avoid putting the subject through unnecessary pain. This 
would include social conflict or the feeling of having been tricked by the researcher. Another 
point is respecting people’s autonomy and giving them the right of privacy. Also, any 
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participant had the right to be anonymity in any released paper. The right to have a private life
is especially tricky in anthropological research, as one usually tries to go beyond the facade 
informants present to a regular sociological interviewer. A lot of the pain caused by this can be
avoided by giving anonymity to informants to the degree where people they have social 
interaction within one domain (family, work, friends) do not obtain information about the 
informants’ behavior in any other domain. 
Additionally, the AAA (1998) requires of anthropologists to obtain ‘informed consent’ from 
anyone studied. This means the subjects need to know how what their statements will say, 
how they will be used, and have the option to deny the researcher from using material about 
them. I believed before going to Nicaragua, the difference in wealth between the researcher 
and informants might make this especially difficult as informants may put themselves in 
situations which cause them problems later on in order to earn the favor of the researcher. My
experiences with Nicaraguan informants did not raise this issue. If they reported on their own 
poverty, they generally did this knowing this would be published. Most of the time I walked 
around with a professional looking camera with a gigantic microphone, thus communicating 
clearly that what people said to me would be used for something more than just a western 
tourist’s vacation photos. This very often generated questions as who I was and what was the 
final object of my study. When I worked in Managua, I made it very clear to my coworkers that
if they wanted me to not mention them then they just needed to tell me. None of them chose 
to do so. When I mentioned I could use false names, they objected. Carlos Alberto Rocha 
Castro, one of the programmers, commented: “All I’m saying and thinking is GPL4.” The only 
person who seemed surprised I used material about her was Carolina Fonseca Icabalzeta, 
4 GPL refers to the GNU Public License (GPL) which is a software license that allows anyone to use the source code of a 
program however he pleases, as long as he attributes it to the original author and makes any changes done to it publicly 
available.
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who knew exactly what I studied, but did not think t of herself as a possible study object even 
though I, formally interviewed her. I offered to retract her statements, but she did not make 
use of this right. She wanted to add that saying she lives in a dangerous neighborhood 
(something which had been said by her uncle Bayardo José Fonseca Galo and her neighbor 
William Leiva Cardoza) was an exaggeration, and that saying her friend Ninfa Ramos did not 
tell her everything about her political activities would make the FSLN look bad in a way she 
had not intended. She did assure me that none of this would create problems for her. 
In Nicaragua the possibility exists that the research findings might be of interest to a future 
dictatorial regime or a foreign power, who would like to map the power relations within 
Nicaragua at present. It was, therefore, of great importance for me the field notes were stored
in a way which neither of them could get hold of these. None of my informants asked to for 
anonymity and I did not deem it necessary to do so as almost nothing they told me was not 
known to people around them already or would be before the publication date. 
Another common issue is with treating “deep questions within society”(Engelstad 1998, p. 
446). As a research goal this generally refers to the notion a researcher should concentrate 
on problems having a practical use for society at large. It becomes relevant as a question of 
ethics when dealing with problems having a great importance connected to them within the 
society of study, in order not to offend the informants. The nature of the Sandinista movement 
and the FSLN is obviously of great importance for just about all of my Nicaraguan informants. 
Wording any criticism needed to be thought through very carefully. In general, I believe I have 
avoided most problems by making extensive use of quotes by informants to make sure they 
feel their viewpoint has been acknowledged. At this time I am not certain whether it will be 
read extensively by Nicaraguans or whether a Spanish language version will be made 
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although several informants requested that. I thought it a good principle for my own writing 
practice to make sure that if it were read, it could not be easily disputed as being my own 
opinion by Nicaraguans from either ideological camp. 
Other typical conflicts mentioned by AAA (1998); Engelstad (1998), such as not disclosing 
funding sources (I received no funding from anybody to perform this study) or having 
problems of staying objective when analysing one’s ethnographic material due to intimate 
sexual relationships with informants (I did not have any such relationship with any Nicaraguan
at any point in time) I did not expect this to become a problem beforehand and the study 
showed it did not. My not having any sexual relationship with anyone in Nicaragua may at 
times have influenced my research. The phenomenon of foreigners in Nicaragua betraying a 
partner at home with either another foreigner or a Nicaragua was so common my 
non-participation in this was seen as most unusual among some, specifically in León. At one 
point I discovered some activists of the MRS referred to me as El Sacerdote (Eng: the priest) 
and they wondered what was wrong with my sex drive. I believe as a spin-off I heard several 
other rumors about myself which made me look somewhat strange during the rest of my time 
in León. According to one, I would oftentimes speak to myself while walking in the streets at a
rapid pace, only to suddenly turn around and head in the opposite direction at an equally 
rapid pace. The effect of this was limited, as just about all my younger informants lived in 
Managua and not León. In Managua I seldom experienced pressures to engage in sexual 
activity with Nicaraguans. 
Where I stayed
I arrived in Nicaragua on 6 April 2008. For the first month I stayed in the neighborhood of 
Bello Horizonte in Managua, where I rented the garage of a friend of a friend of a friend of 
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mine. The family consisted of the mother, a teacher not particularly fond of any political 
ideology, and her son, a disc jockey who was not involved politically, but who felt closest to 
the MRS. During my stay there, he began dating a Palestinian who had very strong 
Sandinista views. After my first month with them I moved to León, the second largest city in 
Nicaragua, where I stayed downtown in a house owned by Rigo Sampson Davila, a member 
of the FSLN. His father formerly was the mayor of León and currently worked as director of 
the local university. I stayed at Sampson Davila’s house until late August 2008. From 
September 2008 until February 2009 I stayed across the road from Rigo Sampson Davila at 
the house of María Mercedes, a former activist in the struggle against the Sandinistas in the 
1980s who lost two brothers in the fight to protect Nicaragua from the Sandinistas. One 
brother had served as a member of the Guardia Nacional, the other one as a member of the 
Contras. From February 2009 until June 2009 I rented a house with an Austrian civil worker in
a poorer area, San Felipe. The area did not have the same party politics as the center of 
town, but political questions came up nevertheless. During this phase I spent less time in 
León than I had previously. From July until September 2009 I stayed at a hostel in Managua 
and did most of my research there, working with young Sandinistas, and involved myself 
during this time in the production of an information system for the ministry of agriculture. 
My background and points of influence on my fieldwork
In order to understand how I could conduct this study, I believe it is necessary to understand 
who I am. Many of the interviews I made were possible only because I could point to my own 
background, and the way I later analysed the information I would strongly depend on my own 
background. 
I grew up just south of the German-Danish border in the West-German village called Schuby 
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(Danish: Skovby), as a member of the Danish minority in Germany. After a high school 
exchange year in South Carolina, I moved out from my parents home at the age of 18 to live 
closer to the only Danish high school south of the border, in the city of Flensburg. This was in 
the fall of 1998, when the Social Democrats were elected to power in the Germany national 
elections for the first time since 1982. I voted for the minor coalition partner, the Green party, 
but after the elections I became involved in a campaign of the socialist party that grew out of 
the ruling party of East Germany The issue I became involved in concerned a campaign for 
the right of dual-citizenship for Turkish-Germans. It was fairly coincidental that it was the 
socialist party I contacted after I had heard about their campaign on TV, but once I was at the 
local party office to ask the local chapter to participate in the campaign, the party started at a 
national level, I noticed the members, most of whom were as old of my parents, had only two 
students among them, and would listen to my proposals as if I were equal to them. I quickly 
became a member and rose in the ranks. Within half a year I took over the post as head of 
office of the local party headquarters, I became president of the newly founded party youth at 
a national level for a short first term though, and within a little more than a year I became the 
youngest candidate at state elections of Schleswig-Holstein in February 2000. 
During this time my life quickly changed. During weekends I mostly went to visit some party or
party youth chapter somewhere in East Germany, while during the week I spent most of my 
time outside of school on campaigns in Flensburg. Not having been part of the mainstream 
German society in Western German, my experiences in Eastern Germany were – not much 
more than a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall – politically and culturally of utmost 
interest. The positions I would have obtained in our west German local chapter were in the 
Eastern local chapters reserved for party militants of many years' participation. I learned 
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about the many differences in understanding of party democracy, and what it meant for 
people to be connected to the party. Whereas in Western Germany we were nothing but a 
marginal group of radicals, in the East the party represented a fairly large part of the 
population, and a member of the party was not something one needed to hide. I also started 
to learn the skill of analysing power structures within the party, and trying to find hidden 
networks within the party. Even in West Germany, where we had almost no elected 
representation and party-related jobs an extreme amount of time was spent in building secret 
alliances within the party to try to take over certain party-internal posts that were seen as 
important. 
When I graduated high school in the summer of 2000, I felt I already had quite a party-political
career behind me. I moved to Oslo, Norway, where I became employed as a national 
responsible for IT of the Red Electoral Alliance (RV) in early 2001 in preparation for the 2001 
national elections. Within the generally left-socialist party, the Maoist Workers’ Communist 
Party (AKP) – had a well-built network of positions of power within the party. Although the 
party only had representation at regional levels in city councils, the struggle for power within 
the power structure was strong, especially in the Oslo chapter. 
As my German political experience taught me to always be suspicious of nationalist 
movements, I was quite shocked to notice the amount of openly celebrated nationalism and 
flag-waving that happened within the RV. I therefore soon joined the more internationalist, 
“The International Association,” another political group within RV connected to the Ernest 
Mandelist Fourth International with headquarters in Amsterdam. Since then I have been the 
national treasurer of that organisation. 
While the internal party struggles in Germany were time-consuming, in Norway they would for
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periods consume all my free time. The amounts of party-internal power-struggles seemed to 
have no limits in any respect. In 2003 I discovered another Maoist group, ’Serve the People’ 
(TF), had made a list of people they would have to kill in case of a revolution in order to make 
sure the revolution would not derail. Questioning them in public on who would be on the list, it 
became apparent I was a likely candidate to be on the list. 
As there were not many electoral positions to be filled, most RV activists looked for alternative
fields in which to be active. Over the next few years I led a peace alliance at the university, 
became active in the teachers union and student politics and joined numerous other 
organisations such as ATTAC. Everywhere I found the same faces. Everyone knew everyone.
In total I would estimate that possibly 100 revolutionary activists were controlling most 
Norwegian organisations, most of which were directly connected to RV, the Trozkyite 
International Socialist Organisation (ISO) or the Socialist Left Party’s Youth (SU). While an 
organisation struggling for some social good or other would appear as independent to the 
outsider – including social scientists, who studied the organisations due to their fascination 
with why we would invest so much time fighting for such things – all these organisations were 
more or less directly coordinated by those 100 revolutionaries. They were not controlled by a 
central leadership which gave out orders, but rather by the same people who worked together
numerous other occasions, read many of the same books, knew about one-another’s opinions
and preferences and built up an informal, but complex system of cooperation through 
compromises. A new person, entering an organisation would not know about this, and would 
generally not have a chance with any proposal if it went contrary to an already agreed-upon 
compromise. 
During my fieldwork in Douglas, AZ in 2004 I became familiar with Latin American politics. I 
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stayed at the encampment of Andrés Manuel López Obrador the fall of 2006 in Mexico City 
and also in Oaxaca during the teacher-led uprising of the same period. I then travelled to 
Nicaragua where I arrived shortly after the FSLN Sandinista victory of that same year. 
In London I met with some anarchists I had met in Oaxaca and I lived with an anarchist girl in 
Hackney during my fieldwork preparation. Different from both Germany and Norway, there 
was not a central party that all the radicals flocked around, and the activity of preparing the 
occupation of houses to live in as well as various camps based on social issues seemed very 
different from what I knew before. 
How did my experiences influence my experience of Nicaragua? For one thing, I was 
extremely aware of the possibility that things were said, not because they were true, but due 
to tactical considerations. In Norway, I saw what we said to the press were just ways to 
express a tactical nature., I had an understanding of the possibility of party-internal power 
struggles. I knew the practice of creating fronts for some social cause or other that were 
formally not connected to the party, but were quite directly controlled by the same few radical 
activists who controlled just about everything. 
All this also existed in Nicaragua, although in somewhat different ways. The FSLN had actual 
positions of state power lacking in Europe and it had united most things under it. The MRS 
was working quite independently from it during the time of my fieldwork. This was different 
from Norway, where many of the front organisations would have activists from different 
parties/organisations. 
I realised many times when discussing my findings with other social scientists in Nicaragua 
that their understanding of the situation was very different from mine, as they would generally 
see any dealings that were not completely out in the open as undemocratic, and in general 
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they would be shocked when I explained how some circumstance or other was not quite as 
simple as their interview partner had tried to make them believe. 
Had I not had the background, I may also have seen the practice of tricking Europeans or 
outsiders as a Nicaraguan cultural pattern rather than a general feature of organisation, the 
way some Nicaraguan informants did it themselves, by pointing to the tale of the Güegüense 
(see also: Field 1999) as describing a part of Nicaraguan cultural.
My background additionally meant I would have a different focus of my studies in terms of 
who I would look at. While some working more journalistically, might have tried to set up 
interviews with a few top FSLN leaders, and anthropologists without my background have 
talked to ordinary people who simply saw themselves as Sandinistas, my focus was on party 
activists. This was out of the experience that party activists were those who actually moved 
the politics or he party, while party leaders generally just tried to forge compromises between 
different internal party factions. I also spoke to people on the ground, far away from any 
decision making processes, and made sure to keep up relations to neighbors and ordinary 
people and to hear their views on day-to-day politics, but it was not the main arena of 
investigation. When speaking of MRS Sandinistas, FSLN Sandinistas or Liberals, these are in
their majority political activities and activists (of which there seem to be extraordinarily many 
in Nicaragua). 
My background likely consequences on the way I conducted my fieldwork. Many times 
informants asked about my own background, likely in order to be able to better categorise me 
and at times it was not enough to say that I was an anthropologist from Europe as the 
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informants wanted to know my personal interest in the subject matter. In these situations I 
talked some of my own history as an activist. For informants who had a history of being 
activists this seemed to work better than for those informants without such a background. 
Consequently, it was much easier for me to obtain information from activists. My selection of 
good informants was also limited in part due to this fact.
Due to changes in my practice during my time in Nicaragua, the way I perceived different 
groups may also have been somewhat skewed. At the time when I investigated the MRS, I 
had only recently arrived in the country. It took some time until I noticed they had told me lies 
(which they considered as such) on just about every subject. I therefore recorded very many 
lies on their part. The fact they told me so many false things may also directly relate to them 
perceiving me as a new arrival from Europe with relatively little knowledge of the country. 
When later I talked mostly to FSLN Sandinistas, I had a much better feel for when certain 
typical tourist lies were about to be presented and with a few words on my part that showed I 
had been in the country for a considerable period already, I managed to avert many false 
statements. Oftentimes the person start over, and tell me a version of events which fit better 
with my level of knowledge. Altogether, FSLN Sandinistas came across as more truthful. 
Is my perspective therefore Euro-centric? Clearly my background influenced what I would 
record. Had I been a female journalist from Japan, I would likely have found other points of 
investigation than what I did. Had I been Nicaraguan, I would also have seen many things 
differently. I would likely have understood some things more intuitively, but I would also not 
have had certain freedoms – such as asking people to tell me things from the ground up. I 
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would possibly also have been restrained in what I could say be pressures from my family, 
future work opportunities, etc.. 
My initial blunders
Just as anyone who enters the field for the first time, I did not do everything right from the 
start, and I made some assumptions based on my earlier research that turned out not to 
make sense under the given conditions. One of the main things I did understand was how the 
political discourse and the relationship between news media and political groups in Nicaragua
worked. I did not understand that at times things were said as part of a tactical game. I 
investigated the MRS party for several months in the beginning before I understood very few 
Sandinistas felt represented by them. I did not include most of that material in this thesis 
when I decided to put the research focus on the FSLN. 
With time it became easier for me to distinguish when statements were made out of tactical 
concerns and when they represented the speaker’s real opinion. When an informant told me 
one of the tactically planted stories, I immediately interrupted and quickly explained how the 
point he was currently making did not correspond to other facts I had already discovered and 
even greater distortion on his part would have made it impossible for him to admit his error 
without losing face. With this I demonstrated, I was not just a tourist with little to no knowledge
about Nicaraguan reality. Some would then react by telling me another tactically planted story,
but at least as soon as I had interrupted the informant a second time and pointed to the 
disconnect from reality,5 the conversation would start over with a more realistic approach. 
Arguably I could not have avoided going through a phase of learning about the nature of 
5 I do here not mean to judge the opinions or intelligence of my informants. In these cases both the informant and me 
would generally agree that his or her initial description constituted a lie or simplification that were told assuming that I 
was an unknowing outsider at a later stage. That the informant would be well aware of the falseness of it, would 
generally be something readily admitted by everybody around.
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tactically planted stories, and they do say a great deal about the nature of the contact 
between Nicaraguans and many foreigners, which generally is of a temporary nature. In many
occasions none of this had to do with me – the same stories were told internationally at 
conferences, and just about anywhere in Europe or the United States when talking to people 
with some knowledge about Nicaragua, it were these same stories that were told over and 
over. Those of my informants who were FSLN activists generally claimed it was part of a 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) tactic to destabilise the country by spreading stories against
the government. That may be true in some cases, but does not explain why members of all 
political groups were engaged in this activity. 
Representativeness of groups
It has been questioned whether my choice of groups and individuals to interview was 
justifiable when looking at their size. This is often-times a difficulty for anthropologists, given 
the focus on qualitative rather than quantitative aspects. When I talk about FSLN Sandinistas,
then I am not principally not concerned with the roughly 40% of Nicaraguans who voted for 
the FSLN in the elections since 1990, but rather the activists who run this party. Without doubt
their numbers are smaller, but especially in the case of León, political participation in one way 
or other seems to be important for wide parts of the population. Those I spoke to had mostly 
long-term organisational experience at least at a regional level. This often indicated higher 
education than the Nicaraguan average and often experiences with international exchanges. 
Both the groups Los Amigos and those who had studied in East Germany belong to the FSLN
activist base at this level. 
The number of MRS activists in León was much smaller during my time there. Maybe three to
five people sat in their office on a daily basis and at maximum 15 people ever congregated at 
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the same time, while probably at least 100 times as many FSLN Sandinistas had 
organisational posts somewhere in town. The FSLN was in power and it was somewhat more 
prestigious to work with them than the MRS. Also, I discovered the MRS had certain internal 
disagreements which meant that a large part of their followers would not come to the office. 
Nevertheless in this light, staying with the MRS 4 of 18 months – equivalent to 22% of my 
time in Nicaragua – it could look as if I put too much focus on them. If one looks at their 
6.29% presidential election results from 2006 – equivalent to 14.21% of the total Sandinista 
vote – this would seem to justify the amount of time spent with them. 
The project of SIMAS/free software movement/MAGFOR has to be seen as a particular case 
of professionals, many of which had strong Sandinista leanings. Obviously, going into any 
particular office or area – say I had instead gone into the administration of the social security 
administration or the mayorship of any particular town – could always be portrayed as very 
particular and not representative of anything beyond themselves. This is of course true and I 
tried to avoid this by not focusing on anything particular to these groups. It must also be 
highlighted that the amount of professionals working at this level is very limited in Nicaragua. I
have not encountered concrete numbers, but my own estimate would be that it is under 5% of
the population, a number still much higher than the total number of MRS activists in the 
country. And given the capacity they have, I do believe their decision making power is not 
insignificant during the current phase of Sandinismo and they are an important group to look 
at when trying to decipher the Sandinismo of today. 
With the focus of the thesis on the FSLN, I did not use most of the material I collected about 
either MRS or professionals. 
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
Quite a lot has been written on Nicaragua and the Sandinista movement since the triumph of 
the revolution in 1979. After I returned from Nicaragua the first time, I researched everything I 
could find in Europe. Other works I did not find before returning to Nicaragua. The literature of
Nicaragua in the 1980s and in the post-Sandinista years has served as a background in 
getting an idea of what significance Sandinismo was like in those periods and what issues 
were important for Nicaragua. I cannot argue much with them as they describe historical 
periods quite different from the current one. Literature that describes the Sandinista II 
Nicaragua is somewhat more limited, yet I have tried to the extent it was possible to engage 
with it. 
Historical studies on Nicaraguan politics and ideologies
David E. Whisnant (1995), who holds a PhD in American Literature, wrote a long history of 
Nicaragua from the time of the European conquest to the 1990s, focusing mainly on the role 
of culture during the different times – a theme which, it must be noted, was left out of this 
thesis even though I do not try to hide the cultural realm which seems to be of particular 
importance to many Nicaraguans. In the view of Whisnant, the cultural sphere was neglected 
during the time of Somoza, when US American influence through print media and TV had 
almost free rein in Nicaragua. This domination in the cultural domain was of particular 
importance to some Nicaraguans who later on, in the FSLN administration of the 1980s tried 
to make up for it by putting extra emphasis on this aspect. However, due to the war efforts 
organised by the United States which took on an aspect of public relation management 
against any political effort made by the Nicaraguan government and which made the access 
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to funding extremely difficult, as well as problems with cultural differences between 
Nicaraguan East and West coasts, as well as ingrained gender role models and arrogance on
the part of Sandinista leaders towards other ethnic groups, in the 1980s Nicaragua 
experienced neglect and discontent in the cultural arena. Nevertheless, the elections of 1990 
meant a clear step backward for Whisnant, who believes the arts and women suffered during 
the times of cutbacks in the late 1980s and even more with the loss of government power in 
1990. 
The philosopher Hodges (1986) seeks to investigate the true origins of Sandinismo in the 
writings of Sandino. The material he has to work with is rather small and in the end he seems 
to have to resort to assumptions – some of which are the same ones used by some of my 
Nicaraguan informants today, if they wish to argue for a Sandino heavily influenced by 
Marxism and anarchism through his experiences in Mexico. According to Hodges, Sandino 
was ideologically influenced by both these groups, yet disagreed with them on much strategy 
and tried to use both patriots and “extremists” to achieve his short- and longterm goals 
(Hodges 1986, pp. 88-99). In the second part of his book, Hodges presents the Sandinismo 
after Sandino and how they incorporated the ideas of Sandino. Hodges (1986, pp. 161-173) 
explains how this task was not uncontroversial, and that the taking of Sandino's name was 
not given from the beginning. While giving a detailed overview of Sandinista history up to his 
time, Hodges explains how the Sandinistas in reality were not only influenced by Sandino, but
also by international groups from Maoists to Cuban revolutionaries and Leninists and how 
they sought to fuse the ideas of all of these back into the original Sandino. Hodges sees 
Sandinismo as split into two versions at his time: a popular Sandinismo built upon Sandino 
(which is compatible with certain types of Christianity), and an FSLN-lead Sandinismo that 
builds upon internationalism and which is not supported by many groups who claim which 
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claim they have betrayed Sandino (Hodges 1986: 293-298).
The political scientist Cruz (2005) compares Nicaraguan and Costa Rican political systems 
and political cultures over the centuries. The central claim of the book is that political culture 
in the two countries “Crucially affected democracy’s chances and the way that democracy 
actually works” Cruz (2005, p. 20). In the case of Nicaragua, she notes several important 
political phenomenon have historically occurred and still do so to this day. One of the more 
important factors that seems to be of importance currently is the role of the press/media, 
which she notes already in the 19th century during certain periods to have been very partisan 
in the internal conflicts of the country and not restraining itself from cliticizing those in power 
while at other times those involved in critical media have suffered severe persecution. This 
seems similar to the relationship between the newspaper La Prensa and the Somoza regime 
in the 1960s and 1970s, when the paper was very critical to the sitting regime until the editor 
Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal was killed in 1978 under mysterious circumstances. Also 
during the current regime, the two printed newspapers are extremely critical of president 
Ortega Saavedra. 
Another important factor that can explain some of the current understanding is the role “pacts”
between the leaders of powerful groups have in Nicaraguan history. While Cruz portrays 
Nicaraguan history as for more than a century including groups that for a long time had 
seemingly irreconcilable positions. These were oftentimes resolved through political 
negotiations by the leaders of these groups. As Cruz explains, the popular idea of such pacts 
has been that these had negative effects for the general population. Cruz believes the 
historical Nicaraguan understanding of terms such as “negotiations” and “pacts” were what 
led Contra leaders in the late 1980s/1990 to avoid the word “negotiations” to describe the 
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peace talks which evolved. It also explains why the MRS insists on naming the cooperation 
on certain issues between Ortega Saavedra and former president José Arnoldo Alemán 
Lacayo a “pact”. 
Dore (2006) focuses on the development of capitalism and land distribution in the village 
Diriomo near the city of Granada in the early 20th century. According to her, the patterns of 
ownership of landed property and labor exploitation prohibited the development of capitalism 
rather than furthering it. She believes that the consequences were far-reaching, and among 
other things it lead to the Sandinistas under-estimating the importance of handing out land 
during the 1980s and that they were caught up in trying to improve labor rights for agricultural 
workers. The Sandinistas simply misunderstood the extent of capitalist development which 
took place, in her view, and did not sufficiently recognise the feudalistic aspects present in the
agricultural sector. Dore also looks upon several other areas that were not directly class 
related, such as the early disappearance of indigenous structures in western Granada, in 
comparison with other parts of Latin America, and the importance that the patriarchic 
ownership models had in forming Diriomo society. 
Studies of Nicaraguan democracy
L. E. Anderson (2006) looks at the power relation between Nicaraguan the legislature and the
presidency during the past few decades. He claims the Nicaraguan executive has world-wide 
power. He favors more legislative power and uses this as a measurement of how good the 
democracy in the country works. His main findings can be summed up as follows: Under 
Somoza, the presidency was extremely strong. Under the Sandinistas of the 1980s, the 
presidency was very strong, but Ortega Saavedra governed in part through strong 
revolutionary popular support. Although the Sandinistas benefited from the strong executive, 
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they gave more power to the legislative through the Constitution of 1987. Torres de Chamorro
announced that she would give more power to the Legislative, but when she came to power, 
she had many other things to take care of initially (and lacked the support in parliament). 
Later she was not interested in change as she made good use of her powers. The 
Constitutional reform of 1995, agreed upon by two thirds of parliament but not signed by 
Chamorro, gave more power to parliament and limited the possibilities for those representing 
the executive to run in consecutive elections. Alemán Lacayo then changed the Constitution 
to give himself further powers, but had to buy this support by compromising with the FSLN. 
This meant he had to give up on some of his neoliberal reforms as well as his plan of stopping
the 2000 municipal elections. Bolaños Geyer did not try to extend his powers, and formed a 
pact with the Sandinistas in organising a march to parliament to get it to remove the immunity 
Alemán Lacayo enjoyed so that he could be tried. Anderson sees Bolaños Geyer and Torres 
de Chamorro as the two presidents least interested in expanding their own power – possibly 
due to their background from Nicaraguan Conservatism – while he sees Ortega Saavedra 
and Alemán Lacayo as most interested in expanding their powers. Anderson concludes that 
Nicaraguan democracy has been improving in recent years and he also sees as a positive 
trait that Nicaragua regularly sees strikes and has laws that favor strikers in comparison to 
other Latin American countries. 
Anderson wrote before the return of Ortega Saavedra to power, and given his views of what 
constitutes better democracy, he may see developments in recent years as rather negative. In
the period 2007–11, Ortega Saavedra largely governed around the national assembly, and 
prior to 2011, Ortega Saavedra changed the Constitution through reinterpretation to give him 
the right to run in the 2011 elections. 
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Revolution studies
After the FSLN won the revolution in 1979, Nicaragua was the site of many anthropologists 
investigating a concrete revolution throughout the 1980s. A number of anthropological studies
were conducted on the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) and the Sandinista 
movement. Three documentary films show the early years of the revolution and the 
experiences of individual members of society: one on the experience of the revolution, one on
the literacy campaign, and one on the FSLN and the Contras (Schultz 1980; Tercer Cine 
1981a; Tercer Cine 1981b). Enriquez (1997) explored how certain collectivisation programs 
worked better than other agrarian programs under FSLN rule to make the farmers identify 
with the FSLN and its project for transition. 
The anthropologist Ekern (1987) experienced the 1984 election campaign in León and 
observed how the Leonese inhabitants related to the ongoing revolution. He put much 
emphasis on studying the organising efforts around the CDSes and the strong role women 
had in these. He seems to have a rather critical view of the power relations between 
revolutionary leaders and general populace. Most jobs are only short-term jobs and Ekern 
believes this means that state employees feel obligated to support the FSLN leaders in 
power. He portrays a revolutionary Nicaragua in which women are the stable and stick to one 
place and men who move on from house to house and city to city while staying with different 
women at different times. Political mobilisation on the streets takes a central stage in directing
politics. Both of these circumstances still seems to be of relevance during the current 
Sandinista administration, and from the reports of the period in-between, this also seems the 
case. 
The anthropologist Lancaster (1988) looked at the relationship between class consciousness 
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and religion in the revolutionary period. He noticed a distinction between the wealthy, who 
followed the conservatives leaders on higher levels within the Catholic church who advocated 
non-intervention in political affairs, and the revolutionary poor who followed an idea of 
liberation theology, according to which faith in Christ required social-justice activism. These 
findings Lancaster (1988, p. 28) believed to already be well documented in other 
Latin-American literature, and while he basically agreed with them, he felt they did not quite 
explain the complexity of religious divisions sufficiently. Through an anthropological study of 
several Managua neighborhoods, he asserted that the historically new revolutionary class 
consciousness, and with it the legitimacy of Sandinismo, was based not primarily a direct 
import in the form of Marxism or liberation theology from other countries nor something 
entirely new. He found that it was much in line with Catholicism as it was practiced in 
Nicaragua before the advent of liberation theology, as Nicaraguan saints represented a 
tradition of helping the oppressed – though with more of a focus on peasants and workers 
rather than indigenous groups as is the in many other Latin American countries (Lancaster 
1988, pp. 37–38). 
The anthropologists Bourgois (1986) and Hale (1987) displayed how the Miskito minority and 
the black population were heavily recruited by the CIA for an insurgency against the 
Sandinistas. These groups live mainly on the Nicaraguan east coast in the two 
semi-independent regiones autónomas and its members are generally subject to even higher 
levels of material deprivation than the general population. The study of these areas is quite 
apart from the study of the central and Spanish speaking part of Nicaraguan, and focused on 
the bilingual language situation and patterns of their internal organisation. 
Another subject of a lot of attention in literature on the Sandinista revolution was the reform of
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the health care system as part of the revolutionary process (Donahue 1989; Ripp 1984; 
Garfield 1984; Bossert 1984; Williams 1984). This subject also now receives attention. Ripp 
(1984) suggested that from a Marxist viewpoint, the study of the health care systems can 
serve as a replacement for participant observation among just a handful of informants, as the 
analysis of the class antagonisms within the health care system will automatically say 
something about class relations in society. These lines of thought may be what made it 
popular to study individual aspects of Sandinismo rather than the phenomenon as a whole. 
Furthermore some research in related studies were produced using anthropological methods. 
Hoyt (1997) had observed Nicaragua starting in the 1960s and 1970s. She wrote on the 
changes in the Sandinista view of democracy. Before the insurrection, they saw elections for 
parliament as not needed, then in the early 1980s as needed for tactical reasons and finally 
some years later as a necessary part of a truly democratic society. She also saw a change in 
the role institutions of participative democracy had in the Sandinista view: While they initially 
saw them as a way to spread the politics of the Sandinista leadership, by the late 1980s they 
realised that they needed to be controlled by the local citizens who they were supposed to 
represent. 
A work I discovered much too late, which would have been very useful in preparing me for 
Nicaragua is the book Nicaragua by Walker and Wade (2011). Walker published previous 
versions under the same title and other books on Nicaragua since the early 1980s. Their 
study was conducted within the Latin America sciences and is written in an extremely 
readable journalistic style. The perspective of Dependency of Nicaragua to the United States 
this study is presents is very much the same way I see the relationship. For obvious reasons, 
the authors have a much closer personal relation to the Nicaragua of the 1980s than me. For 
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me, the 1980s is a backdrop to the current events, whereas for them the focus lies in this 
period, although they accurately describe the history since then. 
Post-Sandinista studies
In the following years, a number of works on Nicaraguan politics were published. Most of this 
concerns the period of time between the Sandinista governments. The period was labelled 
‘Post-Sandinista’ when it was not known that the Sandinistas would return to power. A lot of 
this has to do with new types of social movements and the sense of destructiveness of this 
period. 
The first of this type is the anthropologist Field (1999) who wrote on the changing meaning of 
the popular play El Güegüense. The play originated in colonial times and was about travelling 
Nicaraguan merchants who convince a Spanish official they were rich and how they arrange a
marriage with his daughter. During the 1980s Sandinismo, the play was reinterpreted as being
about anti-imperialism and after 1990 it was again reinterpreted, this time as being about the 
central part that false play had in Nicaraguan politics. 
Prevost and Vanden (1997) give through a series of essays an update to the international 
audience of what has happened in Nicaragua after 1990, when the amount of literature 
written in the social sciences on Nicaragua declined rapidly. Their view, like most others, is 
that Nicaraguan lived under rapidly deteriorating conditions and with a revolutionary past 
faded into the background. The authors believe the 1990 elections were a significant step 
back from empowering Nicaraguans and building up of democracy. Three additional articles 
by Richard Stahler-Sholk, Cynthia Chavez Matoyer and Pierre M. La Ramée/Erica G. Polakoff
describe how the struggles to keep the post-Sandinista government from putting through their
harshest plans of structural adjustment at least in part succeeded: the status women achieved
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during the 1980s and their decline after the 1990s elections and the decline of popular 
organisations (although these have not been done away with completely). 
Another often-read anthropologist of this type is Babb, who wrote about the situation of 
Nicaraguan women and the imagery of revolution in the post-revolutionary period (Babb 2001;
Babb 2004). In “Recycled Sandalistas” she focused on poor households in Managua in the 
1990s, when government programs to help these were rolled back. Babb concluded that the 
consequences were very different for men and women. Women were forced back to the 
household, to take care of children and family and were actively discouraged from 
participating in the wage labor workforce. She showed how some women are able to fight 
back. She compared the situation with that of other post-revolutionary regimes. Generally, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) instituted the same program as imposed on many other 
Latin American countries, but with harsher consequences for the general population (Babb 
2004, pp. 35–36). Many of those who worked in the public sector saw themselves forced to 
work in the informal economy. That oftentimes meant setting up a store in their home, 
especially for women who stayed at home to watch the children (Babb 2004, p. 36). 
Simultaneously, what Babb (2004, p. 36) called ‘still mobilised mass-organisations,’ groups 
she obviously believed would fade away with time, managed to win concessions in 
negotiations with the Liberal governments. In this connection Babb (2004, p. 37) focused on 
how the Sandinista women’s organisation Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenes Luisa 
Amanda Espinoza (AMNLAE) lost support from some sectors, and how a new penal code in 
1992 obliged women who were pregnant due to rape, to give birth to the child, and outlawed 
homosexuality. Babb described a dysfunctional society and combined it with discourses on 
development and how the fundamental premise under the Nicaraguan discourse at the time 
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was that the country was in pain. Those from poor households related this much more to their
own lives than an abstract entity (Babb 2004, pp. 175–202). As she saw it, non-partidarian 
movements were about to start growing out of the rubble of neoliberalism, including, peace, 
environmental and indigenous organisations in what she saw as an “altered national context 
[that] supported more pluralist approaches” (Babb 2004, pp. 203–239). 
Much in line with the same line of thinking, but decidedly more politically, the anthropologist 
Rodgers (2008, p. 79) declares that “there can be little doubt that Sandinismo as a political 
ideology is quite unequivocally ‘dead’.” As evidence for this conclusion, he lists that “the upper
echelons of the [FSLN] … have venally integrated themselves into the elite that has ruled 
Nicaragua since 1990.” Rodgers explains that the Sandinista leaders have integrated fully into
the general Nicaraguan political and economical elite and that seems to make the Sandinista 
political ideology meaningless, or ‘dead.’ Nevertheless, as we know the FSLN continues to 
obtain election results at the level of or better than in 1990, and the marches organised by 
FSLN activists continue to have support from a sizable part of the population, so it appears 
that not every Nicaraguan shares Rodger’s view on this. Rodgers (2008, pp. 77–78) explains 
at length that he was personally frustrated when he came to Nicaragua as a young leftist in 
1996, given the lack of revolutionary spirit in Nicaragua at the time. Rodgers is now strongly 
opposed to president Ortega Saavedra, whom he accuses of owning a hotel chain and 
possible other big businesses (Arsenault 2011). 
The destructive perspective seems similar to what many political commentators, including 
Amin (1990) thought at the time, when he argued that the goal of national independence as a 
common theme which could be used to gain political support throughout the third world were 
exhausted by 1990. He also believed a lot of the subsequent movements would treat single 
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issues, again much in line with Babb (2004). According to Amin (1990) this was not so much 
an expression of the end of more fundamental criticisms of the system, but it meant that 
national liberation in itself was not a goal that would reach far enough for the masses. It would
still be capitalism and the notion of exploitation these new movements tried to confront, even 
though they only did so in isolated cases. Given this perspective, the time of party politics did 
not come completely to an end, but had to be readjusted to the new subjectively experienced 
necessities of the peoples of the South. 
The political scientist Selbin (1993) gives a somewhat more positive picture in his comparison
of the Nicaraguan revolution with other Latin American revolutions. Writing in 1993, it seemed
for him that the Nicaraguan revolution had made some fundamental changes to the 
Nicaraguan state and society that could not be changed back to the way they were before the
revolution, and these changes were being defended against the onslaught of right-wing 
governments. It must be noted that he wrote earlier than many of those who showed more 
pessimistic perspectives. 
The political scientist Wright (1995) does not have as negative a view of the future of 
Sandinismo. He wrote a detailed political history of Nicaragua since the time of earthquake of 
Managua in 1972 and until the 1990s and the split between MRS and FSLN. In his view, one 
of the main problems of the Sandinistas during the 1980s was that it tried to make the 
peasants adhere to what Sandinista leaders saw as what their demands should be, according
to radical theory, instead of trying to adjust their own program to the political demands of the 
peasants. The Sandinista interpretation of Marxist theory was such that it differed from more 
orthodox approaches in several ways. According to Wright, it was the interpretation Carlos 
Fonseca Amador delivered that allowed for a mixed economy, open elections (with the 
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participation of bourgeoisie elements) and that these could be combined with participative 
democracy. This was, at least in part, because according to Wright, Foncesa Amador thought 
the national bourgeoisie had outplayed its political role already, that a phase of national 
bourgeoisie hegemony was not needed, and that Somoza was not more than the 
representation of international capital (Wright 1995, pp. 211-212). Wright saw that after the 
elections of 1990s the future was at least possibly positive – the errors made by the FSLN 
could be revised and he thought it possible that at a future time, the FSLN could again take 
up the work of a revolutionary force which spoke for the interests of peasants and proletariat 
(Wright 1995, pp. 243-244). At times Wright seems to write more like he is on a political 
mission of reforming the FSLN rather than viewing them as a social scientist, therefore, at 
times it is difficult to differentiate between the two parts in his writings. In his conclusion he 
seems to speak more out of political interest rather than as the result of a scientific study of 
Nicaraguan politics. Nevertheless, he was one of the few who predicted a return of 
Sandinismo to a position of state power.
The view of failed agricultural policy is shared by anthropologist and historian Montoya 
(2007), who looked at the ideological construction of an agricultural cooperative in a 
perspective of socialist state formation in the 1980s, collecting stories from peasants in a 
village that had been celebrated as exemplary during that period. Different from Wright, she 
sees this from the peasant perspective according to how it was conceptualised as when 
compared to the ideals of Sandinismo. She also explains how they felt the peasants were 
being harmed by the Sandinista government through their policies that were not always in 
their interest. Montaya (2003) also looks at how gender role persisted in the 1980s, and how 
the gender equality that was spoken about so much, in reality suffered because the 
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Sandinista project was executed in a way favoring men, and at many times it was left open for
men to interpret how revolutionary policies were to be carried out in practice.
The study of health care continued from the Sandinista period, though rather than looking at 
the build-up of the health care system, the focus was on its break-down, looking at such 
things as the abolition of ‘therapeutic abortion’ mentioned above and the preparations to 
remove it (McNaughton, Blandon, and Altamirano 2002; McNaughton, Mitchell, and Blandon 
2004). Another focus of study was land rights following the revolution (Abu-Lughod 2000; 
Everingham 2001). Everingham (2001) wrote on changing property rights in Nicaragua after 
the electoral defeat in 1990. In his perspective, the privatisation of lands after 1990 were done
in a way that favored certain influential groups. Further, this made land disputes in the 
following years inevitable, and made the poor even poorer. It also prevented the full 
establishment of democracy (Everingham 2001, p. 34). He looked at the specifics of 
Nicaraguan law and the history of the various decrees that ordered the expropriation of land 
in the 1980s (Everingham 2001, pp. 63–65). His conclusion, possibly inspired by a politically 
Liberal viewpoint, was that the head of states and international political experts were right in 
arguing that the level of uncertainty of property held, was the most important factor in 
determining the overall level of poverty of peasants within a society and which made 
Nicaragua stand out particularly badly (Everingham 2001, pp. 83–84). 
Similar studies about various aspects of the perceived breakdown of society were written by 
Rodgers (2008) about the horrific lives of the members of street gangs in Managua. Metoyer 
(2000) focused on women’s organisations, and Quesada (1998) focused on embodiments. 
Field (1998) focused on the rebirth of indigenous identities in western Nicaragua. Tatar (2005)
claims to show that the FSLN never really represented the insurrectionist movement of 
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1978/79. Lundgren (2000) looked at those who received professional education during the 
Sandinista regime and how they negotiate their previous alignment with the FSLN in times of 
neoliberalism when these were frowned upon and Lancaster (1992) wrote on the continuing 
existence of gender stereotypes and class relations in the late 1980s/early 1990s which he 
portrayed as a nightmarish time of violence both in the inner-personal relations and at a 
systemic level. 
When Lancaster (1991) wrote about Nicaraguan perceptions of skin colors, he traced the 
origins of the existing categories (and the difference that exists vis-a-vis popular perceptions 
in the United States) back to colonialism rather than to Sandinismo. The anthropological study
of the Miskito could be conducted somewhat apart from this national context, possibly due to 
the physical distance from Managua, language differences and that Sandinismo not being 
popular in the 1980s among the Miskitos. Jamieson (2002) wrote about the importance of 
ownership of the equipment to catch sea bob in a little village in the Laguna Perla in the early 
1990s in determining differences in wealth, without mentioning whether and how the change 
of government in 1990 or the existence of the Sandinista movement had for such class 
relations. Studies in related subjects did include the national reality and Sandinismo, though 
somewhat more distantly than any of the studies on the mestizo parts of Nicaragua. Hooker 
(2005), who has a PhD in government studies, mentioned Sandinismo as one of three 
mestizo-nationalist (anti-Miskito) ideologies. According to her, the first such ideology had been
‘vanguardism’ of the 1930s, which celebrated Spanish ancestry. She placed Sandinismo in 
the 1960, as an ideology that celebrated Amer-Indian origins. As current ideology of the 
1990s, she saw ‘mestizo multiculturalism’ – an ideology that emphasised multiculturalism, but 
also the hierarchical nature of ethnic relations, with ethnic mestizos as the most important 
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group. Freeland (2003), a Linguist who wrote on bilingual education among Miskitos, briefly 
mentioned Sandinismo, but only as a backdrop to the history of the institution of current 
education laws. In all cases, it would have been unthinkable had these studies been 
conducted on the Nicaraguan west coast, to not include the change of power in 1990 in their 
explanations. 
Relevance of studies done in the time of previous governments under current 
circumstances
Studies such as the above formed the preparation of my fieldwork. It was clear I would not 
find the country in process of neoliberal self-destruction, yet given that most of these studies 
were conducted only a few years in the past, I expected them to still be more or less relevant. 
I quickly noticed that gigantic changes had taken place. There was not the plethora of 
different independent social movements which Amin (1990); Babb (2004) had predicted. 
Although a rather large number of formally independent theme based organisations existed, I 
quickly understood they were always related to party politics. The connections were not 
always immediately obvious, and many times the ‘political line’ was to deny any party 
connection. Other times the connection was concealed from some of the participants at a 
lower level. Yet, it could always be found if one was insistent. Most organisations that 
declared themselves independent, were linked to the FSLN. I also discovered such groups 
connected to the Partido de Resistencia Nicaragüense (PRN, the party of the former Contras)
and the MRS. 
The idea that times had changed is not uncontroversial. Many social scientists side quite 
explicitly with the MRS in their views of current Nicaraguan politics. Rodgers (2008) published
his article describing a breakdown of society with fast shifting priorities, based on fieldworks in
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1996/97 and 2002/03, and in 2008 when Ortega Saavedra was in power again. Nevertheless,
Rodgers was certain no greater change had taken place or would take place. Rodgers (2008, 
p. 96) finished his article with a look back at the 1980s, seeing good and bad, using a quote of
Sergio Ramírez, presenting Ramírez as a “noted Nicaraguan author and Vice-president of 
Nicaragua between 1984 and 1990”. Additionally, Ramírez was one of the founders of the 
MRS in 1994 and its presidential candidate in 1996 and he continues to be at odds with the 
Ortega Saavedra government. It just so happens, that the MRS represents a view that the 
current FSLN government has not made any advances. 
On the July 6–12 2009 the Institute for Latin American Studies of the Free University of Berlin 
held a conference entitled “30 years Sandinista Revolution: Retrospective and present of a 
transnational movement” sponsored by the Fritz-Thyssen foundation (connected to the 
German company ThyssenKrupp). The MRS was directly represented through Participants 
Hugo Torres and Hector Mairena, while no-one from the FSLN was present. The remaining 
speakers, German and foreign, all represented more or less directly the views of the MRS. 
When asked why no-one from the FSLN or at least representing one of the many views 
present inside the FSLN was present, I was told that it was simply impossible to find such a 
person. 
Relations between Miskitos and Sandinistas changed markedly from the 1980s, with 
Sandinistas gaining much more support on the east coast than previously. I went to the east 
coast only once, a trip during which I was able to interview representatives of the FSLN in 
Laguna Perla and Bluefields who were in power. The trip gave me more insight into the 
current state of relations as it helped my formation of a general analysis of the current 
Sandinista scheme. Among other things, the FSLN representatives in Laguna Perla now 
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believe their main problem of gaining local support is with mestizos as the party has gotten 
the image of being the party of indigenous and Miskito in this area. 
The situation in land rights was quite different from what researchers encountered just a few 
years earlier in that some land was again given out, although not on the same scale as in the 
1980s. Many unresolved issues exist from those years, including much confusion about who 
is actually the owner of any property due to changing property rights and interpretations of 
laws by the various governments. Political deals made around the handing over of power by 
the Sandinistas to Barrios Torres de Chamorro were still used to explain the repartition of land
by the government. Studies on land rights are highly informative and relevant in 
understanding today’s situation. The confusion I witnessed, tended to favor the poor rather 
than the rich land owner during the second Sandinista period. 
Nevertheless, my findings in the area of economics is that real-life changes that have taken 
place since the FSLN came to power are much smaller than what either Liberals or 
Sandinistas try to make of it. In some aspects the frustration with the FSLN and the world as a
whole, has even grown since 2006 among those of my informants who believed in immediate 
changes. Studying certain parts of society, many of the observations made by previous 
anthropologists will likely still apply. 
Sandinista II studies
The second period of Sandinismo starting in 2006 has received less study than the previous 
period. The studies I found are those of European Master Degree candidates. I did not 
encounter any anthropologists with a doctorate nor US American higher degree students 
conducting studies of Sandinismo in Nicaragua after 2007. The study that came closest is that
of Gooren (2010), who was in Nicaragua in 2005–06 and who focused on Ortega Saavedra’s 
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election campaign of 2006 and looks specifically at the religious aspects of it. This is a field of 
which I have much less knowledge. The part of his study that focused on more general 
aspects of the election are the same ones mentioned by the international media and which in 
Nicaraguan politics form the propaganda of the MRS: Explaining that there is an alliance 
between Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) and FSLN known as ‘el pacto’ to split all 
positions of power between them since 1998. This leaves out the fact there have been many 
other alliances in Nicaraguan politics since then, and many which run counter to this particular
alliance. This gives a skewed view on the issue of therapeutic abortion. 
Of the current studies mentioned, the focus is on health care in general (Bartoszko 2009). A 
difference from studies of the 1980s, which generally had a positive and participative 
undertone, is noticeable. The Bartoszko study has a generally critically undertone in her 
presentation of the subject. The fieldwork is situated in the very early part of the second 
Sandinista government in 2007, and Bartoszko finds a discrepancy between the nationalist 
Sandinista discourse which promotes the idea of an inclusive society and a health system 
which in reality works with principles that exclude and are based on principles of privileges for
certain groups. The other study mentioned above, focuses on the more specific issues 
concerning the changes in the legal framework of therapeutic abortions in 2006 and 
especially the Sandinista involvement both in the negotiations forbidding it and later in 
undermining the prohibition of it (Helgheim 2009). 
Another study looks at adult education and the renewed literacy programs that was very 
important to the Sandinista administration 2007–09 (Pytko 2008; Bartoszko 2010). Pytko 
argues that while literacy programs are offered by the new Sandinista administration just as 
they were in the 1980s, they are not seen as being of any concrete value to those who they 
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are offered. Programs of filling much more immediate needs such as employment and food 
are seen not as being complementary to the literacy campaign, but rather as opposites. The 
point of learning how to read and write is lost for many of those who cannot capitalise on this 
knowledge in the form of an actual job. 
The tradition of studies of politics continues in the form of studies of the CPCs (Bochove 
2008; Pallmeyer 2009). Bochove (2008) was present at several meetings of the CPCs of 
León and compares it with other instruments of direct democracy created in the years 
preceding the Sandinista takeover and similar institutions in Bolivia. His objective is to see 
whether they do in fact bring more direct democracy to the local and municipal levels of 
Nicaraguan government. He concludes they do in fact change one aspect by excluding 
foreign organisations from participating in the structures the way previous organisations 
allowed. At the same time, they are more directly connected to only one party (the FSLN), 
and the fact at departamento level they are organised by FSLN personnel which makes them 
less democratic to Bochove (2008, pp. 47–48). Anderson and Dodd (2009) have a somewhat 
different perspective in that they believe the CPCs execute orders coming from Ortega 
Saavedra, thereby undermining the power of locally elected FSLN mayors.  It is true several 
conflicts between CPCs and elected mayors exist, but my data does not suggest that either 
CPC or FSLN-mayors are directly controlled by Ortega Saavedra. 
 I met Bochove at a CPC conference in León in spring 2008 and although I have been present
at a number of different CPC meetings, I had not compared them to other similar institutions. I
lived with Helgheim during her stay in León. It was through conversations with Helgheim I first
understood how exactly the Sandinistas undermined the anti-abortion law they passed. 
Each of these studies has just looked at one individual program of the new Sandinista 
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government, and not always over a very long period. It is only when taken in its entirety that 
certain aspects of incoherence and general patterns of decision structures first show. While 
Pytko (2008) makes references to an overall Sandinista discourse, it is taken for granted and 
its interaction as regards particular aspects are not further analysed. The historic period and 
economic positions of Nicaragua are not focused upon. It is as if Nicaragua and the FSLN are
free to do whatever they want, disregarding any power structure that goes beyond the nation 
state. The formal and informal negotiations with the world beyond the Nicaraguan state are 
not focused upon. 
It is in this area I choose to locate this study – viewing the Sandinista project or projects, 
including all its programs, as one general program for social change. The comparison I seek 
to make with the Sandinista project of the 1980s is less concerned with individual details, 
such as whether certain government programs have changed names or have slightly different
parameters, as much as how the overall logic according to which they are employed, 
structured and executed has changed. Parts of the Sandinista project go beyond pure 
parliamentary decisions and presidential decrees, which are largely ignored by the existing 
literature. In an overall analysis, this part has to be considered. 
Studies of similar phenomenon in other parts of Latin America
The phenomenon of political parties or more specifically political mass parties targeting the 
poor, the workers or peasants is obviously not exclusive to Nicaragua. Many studies have 
been done of other countries in Latin America.
Adler Lomnitz and Melnick (2000) wrote about relations of people who are not politically 
active but who identify with a party. The identity aspect of belonging to one of the groups is 
similar to what Adler Lomnitz and Melnick (2000, pp. 82–82) describe as ‘party subcultures’ in
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Chile, in that their origins lie in party politics, but they are somewhat freed from the day to day 
politics and are more about personal identity and a feeling of belonging. The groups in Chile 
are mostly defined through descriptions of their consumption patterns, dress and speech. One
can easily identify similar subcultures in much of Europe, and to a somewhat more limited 
degree also in the United States of America. In the case of most of my informants much of 
this is less relevant, as their involvement with politics includes a major component of being 
involved with current politics.
A phenomenon of mass organisation around a party in Latin America that has been studied a 
great deal is of Peronismo in Argentina (Auyero 2001; Levitsky 2001). The comparative 
political scientist Levitsky (2001) looks at the development of leftist parties around the world 
and how they evolved during the period of what he calls “neoliberalism.” He seems to use 
roughly equivalent to the FSLN labelling of the period between 1990 and 2006, with the 
exception that it starts earlier in many parts of the world. Levitsky takes it as given that parties
with previously socialist/leftist outlooks had to act “adaptively” which seems to translate to 
giving up their socialist viewpoints and replace them with neoliberal views. The reason for this
is Levitsky believes only parties appealing to middle class groups and independents not 
connected to the traditional workers' organisations would stand a chance of surviving 
politically in elections. Levitsky identifies several factors he sees as important in determining 
whether a party will be able to make such a switch. According to this model, in the first world, 
a party is hindered in changing its viewpoints radically if it is connected to masses – in the 
form of labor unions or mass member basis. However, Levitsky claims that in some third 
world countries, such as Argentina, mass parties have a rather small leadership that is not 
very formally constituted and which is therefore relatively free in changing the party line. The 
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difference to the first world according to Levitsky is that in the first world mass parties are 
generally directly linked with a big bureaucratic structure of the party which doesn't permit 
large change- easily. Another important factor he sees is the level of routinization within the 
party. If a party works according to routines, internalised and accepted by all those involved, 
leaders tend to stay longer and consequently the ideological position of the party does not 
switch as quickly. At the same time party leaders are constrained in their ability to change 
party lines because they have to adhere to the routines. 
Many aspects of Levitsky's observations can be found in the case of the FSLN – the party 
leadership is not chosen through a bureaucratic process within the party, but are rather 
chosen out of tradition. As we will see in the chapter on history and economic history, the 
party has been very flexible in its policies in many areas. 
In certain areas the analysis does not fit. Levitsky claims the populist parties in Latin America 
were created from above, whereas the European communist and socialdemocratic 
counterparts were founded through disciplined organisers, Latin American populist parties 
were created “from above.” He does not define what he means with “from above,” but if it is to
out a position of state power, then this clearly does not apply to the FSLN. If it is meant 
“through students who made out a privileged layer of society,” then it comes closer to the truth
in the case of the FSLN. As we will see throughout this thesis, many other group besides the 
current leaders of the FSLN claim ownership to the party, and who have been with it from 
before its days of state power and who attempt (and at times successfully) influencing the 
party line. Also, very different from the Peronismo described by Levitsky, the FSLN continues 
to be inseparable from organised labor in Nicaragua. 
Levitsky also mentions three other parties which he ranks according their success in adopting
68
neoliberal policies – in Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile and Peru. In the case of a 
Chilean communist party, Peru and Venezuela, the parties were not able to adapt quickly 
enough and consequently lost at elections in the 1990s, whereas in the case of Mexico the 
party partially adapted and consequently only lost moderately and the case of Argentina and 
a socialist party in Chile which managed to fully adapt to neoliberalism and consequently did 
not lose. The examples given are not anything like the FSLN. Although the FSLN, in the view 
of some, adopted many neoliberal policies in practice for certain periods of time. The election 
results between 1990 and 2006 remained roughly the same.
Memory in anthropological discourse
In the field of anthropology an ongoing debate takes place on the importance of the 
representation of the past in the present and how the past is used by social actors in the 
present. The anthropological debate on memory culture closely relates to an earlier debate on
how the measurement of time and standards for what counts as valid retelling of history 
depend on cultural context. (Durkheim 1964; Evans-Pritchard 1940; Geertz 1973; Bloch 1977;
Malinowski 1945; Leach 1954; Appadurai 1981). The idea of a myth based understanding of 
time as historically changing, is employed in the study of Amer-Indian tribes (see for example 
Ramos 1988; Hill 1988; Gow 2001; Fausto and Heckenberger 2007; High 2009; Hugh-Jones 
1988). Appadurai (1981) creates a framework for the standards to which a particular story 
from the past must conform within a given society, for it to be generally accepted as truthful. It
shows that these standards differ between cultures. 
Several recent anthropological approaches to memory focus on the social purpose of 
remembering the past, and they see the purpose as being an argument for something one 
wishes to take place in the present rather than something that happened in the past. This 
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follows an anthropological tradition of contested history tellings (Leach 1954) and a 
sociological tradition of Maurice Halbwachs (White 2006). Maurice Halbwachs claims that any
kind of recollection of the past is a genuine social process that happens between people 
rather than in the individual human mind and the past really comes into existence only when 
people relate their own actions to historic processes in their everyday life (Maurice Halbwachs
in Assmann 2000, pp. 31–35). He does not mean to say no past existed before someone 
made it up, but the points of the past seen as important and the emphasis put on various 
aspects of it, develop through this process of relating to the past in the present. This 
framework has been appropriated by anthropologists in looking at how political differences 
between groups in the present oftentimes manifest themselves in different versions of history. 
These versions do not necessarily contradict one-another, as they present the past in different
ways by selecting certain events and leaving out others (White 2006). 
Some of the more recent anthropological approaches in this field also focus on the particular 
historical past of any particular group. Many of these studies presuppose a dominant national 
or colonial myth which contradicts that of individual informants (Connerton 1989; Cole 2001; 
A. L. Smith 2004) and that non-dominant groups represent other versions of the past (Kenny 
1999; Rappaport 1990). 
What makes sense for Nicaragua?
While Nicaragua certainly has a colonial past, it is the much more recent past that seems 
most important to my Nicaraguan informants. The discourse relating to current economic 
centers, specifically the United States, takes on a life of its own which—no matter what group 
one chooses to follow—is completely different from any version of the past that may have 
been imported from the United States. No one group dominates all aspects of social life. 
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Several groups exist, each of which dominates in at least one sphere, with each representing 
a different account of the past. 
Besides Nicaragua, Mexico and Cuba have a history of successful revolutions to which the 
states and their populations continue to focus, while other countries in Northern Latin America
do not (Wilm 2009). It has led to some similarities in the understandings of the importance of 
history. The revolution itself appears most important in determining the Nicaraguan situation. 
The Nicaraguan revolution is the youngest and consequently more people from the 
insurrectionist period still live, and Nicaragua experienced more abrupt political changes since
the revolutionary beginning than Mexico or Cuba. This seems to be a factor for the continuing 
extensive discussion of history in Nicaragua (Wilm 2010). Also before Sandinismo and the 
Sandinista revolution, Nicaragua had a long history of having several in-conciliatory groups 
with radically different political goals fight for power. This may constitute an additional factor 
as to why political-historical discourse is so prevalent. 
What makes a lot sense in the case of Nicaragua is to look at how history is employed to 
differentiate and legitimise different groups. While my Nicaraguan informants are extremely 
informed about Nicaragua’s particular history, the meaning of different events within 
Nicaraguan history are highly contested, and my Nicaraguan informants were generally very 
familiar with them and discussed and argued the points. The anthropologist Tully (1997, p. 
302) also noticed this of Nicaragua in the mid-1990s. She saw the diverse practices of 
discussing history as a central part of Nicaraguan popular culture. 
It is important to note that this history telling, which largely happens orally, is not about telling 
myths. Although an apparent ‘rebirth’ of indigenous identities among the majority of 
Spanish-speaking Nicaraguans flowered during the 1990s (Field 1998; Tatar 2005), it has not 
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altered the overall standards of what is accepted as valid history among my Nicaraguan 
informants. Instead of myths of ancient times, the telling of the past in today’s Nicaragua 
generally lives up to the same standards of quality as the western academic discipline of 
history. My contacts were generally willing to use academic standards for falsification and 
validation of stories of the past, once they accepted me as a person generally knowledgeable 
in the area. What is accepted as a believable history seems to be similar or the same as in 
other parts of the western world, so creating abstract models of what constitutes credible 
tellings of the past within Nicaraguan society seems to make limited sense. 
Dependency Theory in the literature on Nicaragua
The main framework employed in this thesis is that of Dependency Theory. The thesis is not 
primarily concerned with proving the relevance of Dependency Theory, but takes its 
fundamental premise – highlighted in the next chapter – as background for the analysis. 
Several reasons exist for the choosing of this framework. As we will see, some type of 
Dependency Theory has in many ways been the fundamental base for the analysis the 
Sandinistas made when drafting their political program in the 1960s and 1970s. This meant 
that much of the terminology and general line of thought was familiar to my informants and it 
was not too difficult to discuss some of the issues relating to it with them. This however is not 
to say I adopted the Sandinista version of Dependency Theory. On the contrary, as my field 
material shows, my informants seem to have build a unique version of Nicaraguan history 
which does not automatically follow from Dependency Theory Framework.
Dependency Theory has been invoked by several social scientists when discussing the case 
of Nicaragua. Walker and Wade (2011) start their work by presenting the relationship between
core and peripheral countries and the stream of wealth between them as a given fact, as a 
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backdrop that Nicaraguan history has to be understood against. In their description of recent 
years they do not seem to resort to such a theory and focus on the power-sharing agreement 
between Ortega Saavedra and the PLC. The economist Biderman (1983) presents a thorough
Nicaraguan history up to his day in which he takes the dependency relationship as a given, 
but then goes a step further and analyses the responses by Nicaraguan actors to the fact that
Nicaragua is a peripheral country. It is this perspective I build upon. While Biderman looks at 
the matter purely from the perspective of an economist and at Nicaraguan governments as 
the principal actors, I transfer this to an anthropological view in which it is activists and 
individual Nicaraguans that are focused upon.
This does carry with it a problem of the connection of macro and micro – it is not possible to 
proof whether actions at a national level are affected by what I observed at the ground level 
among my informants, as will be the case in most anthropological studies. I therefore make it 
clear that I am not trying to say anything with certainty that goes beyond my informants.
Theories/frameworks that were not used in this thesis
Much theory has been written in the social sciences about just about any aspect of human 
existence at an ever greater speed over the past centuries. After having presented my 
material to various anthropologists, I have come to understand there are many views of what 
would constitute a natural theoretical framework and what would need to be included in terms 
of literature. Had I included all the available literature, the entire thesis would be with nothing 
more than a long literature review and would still not be able to include all available material. I
therefore early on saw the need to limit myself in how much written theoretical works I would 
permit to enter the thesis and what type and amount of ethnographic descriptions I would 
include. I will here mention some of the limits I put in place and speak about some of the 
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theoretical works that have come up time and again which I did not choose to include. 
I limit this thesis to the study of understanding economics, understanding history and 
structures of power, and leave out general culture and religious aspects. Many things can be 
said about these areas as well – such as a marked change in churchgoing and membership 
since 1990, and changes in cultural activities with the introduction of Halloween and other 
newly invented or imported celebrations. I recognise the importance of these in the everyday 
life of Nicaraguans. Yet, they lie outside the scope of this thesis. I have placed the discussion 
of the individual pieces of theoretical literature within the chapters they relate to. In the 
following, I only present the type of approaches of which I choose not to make use, while 
recognising their centrality in current social sciences and acknowledging the fact it would 
have been possible to write a thesis using much of the same ethnographic material as I did 
with any one of these approaches. 
Looking at people living in a country with some type of power structure today becomes the 
business of every social science study produced. One has to limit oneself in concerns of what
background literature one chooses to include. I choose to go for the school of anti-imperialism
which developed into Dependency Theory and later on into World Systems Theory (WST) and
onto postmodern versions represented by writers such as Hardt and Negri (2001), but leave 
out most of the later theories beyond Dependency Theory. Dependency Theory has been in 
use both in academia and in political practice and is able to span the two fields, WST has 
almost exclusively been a framework of academic debate and has never been part of a 
political discourse nor is it clear whether it allows for social change through directed human 
political activity. Also, as pointed out by Amin (2004, p. 24), the very generalised idea of an 
Empire without any clear center to it as it newer theorists oftentimes seem to claim, fails to 
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acknowledge the existence of a hegemonic center in the current world system, represented 
by the United States, with Europe and Japan being part of a triad-type center of surplus 
production. This approach seemed initially most helpful to me, because it simultaneously 
represents a theoretical framework in academia for which this thesis is produced and the 
same concepts get mirrored in the language employed by the FSLN. If I were to disagree with
my informants on any concrete point, I assumed that likely my informants would still 
understand my analysis and I would be able to comment on it. This assumption turned out to 
be correct. 
A related perspective that comes out of the world of anthropology is what is presented in 
Europe and the People without History by anthropologist Wolf (1982). He looks at history as 
an anthropologist and explains that “most of the societies that anthropologists study are an 
outgrowth of the expansion of Europe and not the pristine precipitates of past evolutionary 
stages” Wolf (1982, p. 76). The people of the colonial possessions of European powers are 
seen as having participated in the forming of history, and that they are not just affected by the 
doings of Europeans. This seems at first to be much in line with Dependency Theory and 
could be a natural departure point for an anthropological study. The perspective employed is 
however still quite a lot wider than what seemed fruitful in the case of history as it is discussed
in Nicaragua. The parts of Nicaraguan history mainly discussed all lie within the past century, 
where Wolf goes 600 years back in time, to the time of European colonisation of the 
Americas. He dedicates a lot of space to a discussion of different modes of production, with 
capitalism being the latest stage. Although there were some experiments with regulating the 
ownership of the means of production in Nicaragua during the 1980s, this had little to do with 
the historical development of distinct modes of production over centuries, but instead 
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comparatively short-term shifts in global political alliances. I believe it would be rather 
misleading to mix the two perspectives (that of 600 years and that of 30 years) together as 
although they may have some nominal points in common, they really treat two completely 
different issues. 
Another way of going about this research would be to de-construct the categories ‘Liberals’ 
and ‘Sandinistas’ in some post-modern sense. For early draft versions of this thesis I received
comments such as “How do you know that person is a Liberal?” I do not try to pass any 
judgment on whether someone actually belongs to the category as it has been used in 
European discourse over the centuries. Obviously a great deal could be said about how hard 
it would be to define any features that distinguish Sandinistas from Liberals. The meaning of 
‘liberal’ could easily be shown as being used rather specifically in a Nicaraguan context and 
as varying greatly from the term as it is used in other parts of the world. While interesting in 
many ways, such investigations are not part of the research here. As a starting point, I accept 
the existence of these groups and accept those who claim to be part of a particular group and
who are generally seen by other Nicaraguans as belonging to that group. So when I describe 
someone as ‘Liberal’ it is because he is a member of a Liberal party or has described himself 
as ‘Liberal.’ After having accepted the existence of the groups, I then show the views of 
history as they have been presented to me by members of either group. Members of the three
groups also have a lot in common as they all are Nicaraguans. As such, their presentations of
history also have many points in common. 
Another approach I could have taken was to focus on the history of the people versus the 
history of individual leaders. This approach, ‘History from Below’ has been practiced by 
Marxists and their theme has often been people in the third world. In its latest incarnations it 
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has been promoted mainly in Britain and then adapted by the French Annales school in 
history (Bhattacharya 1983, pp. 4–5) and later popularised by various authors of ‘The 
People’s History of [insert country name here]’ books. This approach to history openly invites 
the use of anthropological data as part of one’s case. The reading of various ‘People’s 
histories’ certainly has informed my approach to collecting data. The history I researched 
mainly serves as a background to better understand the current situation and the 
interpretations today. That is the focus of this study. This Nicaraguan history is, as it is 
presented here, comes both in the form of a relatively inter-subjectively line of important 
events seen as such across groups, and as a more specific presentation of distinctions 
between historical understandings not shared across all of Nicaraguan society. A lot of this 
history is connected directly to the FSLN, yet I seek to understand today’s views rather than 
understand how events in the past were perceived by suppressed groups at that time. 
One could also go further into the anthropological study of nationalism, and the FSLN project 
could be interpreted as mainly having a nation building purpose. While the state had an 
important role during the Somoza years and a lot more decision making power concentrated 
in its institutions, there was not the sense of universal citizenship (or at least semi-universal if 
one forgets certain issues with indigenous people on the East Coast) the FSLN built up with 
the literacy campaign, which targeted large disenfranchised rural and urban groups. The 
redirection of industrial output from luxury goods for the elite to mass products for the public, 
and the employment of generally based political organisations is important. All the standard 
literature on nationalism could then be applied. 
The two writers traditionally connected with the beginnings of nationalist ideologies agreed on
the idea of nationalism, but it was not clear to them what constituted a nation. The two 
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proponents for the two main lines of nationalism were Ernest Renan and Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte. Renan (1939) saw nations as voluntary contracts among its members and as a rather 
recent phenomenon. Fichte (1978, p. 187) saw nations as given entities that had common 
traits, and most of all a common language. Comaroff (1996, p. 164) labels these perspectives 
on cultural identities as constructivist and primordialist. 
The two lines of thought have continued up to today, although both have changed 
considerably. Among the primordialists, one can note at least two separate tendencies. Some,
as Fichte, see nations as having commonalities through nothing more than cultural traits built 
upon over many generations. The other tendency combines the idea of objectively existing 
nations with Darwinism. Nations, therefore, have a commonality of genes and must be seen 
as the equivalents of races or maybe rather sub-races which are more important than the 
race held in common with the other sub-races within the same race. The constructivist line 
has changed considerably since Renan. Those seeing nations as constructed no longer 
necessarily see them as an inherently positive concept. The anthropologist Gellner and the 
historian Hobsbawm agree on looking at nationalism as a modern phenomenon that has 
come into being within the course of the buildup of industrialism and capitalism. They see 
nationalism as being a project of the new elites that came into being with 
industrialism/capitalism. They both believe nationalism only spreads downwards to other 
layers of society later on, after it had been established among these elites (Gellner 1983; 
Hobsbawm 1990). 
B. Anderson (1994, p. 90) sees nationalism arising out of the invention of the printing press 
and a capitalist system, as the printing press made it possible to produce the same text for a 
largely coherent readership in a limited number of close-to-vernacular languages which 
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standardised the spoken languages while capitalism in its constant search for unsaturated 
markets made the print industry turn from Latin to these languages. Although Anderson 
allows for single actors to have an influence in the nation building process, such as Luther 
with his use of German in the writing of his theses, it is only as a result of transformations in 
the means of production of printed material and the satisfaction of the market of Latin 
readership, that he was able to succeed. Previous movements in the same direction were 
halted by the more effective lines of communication the Catholic church had in the pre-print 
age (B. Anderson 1994, p. 91). 
Although applying the European models to Latin America and other third world countries is 
often done by the inhabitants of those countries, a literature exists which argues the Latin 
American experience concerning state-building and nationalism is distinct due to the few 
inter-Latin American wars and the high level of violence internally in Latin American states. 
This has the implication several places that differences between countries are seen as much 
less important than class differences inside each country has made the force of nationalism in
many places less substantial than in much of Europe (Thies 2005). Also Anderson recognises
that the newer nationalisms of the Americas are merely recreations of the original versions as 
they came into being in Europe (B. Anderson 1994). 
As mentioned, although these theories on nationalism were mainly created for a European 
phenomenon, many aspects can be applied to the Nicaraguan case. Nicaragua has a colonial
past and the creation of a European style country complete with a capital and a state 
administration in the territory it occupies today, can hardly be said to have been the working of
internal processes. Nevertheless, it was often argued by my Nicaraguan informants as if it 
were this way. Speaking to both Sandinistas and Nicaraguans in general, the fact there has 
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been immigration from Europe, Africa and Asia received very little attention among those I 
spoke to. That current borders do not represent a genetic boundary and were not taken into 
consideration. It seemed to be general practice for them to speak about the Nicaraguan 
people as one steady entity which has existed for a long time, without specifying its exact 
coming into being. In this sense, the folk tale of a primordialist concept of Nicaraguans was 
very popular among them, and for some of them it seemed to be a definition of a Darwinist 
kind with a belief that Nicaraguans share biological genes other people do not possess. 
An anthropological inquiry could be launched to try to relate this to the constructivist aspects 
of Nicaraguan national identity including understandings of cultural aspects which have been 
created over many generations of common history. If one were to do it with a focus on 
Sandinismo, one could focus on the development of a common and distinctive Nicaraguan 
history with systematic and country wide introduction of education practices and equalisation 
of incomes in the 1980s and how it laid the groundwork for certain aspects of Nicaraguan 
nationalism, or historically study the increasing rate of urbanisation and industrialisation under
both Somoza and FSLN and relate it to the development of a national Nicaraguan identity. 
Such studies could be done in a comparative perspective. The general Latin American 
perspective on nationalism of being grounded in few inner-Latin American wars does apply to 
a much lesser extent in Nicaragua than in many other Latin American countries. The attacks 
on Nicaragua in the 1980s that came from Honduran and Costa Rican soil have not been 
forgotten by many, and while a pan-Central American nationalism exists in both Honduras 
and Costa Rica—according to which there is little to no difference between the people of the 
various Central American countries—I have not found the same to be true in the case of 
Nicaragua. 
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One thing that seems to have astonished many European anthropologists has been the 
emphasis on structure and generalisations. Obviously, these can not be complete. Whenever 
I state that most Nicaraguans say one thing or another, it is hereby meant most Nicaraguans I
have met. There are clear limitations to the Nicaraguans I met. Although there seems to be an
emphasis within the social sciences to try to not ever generalise and to point out that really all 
individuals are independent actors in all sorts of forms, I nevertheless have found it very 
important in understanding Nicaragua, to understand what things could fruitfully be 
generalised by patterns of conduct to which I could relate and respond. Possibly—although 
that shall not be the theme of this thesis—is the Nicaraguan nation with its inherent structural 
make-up less questioned by many Nicaraguans than that of many European nations at this 
particular point in history. At least I have found it to be much more common to discuss a 
common view of how the Nicaraguan nation is made up, which sub-fractions it contains, and 
what history it has, than is the case in any other place I have known about. It has been 
suggested this could be used to expand upon ‘structuration theory’, which basically holds that 
agents are influenced by the structure they operate within and that they in turn influence the 
surrounding structure (Giddens 1986). Part of my argument seems to be going in the same 
direction in that I believe the room for actions of Nicaraguans are highly influenced by the past
actions of Nicaraguans which led to a wider repertoire of possible actions, even though 
economic outer circumstances have not improved. Nevertheless, Giddens’ perspective seems
to put too little emphasis on the outer restrictions that govern possible actions. The repertoire 
of possible actions available to Nicaraguans today are still, I argue, governed by the outer 
restrictions of Nicaragua’s position in international trade relations, geographic position, etc.. 
The anthropologist Kertzer (1988) writes on the ritualistic aspects of politics. He uses 
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examples of far past and close to the present and seems to try to show that rituals are an 
essential part of doing politics at all times, that the manipulation of symbols is an inherent part
in this and that the result is identification with the larger unit within which this takes place. A 
great deal could be said about this in the case of Nicaragua – the frequent invocation of parts 
of Nicaraguan history by Nicaraguan leaders could very well be analysed using this 
perspective. The same is true for the participation of Ortega Saavedra in marches and other 
things that represent Nicaraguan history in one way or the other. Kertzer tries to show that the
net of symbols and rituals people within one society/group adhere to is not just part of a 
one-way communication from leaders to subjects, but also leaders are caught up in the same 
system and have to adhere to it. Given the large amount of historic events celebrated in 
Nicaragua of the recent past in which current political leaders actively participated, it would be
interesting to analyse to what degree Nicaraguan leaders have been able to influence the 
creation of political rituals in a Nicaraguan context.
However fruitful studies based upon any of the above models may be, I have chosen not to 
elaborate this any further in this thesis due to various restraints. Even though I ultimately did 
not choose to go further into expanding the study into any of the directions outlined above, I 
did have them at the back of my head when I set out on my fieldwork in Nicaragua and so 
they may have colored my initial understanding of Nicaraguan reality.
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Chapter 4
Development theories
Since WWII, a few theories on how development can be achieved by third world countries 
have been central. These influenced the debate on the strategies for achieving development 
and have been used in most third world countries, including Nicaragua. Before we look at the 
concrete policies different governments implemented as part of their development program, 
we look at general theories of development which formed the basis for these policy decisions.
We need to understand the development of development theories in order to understand the 
economic plans of the different Nicaraguan regimes. Furthermore, we need an etic account of
the economic history in order to make sense of the emic accounts of the different times my 
informants have come up with.
Mainstream modernisation development theories
The international trend in the two decades immediately after WWII, was to apply policies in 
third world countries which copied the historical models set by western countries. The United 
Nations and others tried to employ this theory in their development programs around the 
world. This theory is known as “modernisation theory.” The countries of the third world were 
simply “behind” and had to play catchup to reach the same level of modernity the first world 
enjoyed. Strategies built upon this theory emphasised investments in state and private 
sectors coupled with transfer of technology from the first world (Wallerstein 1999; Smukkestad
1998). 
For the countries allied with the United States, models such as the phase model of US 
American economist and political theorist Walt Whitman Rostow (Rostow 1956; Rostow 1960,
see table p. 85) were developed and employed. These models operated with the idea that a 
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particular ‘impulse’ of some kind needs to start a phase of development which will modernise 
a country. According to these models, if the impulse to start development originates from 
outside the country—true in all cases of modernisation initiated through the United States—
the modernisation phase needs to be oriented towards creating export goods to sell on a 
world market. 
Export oriented strategies for development mainly build on the model of the British political 
economist David Ricardo (1772–1823). Ricardo’s model proclaims that even if a country is 
less productive in all sectors, it will still gain from entering a free trade agreement with more 
developed countries. The important part is the given country should stop producing a range of
goods and instead focus only on one food or product which it is relatively better at producing 
and then focus on exporting it. This is termed a certain country's ‘comparative advantage’ of 
producing within a certain field. According to Ricardo, the country should then import all 
goods in which it does not have a comparative advantage (Ricardo 1821; Smukkestad 1998). 
84
Rostow's phase model
1. Traditional 
society
At this stage industry hasn’t made its entrance yet, and almost all production is 
conducted in the traditional way. That does not mean that society is static. Changes 
can happen, but none of these will fundamentally modernise the country or increase 
living standards substantially.
2. Preconditions 
for take off
At this stage, mechanisms of mass production are introduced. The point of all efforts 
of development policies must be to reach this stage.
3. Take off
This is the tipping point, when one really can say the new production mode take over. 
This happens due to an impulse. The impulse can be internal, as the 1848 revolution 
in Germany, or it can be external, such as the high demand for Swedish products 
throughout the 19th century on the international market.
4. Drive to 
maturity
Now the system matures and work methods get standardised and the cooperation of 
the various economic actors formalised. At this stage foreign trade really starts to 
become important.
5. Age of mass 
consumption
Now domestic demand reaches a level where it makes economic sense to produce for 
it. All the basic needs of the population are being covered.
Rostow's phase model: After the Second World War (WWII), the US economist Walt Whitman
Rostow created an overview of several phases of economic development which he believed a
country needed to move through in order to reach the status of a fully developed country 
(Rostow 1956; Rostow 1960). Rostow’s model is merely one of several similar phase models 
that were created between 1945 and 1968, which were seen as explaining development in 
the view of the United States and its allies (Wallerstein 1999, p. 193).
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Neoliberalism
A current version of modernisation theory is neoliberalism, the theory behind the policies 
universally employed by capitalist states since the time of Ronald Reagan, President of the 
United States between 1981–89, and Baroness Margaret Hilda Thatcher, Prime Minister of 
the United Kingdom from 1979–90. This current version continues along the lines of 
modernisation theory, but puts a lot of emphasis on the exchange model of Ricardo (1821) 
and general classical economic theory (Sandbrook 1995, p. 278). They believe trade is good 
for all involved parties at all times, also those who overall are less efficient in production, 
measured in required labor time per produced unit (Ricardo 1821, chapter 7). 
Differing from early modernisation theory, those arguing the case for neoliberalism hold that 
too much state intervention in the economy is an evil. For the economy to turn ‘healthy,’ 
government should not have ‘too much’ of an engagement in development and economics of 
its respective subjects, and government oversight needs to be rolled back. Neoliberalism is 
strongly in favor of selling public property as a way to cancel national debt. Much of this 
theory is seen by neoliberals as being of universal principles and as one that should be used 
by governments independently of time and space and not beholding to specific peripheral or 
semi-peripheral countries. Associated with the neoliberal approach are the World Bank (WB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Throughout the 1980s it set forth a number of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), supposedly to accommodate both development and 
get rid of the debt these countries had run up (for Nicaraguan case, see illustrations p. 144 
and p. 145). 
Opponents hold that the proponents of neoliberalism in reality have a goal of extending 
exploitation of the third world—which was necessary after the economic problems in the 
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1970s resulting from the oil crisis—and very often the neoliberals are directed not by rational 
social development arguments but their own economic interests. 
Counter-hegemonic development theories
For socialist revolutionaries, development generally is seen as equivalent to the introduction 
of socialism. The classic model according to which Marxists handled revolutions in the 20th 
century in peripheral countries was to follow Russian revolutionary Vladimir Ilyich Lenin 
(1870–1924) in asserting that the conditions for completely socialised means of production—
that which is commonly termed ‘communism’—would first have to be built up. In this period, 
which Lenin calls ‘monopoly state-capitalism,’ the state would take control of and rationalise 
production in order to prepare the country economically and culturally for socialism. This 
could in some cases also happen as part of an unforeseen consequence of general capitalist 
development, such as in the case of Germany, where state-control was largely introduced by 
the rulers during the First World War. Lenin believed this opened the possibility for socialism 
as a next step and argued Soviet Russia should copy it (Lenin 1917a; Lenin 1917b; Lenin 
1921) as a first step towards socialism. 
When Lenin formulated the model, other socialists such as Polish-German revolutionary Rosa
Luxemburg (1871–1919) challenged him on the way this transition period was to be 
organised. Lenin (1921) believes one should use all dictatorial means necessary to ‘hasten’ 
development along, while Luxemburg (1922) holds that parliamentary democracy and 
freedom to organise—also for the opposition—have to be in place if the revolution is to 
represent freedom in any meaningful way. Many Marxists have since come to the conclusion 
that no generalised model of a transition period toward socialism can be made (Harris 1988, 
p. 13). In the cases where socialists have organised such a transition period, they varied 
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heavily in political content and in the length of time they lasted. Yet some form of monopoly 
state-capitalist transition periods were organised in most countries which underwent socialist 
experiments in the following decades. In Cuba the period officially lasted 4 years during which
private property was nationalised (Harris 1988, p. 9) while in Nicaragua during the 1980s it 
never came to that. 
Socialist versions of modernisation theory
In the first few years after the Second World War, Soviet-allied countries followed a similar 
modernisation model as that which the west employed, with the Soviet Union as the leading 
country rather than the United States or Western Europe (Wallerstein 1999, p. 194). Instead 
of directly switching to socialism, many Soviet-allied Marxists believed third world countries 
which had not developed an internal capitalist system would have to do so first. Karl Heinrich 
Marx himself stated at one time that “[t]he country that is more developed industrially only 
shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future” (Marx 1867, Preface). In line with 
this reasoning, these Marxists argued that the overthrow of the system by a socialist 
revolution is not a possibility until one has a large proletarian movement. Until then, radicals 
will just have to participate in regular elections (Palmer 1988, p. 96). Even participation in 
labor unions will not help any, as the members of these are mainly artisans, pre-capitalist 
workers who one never should hope to work for a socialist revolution (Gould 1987, p. 354). 
Marx qualified his statement as only applying to western Europe and he said other parts of 
the world would not necessarily have to go through such a phase of capitalism (Marx 1881). 
This was apparently not acknowledged by Soviet-allied countries immediately following the 
Second World War when they set up their plans for where they thought revolutions would 
make sense or were possible. 
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Some Marxists in other parts of the world went even further along these lines. The British 
communist Bill Warren (1980), who operated within the Marxist paradigm, declared that 
capitalist development is contradictory and he concluded that in the third world, there was still 
what he called ‘the continuing transformative potential’ of capitalism and imperialism. To 
support his claim, he pointed to the growth in manufacturing output in third world countries in 
absolute numbers (Warren 1980, p. 241) and also to the growth of manufacturing as a 
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in several third world countries between 
1950 and 1973. Similarly, in today’s China, the Communist Party of China also makes use of 
the Marxist framework, despite all changes the nature of the regime has undergone in recent 
years, and argues the party’s responsibility lies in following ‘the three representations’: 
“representing the demands for the development of advanced social productive forces, the 
direction of advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the greatest majority of the 
people” (Holbig 2006, p. 18) This means Radicals should support the demands of engineers 
and capitalists for further capitalist development rather than follow peasants and workers and 
other groups with which Leftists traditionally have been connected. 
The Soviet Union never went quite as far in dismissing socialist ideals for the sake of 
development as these two examples show, and there was one difference to be noted in how 
the Soviet Union related to the countries in which it directed development in comparison with 
how the United States and western European powers did : The Soviet Union did not have 
current or former colonies and those third world countries who they were allied with in 
practice, were generally encouraged to seek a status as nonaligned countries rather than 
formally allying with the Soviet Union (Wallerstein 1999, p. 194). That may be why the idea 
89
that the Soviet Union would support a country with a capitalist structure is seldom mentioned. 
Dependency Theory
With the gradual realisation that modernisation theory did not bring the welfare to the masses 
the way promised or at least expected in much of the third world, criticism of mainstream 
theories of development started to appear in the 1950s. One of the more prominent group of 
critics was known as Dependency Theorists. Their main target for criticism is the underlying 
premise in mainstream development theories that the development in one country works 
independently of external influences from other countries (Wallerstein 1999, p. 194). 
Under the heading Dependency Theory various approaches emphasise a constant stream of 
wealth transferred from the developing third world countries (periphery) to the developed first 
world countries (core). Some theorists hypothesise operating with a middle layer of 
semi-periphery, acting as a buffer zone between core and periphery societies (Wallerstein 
1974, pp. 229–233). The fundamental difference between first world and third world, they see,
as what is produced. Third world countries generally sell raw material and produce 
agricultural goods, whereas first world countries produce industrial goods. The two then trade 
one-another’s products with each other. Over time, they note, the price of raw material and 
agricultural products goes down in comparison to the price of manufactured goods. This 
means the third world can afford less and less of the industrial goods they import from the first
world, and this leads to obvious economic problems for the third world (Prebisch 1950; Singer
1950). They also argue that much of the high standard of living of the masses of the first 
world is a product of this transfer of wealth, and the various types of powers the countries of 
the first world have (media, military, political, etc.) are actively employed to keep this state of 
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affairs in place. 
One of the most well-known group of non-radical followers of Dependency Theory are called 
Structuralist Dependency Theorists and they were linked to the United Nation’s Comisión 
Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) during the later Cold War years. They 
supported programs of import-substitution6 in order to build up a home industry in the various 
third world countries. They hoped by producing some of their own machinery, these countries 
would be able to diversify their production and over time be able to do away with the 
exploitative links to more central first world countries that existed through the import of first 
world machinery. 
Radical Dependency Theory
Political radicals appropriated Dependency Theory a few years later. Their geographic 
background was quite diverse as were their audiences. In western countries, The Political 
Economy of Growth by Baran (1957) was one of the most popular early texts written in this 
category. This inspired several of the later writers. Followers of what with time became known 
as Radical Dependency Theory extended the idea of exploitation through terms of trade 
within a country. They hold that inside third world countries the local elites, situated in urban 
centers, exploit people further away from those centers, and they often have closer personal 
ties to and share interest with the interests of the western elites, compared with the rural and 
poorer population of their own country (Johnson 1981; Gunder Frank 1969). 
Although the idea of extraction of surplus from the third world is essentially the same as it is 
for other Dependency Theorists, it is expressed in Marxist terminology and analysed 
6 Import-substitution schemes denote government policies which put heavy taxes on the import of certain key industrial 
products in order to provide for the establishment of such an industry at home.
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accordingly. Baran (1957, chapter 5) argues that the only reason Japan is not as 
underdeveloped as the other countries of Asia is that the country was never subjugated by 
the west and turned into a colony, the way just about all other countries of the third world had 
been at some stage. The attention to the importance of third world exploitation originates, for 
these radicals, from Marx’s discussion of what the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ of 
capital represented that made it possible for some Europeans to already have built up capital 
at the time when industrial capitalism was just starting. Marx (1867, chapter26) argues a great
part of that came from the forceful exploitation of the third world – through wars, slavery, 
forceful land grabbing, etc., all actions that today’s capitalist would see as highly illegal and 
unethical, at least in the first world. Luxemburg (1913) argues this exploitation by force of the 
third world still continues to provide an influx of money to western capitalist countries even 
now and that capitalism started and capitalism is dependent on this. More recent Radical 
Dependency Theorists add to this, that when one produces either for a mass market in a 
foreign country in export enclaves or luxury products through import-substitution for the ultra 
rich in one’s own country, the size of the available market is disconnected from wage levels, 
and so great profits can be made by lowering wages (Biderman 1983, pp. 7–8). 
Among several other reasons, that is why many Radical Dependency Theorists do not believe
in import-substitution and according to Kay (1989, pp. 126–127) take the fact that Latin 
America generally becomes more dependent and has national elites that react with acts of 
repression on popular movements as indicators that the national capitalist classes do not play
any progressive role. According to this logic, a national capitalism that brings the same benefit
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to the population as has been the case in the first world is not possible, and the remaining 
options are either a fascism based dictatorial system or some type of socialism. Some 
Radical Dependency Theorists from Latin America, like Theotonio Dos Santos and Vania 
Bambirra, explored the idea of an independent capitalist development in dependent countries.
If only one builds up machinery and heavy industry by nationally owned capital, they stated, 
accumulation processes could work without exploitation from other countries (Dos Santos 
(1978) and Vania Bambirra (1973), cited in Kay 1989, pp. 151–152). Five years later, 
Bambirra (1978, p. 19) seemed to differ with her earlier statement as she declared that the 
Cuban revolution had shown socialism was the only way forward for Latin America because 
the national bourgeoisie no longer saw any perspective in nationalist-capitalist autonomous 
development. 
The criticism of mainstream development theories continued to develop among Radical 
Dependency Theorists and more recent works seem to give less specific advice to third world 
countries. Amin (1980) attacked modernisation theorists mainly on the basis of their belief that
current developments in the third world mirror those of the center regions some decades or 
centuries earlier. At this time, he claimed developments in the third world are fundamentally 
different in that when development occurs in the third world it is capitalist, and mostly aids the 
international capital based in the countries central to capitalism. This more general view does 
not give a clear answer as what actions people in a third world country can take to evade 
dependency. This change was probably caused by the failure of the Soviet Union and failed 
attempts at revolutions by third world countries in the second half of the 20th century. 
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Chapter 5
Recent political history of Nicaragua and the Sandinista 
movement
In order to understand anything about the Sandinista movement, one has to know something 
about Nicaraguan history over the past 100 years. This is when the political groups which 
exist today formed. During my time in Nicaragua, it was frequently pointed out to me that 
without knowing this history, I could forget about understanding anything about what goes on 
today. Such a history can of course be presented in many ways. The focus I place on it here 
is the one emphasised by most of my informants – all of which were Spanish-speaking 
Nicaraguans – and it is presented in a way I believe to be uncontroversial among any of those
I spoke to in Nicaragua (see tables p. 95 and p. 96). Additionally, I have added some points 
about general political developments on a global scale that may aid in understanding the 
specifics in Nicaragua. 
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Timeline of Nicaraguan leaders
1893–1909 Liberal President José Santos Zelaya López
1909–26 A series of Conservative and Liberal presidents seldom referred to, in combination with constant interventions by the United States
1926–29 Conservative President Adolfo Díaz7 / US Marines
1929–33 Liberal President José María Moncada Tapia / US Marines
1933–36 Liberal President Juan Bautista Sacasa / Director of the Guardia Nacional, Anastasio Somoza García
1936–56 Dictator Anastasio Somoza García8
1956–63 Dictator Luis Anastasio Somoza Debayle
1963–79 Dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle
1979–80
Five-person Junta of National Reconstruction: José Daniel Ortega Saavedra (FSLN), 
Sergio Ramírez Mercado (FSLN), Moisés Hassan Morales (FSLN), Violeta Barrios Torres
de Chamorro, Alfonso Robelo
1980–81
Five-person Junta of National Reconstruction: Ortega Saavedra (FSLN), Ramírez 
Mercado (FSLN), Hassan Morales (FSLN), Arturo Cruz (Conservative), Rafael Córdova 
Rivas (Conservative)
1981–85 Three-person Junta of National Reconstruction: Ortega Saavedra, coordinator (FSLN), Ramírez (FSLN), Rivas (Conservative)
1985–90 FSLN President Ortega Saavedra
1990–97 UNO President Barrios Torres de Chamorro9
1997–2002 Liberal President José Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo
7 Although Díaz called himself president, the legitimacy of his presidency is disputed.
8 The official positions of the Somozas vary, as they sometimes controlled the country as presidents and at other times as 
leaders of the Guardia Nacional.
9 Unidad Nicaragüense Opositora (UNO)
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2002–07 Liberal President Enrique José Bolaños Geyer
2007– FSLN President Ortega Saavedra
Sources: Ministerio de Educación (2011); Pozas (1988, p. 58) 
Events and figures often referred to in Nicaraguan history
1856 Andrés Castro Estrada threw stones at invaders from the United States
1912 General Benjamín Francisco Zeledón Rodríguez fought US troops occupying Nicaraguan territory
1923–25 Augusto Nicolás Calderón Sandino worked in oil sector of Mexico
1926–27 Calderón Sandino and his rebel army teamed with Liberals to fight Conservative and US forces
1927–34 Calderón Sandino and his rebel army fought US forces by themselves
1934 Calderón Sandino was killed during peace talks with the Director of the Guardia Nacional Anastasio Somoza García
1956 Liberal Rigoberto López Pérez killed by Dictator Anastasio Somoza García
1959 León students massacred during rally
1961 Leftist FSLN founded under the name Frente de Liberación Nacional (FLN)
1963 FLN name changed to FSLN
1975 FSLN split into three ideological factions
1976 FSLN founder Carlos Fonseca Amador killed
1979 FSLN reunited and triumph of Revolutionary Insurrection
1979–90 FSLN control of Nicaraguan state and society
1990–200 Known as ‘the 16 years of neoliberalism’
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72000 FSLN regained position of mayor of Managua
2007– FSLN reelected to state power
Sources: Ejército de Nicaragua (2009); Cuenca (1992); Evans (2007); Bahen and Hernández
(2007); Barbosa (2005); Valenta (1985); Equipo Correo (2010); Palmer (1988); Ministerio de
Educación (2011); Equipo Envío (1990); Equipo Envío Nitlápan (2006a); Equipo Envío
Nitlápan (2006b) 
Before 1920
From the middle of the 19th century up until at least the 1920s, the two main political groups 
in Nicaragua were Liberals and Conservatives. Most historic characters can be classified as 
belonging to one of the two groups. Although the terms ‘Conservatives’ and ‘Liberals’ 
originated in European political discourse, one should not mistake them as necessarily 
meaning the same as what is common in Europe. Until the 1930s, the United States usually 
favored Conservative leadership in Nicaragua, and intervened militarily several times on the 
Conservatives’ behalf. Liberals and Conservatives were and are political identities that are not
always directly linked to social class. Until 1979, the presidency went back and forth between 
these two groups. Liberals and Conservatives still exist in Nicaragua, although the group of 
Liberals has fractured into several parties in recent years, all of which claim general 
adherence to the traditions of the historical Liberal movement. 
97
The first notable person commemorated today for being historically significant is Nicaraguan 
soldier Andrés Castro Estrada, who fought invaders from the United States in 1856 by 
throwing stones at them. He is seldom described as connected with one of the political 
groups, although he most likely Conservative. The action he is remembered for is throwing a 
stone at one of the US Americans during a battle. The second person remembered today is 
Liberal President José Santos Zelaya López who governed Nicaragua between 1893 and 
1909 (16 years) and was responsible for the construction of a railway and for drafting a 
constitution that gave women the right to abortion in the case of a pregnant woman’s life 
being in danger. Generally, he promoted a program of modernising Nicaraguan production. 
The third person remembered today is the renegade general and Liberal politician Benjamín 
Francisco Zeledón Rodríguez, who fought against the US troops occupying Nicaragua in 
1912 (Ejército de Nicaragua 2009). 
Augusto Nicolás Calderón Sandino
Augusto Nicolás Calderón Sandino10, the Nicaraguan who the Sandinista movement was later
named after, worked in the Mexican oil sector in the state of Veracruz for 3 years. In 1927 he 
returned to Nicaragua. Nicaragua was invaded several times by US Marines after the end of 
the Zelaya López presidency, and in 1927 the country was again occupied by the United 
States, which intervened in an electoral issue between Liberals and Conservatives, favoring 
the Conservatives (Jansen 2004). 
Calderón Sandino founded a small army, which joined the Liberals in a struggle against 
10 Calderón Sandino was born ‘Augusto Nicolás Calderón’ because his father did not recognize him as his son until 
adolescence. When his father did recognize him (socially speaking), he started signing his name as ‘Augusto C. 
Sandino,’ although, in legal terms, his status in relation to his father had not changed. He has later been referred to as 
‘Augusto César Sandino,’ whereby it is unclear whether he himself started using that name around 1927, or whether it 
was just assumed that the initial ‘C’ stood for César, given the historical precedent of ‘Augusto César’ in the Roman 
empire (Sánchez 2007).
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Conservative forces and US Marines (Ejército de Nicaragua 2009, p. 36). In 1928 the Liberals
decided to sign a peace treaty with US forces and Conservatives, which let the Conservatives
keep the presidency and forced both sides to disarm. Calderón Sandino refused to abide by 
the treaty. He and his army continued fighting against the Conservative regime and the US 
American presence in Nicaragua. Their stated goal was to make every US soldier leave the 
country (Jansen 2004). Calderón Sandino and his men claimed their struggle was 
‘anti-imperialist’ and they fought for ‘nations’ right of self-determination.’ The group consisted 
largely of peasants, and some of its leaders were illiterate, which led to many difficulties in 
debates on theoretical issues (Fonseca Amador 1969, p. 30). It is not easy to determine 
whether Calderón Sandino and his group shared an overall ideology (Jansen 2004; Fonseca 
Amador 1969). 
Somoza
The United States left Nicaragua in 1933, after training an army of Nicaraguans called the 
Guardia Nacional during its last year of occupation. At its head the United States put the 
Nicaraguan General Anastasio ‘Tacho’ Somoza García. The stated plan of the United States 
was for the Guardia Nacional to control uprisings against the constitutional order (Ejército de 
Nicaragua 2009, p. 35). Calderón Sandino was assassinated by Somoza García’s men during
peace talks between the Guardia Nacional and Calderón Sandino in 1934, while the terms for
the decommissioning of Calderón Sandino’s group were being discussed. Calderón Sandino’s
associates were then strongly suppressed. The revolutionary movement died down for 
several years, and 40 years of dictatorship commenced (Palmer 1988, pp. 92–94). 
Somoza García utilised the Guardia Nacional to establish himself as dictator, and he formally 
took over the presidency for the first time in 1936. He and his two sons ruled Nicaragua until 
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1979, although formal sham elections were held throughout the period of the dictatorship. 
Most of the time a Somoza was officially president, with a few minor interruptions. Throughout
this period, one of the Somozas controlled the armed forces. This era is now referred to as 
the period of ‘Somocismo.’ Somoza García acted as dictator of Nicaragua until 1956, when he
was assassinated. His first son, Luis Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was in charge until 1967. 
His second son, Anastasio ‘Tachito’ Somoza Debayle, ruled Nicaragua until 1979 (Ministerio 
de Educación 2011). 
The Somoza dictatorship was brutal. It included torture and execution by firing squad of 
political opposition groups. It was also riddled with contradictions, as the Somoza government
regularly broke the laws it created whenever it seemed the convenient way to secure 
dominance (Borge Martínez 1980). Some controversy exists today as to whether it was really 
the wish of the United States to establish a dictatorship during the early Somoza years. The 
opposing argument is that the majority of US policies toward Nicaragua pointed to 
reestablishing democracy until 1948. Washington even cut off diplomatic relations with 
Nicaragua for an entire year: from 1933 to 1944 US-embassy personnel were told not to 
influence Nicaraguan politics. From 1948 on, the United States did not complain about 
Somoza, and shifted its policy to supporting him openly (Clark 1992). 
The organisation of resistance against Somoza
Towards the end of the period of Somoza García, the struggle against the dictatorship 
commenced. Somoza García was shot and killed by the Nicaraguan poet Rigoberto López 
Pérez of the dissident Liberal party, Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI), in 1956 in an attempt
to end the dictatorship (Evans 2007). Another often-mentioned part of the resistance against 
Somoza in the early years was a student protest march in León on 23 July 1959. The 
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students were protesting a ‘massacre’ of another protest organised by Conservative students 
which happened just prior to that. The León protest march was attacked by the Guardia 
Nacional, leading to four deaths among the students (Manzanares Calero 2002; Barbosa 
2005). 
The Soviet Union initially opposed revolutionary attempts in nonindustrial societies. Its line 
during the Second World War was not to attack Latin American governments which 
cooperated with the United States and the struggle against Nazi Germany. This profoundly 
influenced the principles of the Partido Socialista Nicaragüense (PSN) founded in 1944 
(Fonseca Amador 1969, p. 31). The most famous Somoza-era revolutionary, Carlos Fonseca 
Amador, was originally a member of the PSN. After a visit to Cuba from 1955 to 1956, where 
he allegedly learned about guerrilla tactics and studied anti-imperialism and Calderón 
Sandino, he and his contemporary revolutionaries decided to break with the doctrine of 
nonaggression, and an organised struggle against Somoza formed (Palmer 1988, pp. 94–95).
In 1961 Fonseca Amador and other students founded the party which later became the 
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). Their stated goal was the overthrow of the 
Somoza dictatorship. During the first two years of its existence, the party was known as the 
Frente de Liberación Nacional (FLN) (Valenta 1985, p. 165). The idea to include the name of 
Calderón Sandino in the name of the FSLN in 1963 allegedly came from Fonseca Amador 
(Alegría and Flakoll 2004, p. 146). Tomás Borge Martínez, Interior Minister during the 1980s 
and one of the founding members of the FSLN, claims the image of Calderón Sandino was a 
natural historic reference point for any revolutionary group (Tomás Borge Martínez, cited in 
Alegría and Flakoll 2004, p. 148) with a strategy like that of the FSLN. 
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The FSLN divided into three tendencies
The FSLN fought an 18-year continued struggle, largely underground, until it took over state 
power in 1979. Fonseca Amador functioned as the chief ideologue of the party for most of 
that time, with an ideology of combining peasants’ and workers’ struggles. Fonseca Amador 
advocated the unity of opposition to Somoza among radicals and Liberals. In some texts 
Fonseca Amador (1969) refers to himself as a Marxist and claims the FSLN represented a 
Marxist line without the Marxist-Leninist baggage associated with the PSN. 
The FSLN at first tried to organise using Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s so-called foco-strategy. 
Instead of starting by organising large amounts of people among the urban proletariat, the 
discontented and alienated peasant farmers made for an easy breeding ground of 
ideologically-clear revolutionaries, and once having grown in the countryside to a level where 
small and mobile insurrectionist cells could attack the Guardia Nacional in several 
strategically important points, organising an urban insurrection would be easy (Childs 1995, p.
597). In the following years 1963–67, the strategy did not work very well and many 
Sandinistas were killed. In most countries in Latin America, similar movements were wiped 
out by military forces supported by the United States, but the FSLN managed to survive 
(Palmer 1988, p. 97). 
In the last years before the 1979 insurrection, the strategies and ideologies within the FSLN 
diversified as more people joined (Miranda, D. Ortega, and Gorman 1979; Perez 1992). 
Between October 1975 and March 1979, the party consisted of three ideological tendencies 
or wings, each of which had slightly different ideas about what revolutionaries should do 
under the given circumstances (Equipo Correo 2010, p. 13):
• The Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP) tendency, to which Fonseca Amador belonged,
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believed a prolonged struggle in the mountains in combination with labor struggle in the
cities would be the only way to succeed, and that peasants formed an essential part of 
any revolutionary movement. It represented the views most closely resembling the 
initial ideology of the party. 
• The Marxist-orthodox Tendencia Proletaria (TP) argued that, in the decades after the 
Second World War, Nicaragua had developed capitalism and with it an urban 
proletariat had grown. They believed it was the time to focus on the classic Marxist 
strategy of organising the urban proletariat, and they aimed their organising at this 
sector of society. 
• The third tendency, the Tendencia Tercerista (TT) to which current President José 
Daniel Ortega Saavedra belonged, focused on the need for immediate action. It 
defended the practice of insurrection in the countryside and the city simultaneously – 
as already established. It did so without combining it with most of the ideological 
considerations the other two tendencies entertained (Miranda, D. Ortega Saavedra, 
and Gorman 1979; Perez 1992, pp. 115–116). 
In an interview with Ortega Saavedra, half a year before the takeover of power in early 1979, 
reveals how fragile the coalition within the FSLN was at the time. Ortega Saavedra argued in 
the interview that the TP was just a small group of academics, quite distant from the initial 
ideas of the FSLN, and although they were close to the centers of production, they spent 
most of their time propagandising and not organising. About the GPP, Ortega Saavedra said, 
they were isolated in the mountains, and they did not have real influence either. According to 
Ortega Saavedra, the unity of the FSLN at the time derived from common actions rather than 
commonality in ideology. Simultaneously he explained that the TP was complaining about 
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insurrectionist actions organised by the TT, but he believed they would accept them bit by bit. 
During the entire period of their existence, 1974/75–79, members of all three tendencies tried 
to come up with a unifying strategy (Miranda, D. Ortega Saavedra, and Gorman 1979, p. 
115). 
In the 1986 published version of Carlos, el Amanecer ya no es una Tentación / Carlos, now 
the Dawn’s no fond Illusion, which Borge Martínez originally wrote while incarcerated in 1976,
the author showed differences in strategic outlook made up the disagreement between the TP
and the GPP. Disagreements also existed between the leading figures of the GPP. Fonseca 
Amador stated during internal meetings that the industrial working class would be destined to 
lead a revolution if it was to be victorious, but that the peasant class should not be discounted
due to their prevalence in countries such as Nicaragua (Fonseca Amador, cited in Borge 
Martínez 1976, pp. 39–41). Fonseca Amador’s statement could just as well have been made 
by a member of the TP and was controversial. This gives some idea about the broadness of 
the scope of the tendencies of the revolutionary Sandinistas and their beliefs. 
In the later years of the Somoza regime, opposition to Somoza also grew among some 
bourgeois sectors of society. Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, editor of the newspaper La Prensa, 
was arrested together with 27 other civil leaders for conspiring against the Somoza 
government after calling the 1974 elections fraudulent (Tijerino 2008, p. 296). On the 15 
December 1974, Chamorro started organising a group opposing Somoza. The group involved
Socialists, Liberals and Conservatives. They agreed on their opposition to Somoza, but not all
of them were prepared for insurrection from the bourgeois part of society. Chamorro was 
killed by Somoza’s forces in 1978 (Tijerino 2008, pp. 296–299). The alliance with oppositional 
parts of the bourgeoisie was also part of Ortega Saavedra’s program. Different from some of 
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the pro-capitalist modernisation Marxists, this alliance was to be ‘tactical and temporary.’ 
Ortega Saavedra was asked in an interview how one could avoid the United States 
supporting one’s capitalist alliance partner, who with their help could take control entirely over 
the process. Ortega Saavedra answered, that the choice was to ally oneself with capitalists, 
but not with the traditional capitalist parties. Henry Ruiz, speaking for the GPP agreed, but 
believed a prolonged struggle would make it in the interest of the bourgeoisie to do away with 
“Somoza …, a bastion of imperialism”—and set the interests of the national bourgeoisie 
against those of imperialism (Miranda, D. Ortega Saavedra, and Gorman 1979, pp. 117–118). 
In March 1979, a conference was held in Havana, Cuba, in which the three tendencies 
reunited (Equipo Correo 2010). At this time the FSLN was given a structure of nine 
comandantes, who formed a national directory in which each of the tendencies was 
represented with three people. With that step taken, the tendencies officially ceased to exist. 
The composition of the national directory remained the same until the 1990s (Perez 1992, p. 
117). 
The Sandinista years 1979–90
In July 1979, after an 18 month insurrection against the dictatorship of Somoza Debayle 
(Leogrande 1996, p. 329), Somoza Debayle fled and the Sandinistas took charge. The 1980s 
were, before the taking of power by the Ortega Saavedra government in 2006, the only time 
in the Sandinista movement’s history in which it held power at a national level and its ideology
converted into the ideology promoted by the state. The country was led by a junta rather than 
a democratic-representative government during the first five years. This junta was made up of
three FSLN representatives and initially two bourgeois anti-Somocistas. It established a 
(politically) left-leaning, but not fundamentalist, power base (Pozas 1988, p. 58). 
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Foreign Involvement
Initially, Sandinista leaders tried to forge ties to the US administration in order to gain access 
to funding. The United States under the rule of President James Earl Carter initially 
cooperated to a very limited extend, while pressuring its Western European allies to not 
cooperate with or support the Nicaraguan government. US legislators compared the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua to the Communist Party in Cuba to explain why they could not 
support Nicaragua under a Sandinista-led government (Berrios 1985, p. 112). From a US 
American perspective, the two cases were somewhat similar: Just as in Cuba, the 
revolutionaries initially were not against the United States or opposed to capitalism, but 
non-acceptance and lack of assistance from the United States led to their radicalisation. 
Carter’s limited initial support may be seen as a way of trying to avoid a Cuban-type situation 
(Leogrande 1996, p. 330). 
Under President Ronald Reagan, the United States’ position towards Nicaragua became 
increasingly negative. From 1981 to 1990, the United States more or less openly tried to 
overthrow the Sandinista regime. The United States funded the so-called ‘Contras’ who 
maintained a civil war against the Sandinistas during much of the 1980s. Those involved with 
the Contras often claim the FSLN established a dictatorship in 1979 (Hüeck 2006, p. 9). 
Reagan’s support for the Contras ultimately culminated in the Iran-Contra affair, in which the 
President circumvented legislation designed to hinder him from financing the Contras. This 
prohibition was put into place by the US House of Representatives (USHR) in 1984 
(Leogrande 1996, pp. 329–338). 
Starting in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union invited Latin America to cooperate with the 
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Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the economic network binding Soviet-allied 
countries together. This allowed for countries receiving aid through CMEA to gain greater 
economic independence from the United States (Berrios 1985, p. 111). The Soviet Union was 
not officially involved in the Nicaraguan revolution, and only established official contact with 
the FSLN shortly after the triumph of the revolution. 
During the Somoza dictatorship until July 1979, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union did not 
entertain political or economic relations. Diplomatic ties were established on 18 October 1979.
Soviet embassy personnel did not arrive before January 1980. In March 1980, the Sandinista 
leaders went to Moscow for the first time and signed cultural, technical and economic 
agreements with the Soviet Union, followed by similar agreements with Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, and the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR, German Democratic 
Republic) (Berrios 1985, p. 112). The agreements were in trade and interpersonal exchange, 
which gave university scholarships to Nicaraguans to study abroad and allowed for 
professional experts to be sent to Nicaragua from Eastern Europe. This relationship lasted 
until the electoral defeat of the FSLN in 1990. 
The FSLN structure
From working as a rather small organisation in the mid 1970s, the FSLN quickly changed its 
operational model into that of a larger political party with significant political power. 
The modern concept of political parties first came into being in the 1800s. Among socialist 
and social democratic parties, two basic concepts evolved: Mass parties, which try to grow 
membership as much as possible, and small Leninist Vanguard models. Largely, mass parties
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resemble trade unions in their membership and are made up of broad parts of the working 
population. These parties mostly accept quite different views among their members even on 
their core issues. The life of the majority of the members of these parties is not exclusively 
centered around party membership. Parties following the Leninist vanguard party model try to 
only gather the ideologically most schooled and trained persons within the party. Other 
supporters are not permitted full membership status. The process for joining a party operating
according to the Leninist model is complicated, and may involve several months or even 
years of probation, before membership status is obtained (Lenin 1902, chapter 4). 
The ruling parties in the Soviet allied countries and small communist parties in countries that 
were allies of the United States up until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all tried to follow 
the vanguard party in theory, while Social democratic parties in the west during this period 
followed the mass party model. Some East European ruling parties ended up having a 
membership in the millions and were therefore mass parties and vanguard parties 
simultaneously. 
The FSLN structured itself using elements of both models, similar to how revolutionaries in El 
Salvador organised at the time (Harris 1988, p. 24), and similar to the revolutionary parties in 
Cuba and Grenada during the insurrection period of the revolution. The FSLN operated 
according to a relatively open membership model before taking state power (Harris 1988, p. 
24). After the insurrection, the FSLN turned to a vanguard party model with very limited 
possibilities of joining the party. The party consisted of a self-selected and disciplined elite of 
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revolutionary cadres/members. Many key positions in the state were controlled by members 
of the party. This vanguard party was augmented by a network of mass organisations linked 
to the revolution. The Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos (UNAG) and the 
Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo (ATC) organised larger groups of the population, and 
were two of the main organisations which fulfilled this role (Harris 1988, p. 24). 
The need to include democratic rights in socialist, anti-imperialist struggles received a lot of 
attention across Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s (Santos 1977, p. 188) after being 
absent for many decades (Harris 1988, pp. 18–19). Discussion focused on how to set up a 
political party focused on keeping internal political structures democratic (Lowy, Michael and 
Denner, Arthur 1987, pp. 460–462). An essential part in what set Nicaragua apart from other 
Soviet-allied countries11 was the government’s position on the issue of democracy (Hoyt 1997,
p. 3). The Sandinistas did not forbid opposition parties, and free elections were held in 1984 
and 1990. The FSLN had a goal of always permitting oppositional parties, while expecting 
these to eventually whither away, as they believed they would no longer fulfil a social purpose
(Borge Martínez 1980, pp. 96–97; Ramírez 1984, pp. 338–339). 
Popular participation and direct democracy
After taking power, besides focusing on politics of social justice, Sandinistas looked towards 
politics of popular participation, which they thought essential in the creation of a new type of 
society (D. Ortega Saavedra 1979). Besides the Sandinista mass organisations, there were 
the Comités de Defensa Sandinista (CDSs). These institutions of popular participation had 
been created before the Sandinista revolution and with the revolutionary triumph it was 
11 Nicaragua officially formed part of the nonaligned bloc of countries, and D. Ortega (1979, p. 44) described it as a 
misunderstanding that the country would form part of the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, connections with the Soviet Union 
were close enough for outside observers to describe the country as Soviet-allied.
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organised into groups representing blocks and neighborhoods in the entire country (Hoyt 
1997, p. 57). The CDSs totalled around 500,000 people. It mirrored a similar Cuban institution
employed since the 1970s with the stated goal of preventing bureaucratisation of the state 
(Harris 1988, p. 22). The CDSs were organised as an institution of direct democracy, with the 
members at the base not representing anyone other than themselves. Everybody was 
allowed to participate voluntary. The CDSs were represented in the Consejo de Estado and 
integrated into the dealings of the government at ministerial level through ‘coordinating 
committees’ (Irvin 1982, p. 41). 
The FSLN electoral defeat in 1990
In 1990, national elections were held and the FSLN was voted out of power. The elections 
were part of a peace agreement with some of the groups of Nicaraguans who fought against 
the Sandinistas during the 1980s. Violeta Barrios Torres de Chamorro, won the presidency as 
a leader of a coalition called the Unidad Nicaragüense Opositora (UNO) which included 2 
left-wing groups, and 12 right-wing parties from Conservative and Liberal origins, several of 
which at some level had cooperated since the mid-1980s, but at all times fought between 
themselves. The campaign of Barrios Torres de Chamorro was strongly supported by the 
United States and surprisingly won with 55% compared to Ortega Saavedra’s 41%. Most 
Sandinistas seemed to think electoral defeat was impossible at that stage. With the election of
Barrios Torres de Chamorro, the end of the war was a certainty and on 26 June 1990 the 
Contras officially ended their demobilisation (FRD 1993). 
The government change in Nicaragua in 1990 was one of several cases in which the United 
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States successfully overthrew a socialist government. Access to agricultural production and 
direct foreign investments under the Sandinistas may have constituted reasons for 
intervention in the thinking of the US. The Nicaraguan market for products from the United 
States was fairly limited due to the overall level of poverty. An additional reason for 
intervention may have been the fear of a Sandinista-like ideology spreading to neighboring 
Central American republics, in which revolutionary movements formed simultaneously with 
the founding of the FSLN in Nicaragua. This could have an effect on Mexican politics, and 
with time, the Soviet Union could possible have been able to build an alternative to the 
Panama Canal through Nicaraguan territory. This will always remain mere speculation, as 
long as files on the analysis by the United States of the Sandinistas are inaccessible. 
In the early 1990s socialist regimes in Eastern Europe were not replaced by US allied puppet 
dictatorships with orders originating directly in Washington, the way United States historically 
had done. The countries were turned into allies by integrating the country’s leaders with the 
internationalised global elite. Elitist and liberal, but democratic regimes were put in place and 
formal democratic state apparatuses established. Extensive ideological rhetoric was 
employed on the popular classes to change their aspirations and dreams to be in line with 
that of western countries. In the western hemisphere the same strategy was used on both 
Nicaragua and Haiti. The United States seems to have sought to control these countries 
through obtaining hegemony in civil society (Robinson 1996, pp. 642–643). 
The Sandinistas negotiated a treaty with President Barrios Torres de Chamorro to keep the 
leader of the army, Humberto Ortega12, for half her governing period, until 1993. Barrios 
12 Humberto Ortega Saavedra has the same two last names as his brother José Daniel Ortega Saavedra. In order to 
minimize confusion between the two, only Humberto Ortega Saavedra's first last name will be used in the remaining 
parts of this thesis.
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Torres de Chamorro was only able to govern because she made deals with the Sandinistas. 
She started to privatise many services and abolished the Nicaraguan railway system. The 
next president, José Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo (1997–2002), was very anti-Sandinista. It is said
he required public employees to enroll in his Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC). The 
President of the United States, Bill Clinton, suspended aid to Nicaragua after a hurricane 
during the Alemán Lacayo years, when it was discovered the aid never reached its final 
destination. President Enrique José Bolaños Geyer (2002–07) was vice-president under 
Alemán Lacayo, but once he took over as president, Bolaños Geyer charged Alemán Lacayo 
with fraud. The FSLN at first helped Bolaños Geyer remove Alemán Lacayo’s immunity, but 
then once the PLC split over the issue and when Alemán Lacayo was in prison, switched 
back and forth between Alemán Lacayo and Bolaños Geyer, voting with the party of either 
one, depending on the issue (Ministerio de Educación 2011). 
At some point in the 1990s, as a product of the Sandinistas trying different strategies to 
continue to exert power, it seems the Sandinista movement grew into a more diversified group
with several individuals and subgroups each coordinating their own projects independently of 
the FSLN leadership. In a 1999 interview, Ortega Saavedra described the party as looking like
an ‘anarchist party’ – apparently meaning that it was full of highly studied but not always 
agreeing activists who now ran their various projects relatively independently. He admitted the
‘marked contradictions’ of class in society reflected in the FSLN – some of the FSLN 
members were now to be counted as part of the ultra rich (Gaynor 1999). I understood what 
Ortega Saavedra meant after visiting several projects—of land grabbers or groups organising 
children’s activities—organised by Sandinistas and in the name of Sandinismo, but without 
the party formally being aware of their existence. 
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The FSLN as an opposition force
In the years after the FSLN lost power, the concept of the vanguard party was questioned. In 
1994, a power struggle between an orthodox pro-vanguard faction around Ortega Saavedra 
won against a faction which claimed they wanted to change the party so it would be a more 
open, and an electorally oriented party. After Ortega Saavedra won, the opposing faction lost 
top posts it held in the party newspaper Barricada. Since 1990 the paper operated rather 
independently of the party (Jones 2002). 
The losing faction started a new political party—the Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS)
—which in theory was to be more open to alliances with other political groups, devoid of 
vanguard concepts (S. K. Smith 1997, p. 106) and more of a party of the social democratic 
kind. Most of the FSLN members of the national assembly left the FSLN and joined the MRS. 
In the next elections in 1996, the FSLN won many more members of the national assembly 
than the MRS. Other than these few years, the FSLN always held a substantial number of 
members of the national assembly. These members of the national assembly were essential 
for finding majorities for each of the three Liberal presidents. Additionally the FSLN continued 
to hold substantial power in labor unions, and until 1998 in other mass organisations. During 
this period, the FSLN could theoretically stop orders made by any one of the Liberal 
presidents. Each one of the Liberal presidents committed to signing a number of political 
contracts with the FSLN over the years, in order to avoid such interferences (S. K. Smith 
1997). 
In 1998 the FSLN newspaper Barricada closed down, because the government decided not to
fund advertisement in it any longer. Government advertisement accounts for 70% of all 
advertisement in Nicaragua. The state acting as a major advertiser is very common in Central
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America. All newspapers have experienced a sharp decline since 1990. Between 1994 and 
1997, the number of newspapers sold fell from 68 per 1000 inhabitants to 30 per 1000 
inhabitants. Much of this was due to overall economic problems. The literacy rate fell from 
88% in the 1980s to 66% in 1995. Local companies were drained of capital and could not 
invest. The few people still reading the advertisements were too poor to buy most products 
(Kodrich 2008, pp. 63–71). 
It is widely reported after losing the elections of 1990, Ortega Saavedra met with all the 
solidarity groups and told them to continue to help, but to stop sending the help to the 
government and send it to a net of Sandinista-dominated NGOs, created for that purpose, 
and to send it to the already existing ‘mass organisations.’ The NGOs consist mostly of 
professionals and very seldom do they publicly portray their NGO as being part of the 
Sandinista movement. The internal communication network between FSLN, Sandinista mass 
organisations and Sandinista NGOs was frequently mobilised in order to stop the Liberal 
governments from acting contrary to Sandinista ideology. This approach, famously called 
‘governing from below,’ is what the Sandinistas claim to have done during the 16 years of 
neoliberalism. The ties between FSLN and mass organisations were officially given up in 
1998 (Font 2009, p. 279). 
The FSLN electoral victory 2006
In the fall of 2006, the FSLN won the presidential elections for the first time since 1990, and 
Ortega Saavedra was inaugurated as president on 6 January 2007. He did not win a majority 
of votes to become president. Only 38.07% voted for Ortega Saavedra according to the 
official count. That is less than he received in previous elections. In 2001, 42% voted for 
Ortega Saavedra (2001). The figure for 1996 is 37.75%, and for 1990 40.8%. Each of the 
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national elections of Nicaragua in those elections was won by a Liberal candidate (Equipo 
Envío 1990; Equipo Envío Nitlápan 1996; Equipo Envío Nitlápan 2006a). 
Part of the explanation for the electoral victory in 2006 was a combination of a split vote 
among Liberal voters between the candidates of the Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN, 
29%) and the PLC (26.51%) (Consejo Supremo Electoral 2006). The other part was the 
electoral reform in the 2000. The reform added a special provision that specified in the case 
of one candidate gaining at least 5% more than the second best scoring candidate, only 35% 
of the total vote are needed in order to be able to declare victory. Previously, 45% of the total 
vote were needed to gain the presidency without a second round. The reform was pushed 
through by a permanent alliance of PLC and FSLN as part of an agreement to split all major 
posts in the country between them. This political maneuver is known as ‘el pacto’ (La Prensa 
2005; Equipo Envío Nitlápan 2006a). Taken together and if the election results of 2006 were 
not manipulated, the FSLN electoral victory of 2006 was only due to a lack of unity among 
Liberals and advanced political negotiating on the part of the FSLN and not due to increased 
popular support of Ortega Saavedra and the FSLN. 
Subjective aspects of the history as it is presented
The political history of Nicaragua as presented above is and cannot be complete, as no 
history can ever be complete. I mention the events I believe most important to the 
Nicaraguans with whom I spoke. It is a simplified version, in that most of my informants were 
able to list a much longer list of historical events that are important to them. Some of the 
commemoration celebrations are only held locally in certain villages or cities. These are 
mostly left out, partially due to lack of awareness of all and for reasons of space. History does
figure prominently in many aspects of Nicaraguan social life and in all the following chapters 
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we will look at this phenomenon more closely. 
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Chapter 6
Nicaraguan economic history
Here we look at the economic history of Nicaragua and the underlying development theories 
that seem to have formed the economic policies of the different Nicaraguan governments 
using a perspective of dependency theory as an analytical tool. Notice that we here use it as 
an analytical tool, quite independent from any possible Nicaraguan appropriation of that 
theory.
The Somozas from the 1950s until 1979, the Sandinistas until 1990, and the Liberal 
governments up until 2007 represented very different approaches to achieving economic 
development. Each one of these was connected to one of the theories of how development 
could be achieved for third world countries, that was popular at the time at an international 
level.
We need to understand the economic development of Nicaragua and the different 
development theories that were used in order to make sense of the views on the economic 
aspects of these times expressed by my Nicaraguan informants today.
I here use the framework of Biderman (1983), who divides Nicaraguan history into these 
different phases, based on the relation of Nicaragua to the world market. I expand this model 
up to present times. According to him, there are three development models that represent 
three basic setups of the economy: The Somoza period in which a national bourgeoisie is 
built up, the country develops economically but income gaps are high, The Liberal period in 
which foreign capital is given access and controls most of the economy, and the Sandinista 
period in which it is a stated goal by the state to diminish income gaps while increasing overall
production levels. 
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After colonisation
Once settled after the Spanish conquest, the Nicaraguan economy was for a long time based 
around an agricultural sector dominated by a few large latifundio properties of over 500 
hectares, which produced for export, and many small minifundio properties of under 5 
hectares, which provided for subsistence farming. This structure existed in much of Latin 
America since the time of the Spanish conquest and continues in many places. During this 
phase, Nicaragua provided ample opportunities for the investment of international capital in 
the latifundios. Most indigenous people were killed or sold into slavery. It meant there was an 
almost constant lack of laborers for the latifundios. This problem was solved by preventing 
agricultural laborers from leaving the property they worked on as much as possible, and by 
raising cattle rather than growing crops. Raising cattle required little human intervention in 
comparison with growing most crops. In the 17th century, cattle represented the main basis of
the Nicaraguan economy. In addition to cattle, two cash crops were grown: cacao was 
produced for the Mexican market, and indigo exported to Europe. The combination of the 
three products worked well together for a while. With time competition from other countries 
grew, the labor shortage extended and British pirates made transport increasingly unsafe. 
Thus the production of both cacao and indigo eventually lost profitability (Biderman 1983, pp. 
9–10; Tijerino 2008, pp. 93–97; Román 1975, pp. 13–103). This period lasted until the second
half of the 19th century. 
Obviously, the amount of choice that lay in following this model of development for the 
Nicaraguan state must have been very limited; even if they had wanted to follow a different 
development model, it is questionable whether they would have been able to control 
Nicaraguan farmers and prevented foreign intervention to protect foreign capital. It may be 
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wrong to say Nicaragua followed any particular development theory in this period. If one were 
to specify a theory, it would be that of classical liberals such as Ricardo (1821), seeing a 
value first and foremost in international trade and the specialisation on only one or a few 
products, and following a doctrine of little or no state intervention, as neoliberals preached 
much later. 
The following period, the last third of the 19th century, was a short-lived phase of 
nationalist-bourgeoisie development (Román 1975, pp. 106–107). Coffee-production was 
introduced and production techniques modernised rapidly due to favorable policies towards 
increasing national production levels under 30 years of Conservative government. Even more 
such policies were instituted under the following, nationalist government of Liberal 
President/dictator José Santos Zelaya López (1893–1910). Zelaya López came to power by 
way of a military coup, yet the policies before and after the coup seem to have gone 
somewhat in the same direction. Coffee production doubled in the first few years after 1899 
(Biderman 1983, pp. 10–12; Tijerino 2008, pp. 166–176). The changes that this phase 
brought consisted of, among other aspects, the forced breaking up of indigenous, communally
owned land and replacing it with private individual land ownership in the form of large 
plantations. Laws were passed to require all indebted persons to either find work or go to jail 
(Mahoney 2001, p. 250; Biderman 1983, p. 11). The first professional Nicaraguan army, which
Zelaya López put into place, was used to hunt fugitive workers and send them back to the 
estates where they had worked (Mahoney 2001, p. 249). Another measure under Zelaya 
López was the incorporation of the Atlantic coast into the state of Nicaragua with help from 
the United States, providing unfavorable economic terms to this area, which housed the 
center of US trade (Powell 1928, pp. 45–46). The new government’s policies effectively 
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started the first developments toward a capitalist production model where both land and labor 
became commodities, and the first private bank was established. These were limited in 
scope, and wealth was largely built using massive exploitation of the workforce and lands as 
had been done previously (Biderman 1983, pp. 10–12; Tijerino 2008, pp. 166–176; Román 
1975, pp. 104–106). Zelaya López also tried to diversify trade patterns by establishing trade 
connections to European markets (D. Ortega Saavedra 1979, p. 46). Today, Zelaya López’s 
uprising in 1893 and the writing of a new constitution 1894 are officially celebrated by the 
Liberals on July 11th, but as mentioned, I have only heard Sandinistas speak positively about 
him. They recognise he was a Liberal, but understand the economic policies of that time 
period are more in line with the current Sandinista policies than the policies of the Liberals 
before 2007, in that they favored national over foreign capital. 
Although Zelaya López would not have known it, his policies were somewhat in line with the 
development models that came up after the Second World War. Part of his policies can be 
seen as being in line with modernisation theory in that much of the population was forced into 
capitalist production, and other parts could have been the program of Structuralist 
Dependency Theorists in that he built up institutions necessary for industrial growth at home, 
such as a national bank. It is interesting to note that although Sandinistas identify with Zelaya 
López today, he did not put much emphasis on eliminating social differences within 
Nicaragua. He was definitely not a follower of Radical Dependency Theory. 
Economic policies between Zelaya López and the Somozas
The end of Zelaya López’s government was the end to the phase of nationalist-bourgeoisie 
development, which gave way to a yet another phase of development led by international 
capital. Many of my Nicaraguan informants believed what halted the overall development of 
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Nicaraguan production, was that Zelaya Lopez’s nationalist policies did not continue after he 
was removed from power (Biderman 1983, p. 12). The United States overthrew the Zelaya 
López regime in 1909/10 through a coup and gave control over agriculture back to a landed 
coffee oligarchy. This oligarchy had no interests in modernising the industry they controlled, 
as they made good profits without needing to reinvest much. According to Sandinista historian
Román (1975, p. 106), it was mostly the fear that Zelaya López could cooperate with non-US 
companies in trade and possibly in the building of another canal to compete with the one the 
United States was building in Panama, which led the US administration to this step. 
For the next three decades, private bankers from the United States took control over just 
about the entire Nicaraguan economy. Combined with ever recurring US military interventions
to hinder popular struggles, this meant economic development was not feasible (Biderman 
1983, p. 12). The production practices, such as the planting of low-yielding types of coffee 
and very limited use of pruning and pest control, were not renewed between 1900–50, and 
with a lack of focus on soil preservation, these factors led to a decline in total yields of 4% per
year between 1925–49. As late as 1957–58, the yield per tree or yield per hectare was half 
that of Costa Rica and El Salvador (Biderman 1983, pp. 10–12). In 1951–52, mechanised 
farming was almost nonexistent, and when it was employed it was without much access to 
spare parts or expertise on how the machinery was to be used (Winters 1964, p. 502; Román 
1975). Furthermore, the cattle industry did not modernise in those years and a dairy industry 
did not come into existence before 1943 and 1953 with the installation of the first and second 
pasteurising plants and subsequent modernisation of them (Patten 1971). 
It is not difficult to see that during this period it was once again classical liberal theory which 
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governed Nicaraguan economic policy. Different from the previous phase, at this stage it had 
been proven that the institution of a different type of development policy would be possible in 
Nicaragua – given the absence of intervention by the United States. 
Economic policies under the Somozas
The Somoza period is generally treated as one single period of government during which a 
combination of the Somozas and the interests of the United States governed Nicaragua. In 
reality it included periods with different economic policies. At times the Somozas followed 
ideas of non-interventionists government in much the same way it later was incorporated into 
neoliberal theory. At other times, the government’s policies leaned more towards ideas about 
modernisation theory, with some state intervention to modernise agriculture, and Structuralist 
Dependency Theory with import-substitution schemes. 
The Somoza regimes took the first steps to move back to a phase of nationalist-bourgeoisie 
development with control of international capital in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Although 
very limited and without any great consequence to the overall demographics at first, it used 
the power of the state to encourage the development of new crops (cotton and sesame) and 
started the import of tractors.  The Second World War allowed for the development of some 
limited mining, lumbering and rubber cultivation operated by foreign companies on the Atlantic
coast (Biderman 1983, p. 13). The main economic policies of the Somoza regime remained 
the same until the 1950s, permitting more or less free access to foreign capital and doing 
nothing to close the income gap between rich and poor. In the later 1950s, the policies of 
modernising agriculture dominated to a degree where they could be successful in 
modernising production and elevating the GDP, which grew significantly throughout the 1950s
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and 1960s, with cyclical downturns in 1958–59 and 1968 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011, 
see also illustration p. 208). Between 1950 and 1955, the total number of tractors used in 
Nicaragua grew from 500 to 2500 (Biderman 1983, pp. 13–16). At the same time the, country 
became increasingly dependent on foreign companies like many Latin American countries 
(Muro Rodríguez et al. 1984, p. 70). To counter this trend, import-substitution schemes for the
manufacture of chemical sprays for agriculture, the production of foot wear and textiles, and 
food processing were successfully set up in the early 1960s (Irvin 1982, p. 36). 
The gross value of manufactured exports increased from $4.1 USD million ($27.1 USD05 
million13) in 1960 to $143.1 USD million ($491.2 USD05 million) in 1976 (WB LA and Carib. 
Office 1978, p. 9, see also illustration p. 156). Exports and imports grew rapidly at a similar 
pace during the 1960s and 1970s (Banco Central de Nicaragua 2010a, for imports see also 
illustration p. 155). At the end of the 1970s, industrial production stood for 28% of GDP, 
slightly more than agriculture (Pres. of IDA 1980, p. 1). However, a large part of the value of 
the main industrial export, chemical products, went to pay for those of its ingredients which 
had to be imported (WB LA and Carib. Office 1978, p. 27). Food production remained, 
therefore, the most important source of export earnings. 
By the time of the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the country had—helped by 
an advantageous position in the regional market Mercado Común Centroamericano (MCCA, 
created in 1961) for its agricultural and industrial products—less foreign ownership in the 
agricultural sector than in any of the other Central American countries (Irvin 1982, p. 36). 
Throughout Latin America, the development of import-substitution schemes and with it the 
13 USD05 are USD adjusted for inflation to 2005 levels, using the US Urban Consumer Price Index (USCPI-U).
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buildup of stronger national bourgeois interests spread (Pollin and Cockburn 1991, p. 28). 
Radical criticism of Somoza’s economic policies
In the first few years following the Second World War, the Soviet-allied Partido Socialista 
Nicaragüense (PSN) stated that pre-capitalist countries such as Nicaragua should first 
develop industrial capitalism, before a struggle for socialism could begin. For Carlos Fonseca 
Amador and other radical students who initially associated with the PSN, the economic 
advances under the Somoza regime in the 1960s and 1970s were not enough, and they 
strongly disagreed with the unequal distribution to which these advances in development 
would lead. Fonseca Amador (1969, pp. 24–25) saw the politics of Central American 
integration, during the time of the MCCA, as a project for US American companies to better 
drain the area of its riches and not as a help in terms of enhancing national economic 
development, much in line with how Dependency Theorist Baran (1957, pp. 190–194) sees 
the setup of some infrastructure projects in the third world. Big companies were given rights to
mine and cut lumber for very low fees (Fonseca Amador 1969, pp. 23–25). 
Although GDP grew, development remained fundamentally unequal. In 1951–52, 42% of all 
agricultural land was in the hands of only 1.6% of the population (Winters 1964, p. 501) and 
55% of the total area of privately owned farms in 1952 were held by very few private 
proprietors (Fonseca Amador 1969, p. 24). The modernisation in production that the state 
promoted starting in the late 1950s, meant that big producers—those producing for export—
received preferential treatment over those producing for local consumption (Biderman 1983, 
pp. 16–22; Wall 1993; Dijkstra 1999, p. 212). The focus on export crops led to food being 
grown in the worst possible areas, and in order to feed the population additional imports of 
food had to be made (Fonseca Amador 1969, p. 24). By 1969, cotton production took up 75%
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of all cultivated land (Muro Rodríguez et al. 1984, p. 71). The number of students exiting 
school prematurely and the number of deaths and severally injured due to production related 
incidents reached record levels, even in a Central American comparison (Fonseca Amador 
1969, p. 25). One of the consequences of the state’s policies was more rapid migration to the 
population centers, most of all to Managua. In Managua, various capitalists with close 
connections to the Somocista regime built factories to take advantage of laborers flooding in 
(Wall 1993, p. 2). 
Fonseca Amador and other leading Sandinistas proposed to equalise the development of the 
country, with a focus on equalising economic development in the city of Managua with the rest
of the country (Wall 1993, p. 1). While modernisation led to the creation and strengthening of 
the bourgeoisie and a professional middle class in the cities, especially on the Pacific coast, it
also meant peasants were transformed into urban wage laborers – often unemployed and 
destitute city dwellers (Irvin 1982, p. 37). 
Conflict of interest between bourgeoisie Nicaraguans and Somoza
The Somoza dictatorship managed to keep up high overall growth rates throughout the 
1960s, but the saturation of the Central American market for Nicaraguan products, the 
Managua earthquake (1972), the world oil crisis (1974), combined with cyclical economic 
downturns, led to a downturn at the beginning to middle of the 1970s. This downturn proved 
to be a huge obstacle for the Somoza regime. New investments were increasingly made by 
government borrowing, first through development assistance, then by borrowing in the 
commercial market. By the mid-1970s, debt payments made up one third of all export 
earnings, and the government accounted for 40% of all investments. The ratio of taxes to 
GDP fell in the years following the earthquake from 10.8% in 1973–74 to 10.5% in 1975–77, 
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despite increased income and sales taxes (WB LA and Carib. Office 1978, p. ii) and although 
Nicaragua had the second lowest taxes to GDP ratio in Central America after Guatemala (WB
LA and Carib. Office 1978, p. 23). In 1978, the WB proposed to stabilise the economy by 
decreasing planned public investments 35–40%, only carrying through projects with a high 
socio-economic priority as well as other austerity measures, increasing taxes, and 
augmenting exports to pay down external debts (WB LA and Carib. Office 1978). 
Control of the economy also shifted markedly during the last years of the Somoza regime. At 
the beginning of the 1970s, the Pellas family from Granada and the Montealegres from León 
together were responsible for 20% of GDP (Dijkstra 1999, p. 296). As late as 1975, the 
Somozas were still only the third richest family (Brown 1994, p. 212). Through ownership of 
various enterprises and their rule of the country, the Somozas tried to appropriate an 
increasing part of the total national income. By the end of the 1970s, the Somozas were the 
richest family, and they were responsible for 25% of GDP (Dijkstra 1999, p. 296). 
The policies that aimed to enrich the Somozas in relation to other Nicaraguan capital owners 
led to an increase in dissatisfaction with the regime among the bourgeoisie (Irvin 1982, pp. 
36–37; Brown 1994, p. 212), and much attention at the time focused on the part of the 
business community that disagreed with Somoza and the part they played in the organising 
efforts against the Somoza regime. Relatively little attention is given to that now, either by 
Liberals or Sandinistas. The Somozas were generally described as having been in control of 
just about everything and they are seen as the richest family of that time. A reason for this 
may be that the other two families have survived and the Montealegres finance a great part of
the Liberal opposition. 
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Economic realities and policies under the Sandinistas of the 1980s
The insurrectionist war left the country indebted by $1.5 USD billion ($4.0 USD05 billion), 
most of which Somoza had spent on arms purchased from the United States during the 18 
month insurrection. In order to be eligible for any foreign loans, the governing 
post-insurrection junta accepted the debt of the Somoza regime, although only $3.5 USD 
million ($9.4 USD05 million) was left in Nicaragua’s reserves (Berrios 1985, p. 125). It is 
estimated that 40,000 Nicaraguans were dead and 100,000 wounded (Irvin 1982, p. 37). The 
damage to building structures was valued at around $250 USD million ($672.5 USD05 
million). Capital flight during and directly after the insurrection totalled around $500 USD 
million ($1.3 USD05 billion) (Pres. of IDA 1980, p. 2). In addition to the economic difficulties 
the country inherited from the last Somoza years, these war-related issues had an enormous 
impact on the Sandinistas’ achievable short term production levels and the type of trade the 
country could realistically set up. 
Ideological influences on economic policies
After the successful Sandinista insurrection of 1979, the influence of Dependency Theory on 
the way the Sandinistas tried to set up the country’s economy was strong (Velasco 2002, p. 
42). Jaime Wheelock Román is known for his work Imperialismo y Dictadura: crisis de una 
formación social, which analyses Nicaraguan history in a Marxist Dependency Theory 
perspective, and for being among the nine members of the national directory of the FSLN 
representing the Tendencia Proletaria (TP) during the 1980s. He also became the Minister for 
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform after the insurrection. His book achieved cult status among 
most Sandinistas, especially those not having a background from the Tendencia Tercerista 
(TT), and several reedited editions of Imperialismo y Dictadura: crisis de una formación 
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social, and several other books representing much the same economic thinking, were 
published during his time in government.14
14 The description of the early years of the FSLN in the 1960s and 1970s by Borge Martínez (1990) suggests the theoretical
studies of most central Sandinistas had not gone beyond Marx, his friend and co-writer Friedrich Engels, Lenin, and 
Augusto Nicolás Calderón Sandino. It seemingly did not include much from the writers of Dependency Theory, even 
though their ideas were associated with Sandinismo. The knowledge horizon must have varied quite a bit among leading 
Sandinistas. With his central position in the government, Román did make central economic policy decisions and 
economic theory. In that sense, the Sandinista period represented a period of development with the stated goals of 
achieving more national independence and achieving more equality.
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Illustration 1: Government spending has long been a higher percentile of GDP in Nicaragua and 
Honduras than in the United States and Mexico and at times even Sweden. The 1980s brought the 
government portion of GDP up to more than 40% – almost twice that of Cuba. In the subsequent 
years of Liberal governments it declined to around 20% – still more than twice what it had been in the
1970s. In the period 2006–09, it increased insignificantly by 1.4% per year. The figures are somewhat 
skewed. Until 1979, the businesses of the Somoza family were part of the private sector, even though 
the Somozas and the Nicaraguan state worked much like a single unit, and since 2007 the activity of 
the Sandinista owned company ALBA de Nicaragua, S.A. (Albanisa) has been counted as part of the 
private sector, even though it operates like an extension of the state. Recent figures for Honduras look 
similar to those of Nicaragua, although Honduras did not go through a similar revolutionary process.
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The governing junta nationalised the banking sector, the Somoza property and put foreign 
trade under national control. This put 20% of industry, 25% of agricultural production and 
more than 50% of the service sector under national control. This made up an important part of
national production. In the early 1980s, agriculture represented around 25% of GDP, 
employed 50% of the labor force and generated 70% of export earnings (Pres. of IDA 1980, 
pp. 1–2). In the first year after the insurrection, the public sector share of GDP rose from 15% 
to 40% (Pres. of IDA 1980, p. 2, see also figure, p. 129). Each year in the period 1984–87, 
this figure was higher than 40% (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011), while a much smaller 
part of the total productive sector was in public hands. This made state planning difficult. The 
export oriented industry which still operated was entirely in private hands (Irvin 1982, p. 38). 
In the 1980 and 1981 economic plans, the prioritization made the shift in economic policy 
from the Somoza years obvious. The plans tried to restore the same levels of growth and 
capital accumulation existing in the Somoza years, but with consumption geared toward the 
poor rather than the luxury sector. The idea was that while in the short term, Nicaragua would 
be almost entirely dependent on foreign aid, in the long-term it would be able to lower 
dependency on aid while diversifying its sources rather than relying on aid only from the 
United States (Irvin 1982, pp. 38–39).15
Land reform, trade and oligarchs
The main Sandinista reform in the 1980s within the sector of production was in the area of 
land redistribution. The lands of the Somozas were nationalised and divided out through 
15 With the Sandinistas in power, social scientists of all types flocked to Nicaragua, and the economy was analyzed much 
more than before. Berrios (1985); Irvin (1982); Cuenca (1992) studied the economic reality Nicaragua faced during the 
first few years of the Sandinista rule with no support from the United States, limited support from Western Europe and 
somewhat more support from Soviet allied countries. Many figures that demonstrate economic development are only 
available for the years after 1979 due to this increased interest. It also means that it is not possible to compare all aspects
of the Nicaraguan economy in the 1980s with the years before the revolution due to lack of data.
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agrarian reforms. The titles were not always written out on paper, and oftentimes were just 
informally known by Sandinista authorities at the time. It was believed the first land 
disbursements would be followed by further steps of land reform which would include 
measures to further the collective usage of lands. Land reform on a large scale did not start 
before 1984 (Fonseca Terán 2008d). Altogether around 60,000 families received redistributed
lands, either collectively or as individuals (Tijerino 2008, pp. 313–314). The land titles given 
out generally had provisions in them, such as, land given to cooperatives could not be sold. 
The idea behind this setup was it forbid any future renewed accumulation of lands by the few. 
State run businesses were also part of the Sandinista economic plan, especially in the early 
1980s. Yet quite differently from other socialist experiments, the stated goal by state officials 
was not that all land would essentially be state-run, but rather the growth of an economy 
dominated by a mix of small producers and the encouragement of the formation of 
voluntary-based cooperatives (Borge Martínez 1980, p. 96). Government takeover occurred 
more at the level of foreign trade. Part of taking trade into state hands was done through the 
creation of the Ministerio de Comercio Exterior (MICE) in August 1979 which was to regulate 
everything that entered and exited the country (Berrios 1985, p. 119). 
The remaining two super-rich families, the Pellas and the Montealegres, who had made up 
the oligarchy together with the Somozas, continued to function as important economic 
entities. Several leading activists of the FSLN had direct family connections to the companies 
connected to the Pellas family, the Grupo Pellas, and some had been involved in the 
management of the Ingenio San Antonio, a sugar mill controlled by the Grupo Pellas, during 
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the years of Somoza (Vilas 1992, pp. 424–425). The head of the Grupo Pellas, Carlos Pellas 
Chamorro, stayed in Nicaragua until 1987, and not before 1988 was the Ingenio San Antonio 
confiscated by the government (Everingham 2001, p. 71). This was only due to failing 
re-investments in the plants and it was agreed the state would pay the Grupo Pellas annual 
compensation payments (Everingham 2001, p. 71). Several Montealegre properties 
connected to their Banco Nicaragüense de Industria y Comercio (BANIC) were confiscated by
the state (Everingham 2001, p. 71), but Eduardo Montealegre Rivas, one of the current 
opposition leaders, worked as vice-president of the Banking Investment Group of Shearson 
Lehman Hutton in the United States during the 1980s (GWU 2010). 
Economic involvement of the United States
Just two weeks after the revolutionary victory, at the end of July 1979, a first inquiry was 
made for military aid from the US government. In August of that year, the United States 
decided to give monetary aid of $75 USD million ($201.8 USD05 million) – $5 USD million 
($13.5 USD million) as a grant and $70 USD million ($188.3 USD05) as a loan. In September,
José Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Sergio Ramírez Mercado and Moisés Hassan Morales, the 
FSLN members of the governing junta, went to Washington to ask for military help once more.
Military aid was denied again (Berrios 1985, p. 112). 
In January 1980, the US Congress (USC) legislated that 60% of the already decided upon 
help of $75 USD million was to go to the private sector (Berrios 1985, pp. 112–113). One 
interpretation of this move may be that this measure would fund the opposition to the 
Sandinistas in the private sector (Leogrande 1996, p. 331). In Nicaragua the WB called for 
that – this report warned that too many loans had been given to the public sector and that the 
private sector was lacking behind due to uncertainties in how far Sandinista reforms would go.
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It warned that if Nicaragua wanted to maintain a mixed economy as had been announced, 
more attention had to be given to the needs of the private sector and specifically 
entrepreneurs (WB LA and Carib. Office 1981).16
In February 1980, even more conditions were laid upon the aid by the US House of 
Representatives (USHR) even further restricting access to the limited funds. Altogether 16 
conditions, including that the money be used to buy products from the United States and that 
no economic ties with Cuba were to be established, sought to restrict the options available to 
the Nicaraguan government (Berrios 1985, p. 112). Washington expressed fears that 
Nicaragua would develop into “another Cuba” by spring 1980 (Der Spiegel 1980, p. 191). 
By the end of 1980, the last $15 USD million ($35.6 USD05 million) still to be paid out was 
suspended by the US administration under President James Earl Carter, with the excuse that 
the Sandinistas supported insurgents in El Salvador logistically and politically. On 2 April 
1981, newly elected President Reagan formally suspended the aid altogether (Berrios 1985, 
p. 112; Der Spiegel 1980, p. 191; Veterans Peace Action Team Pre-election Observation 
Delegation to Nicaragua 1989; Dijkstra 1999, p. 299). In its place he put a policy of trying to 
overthrow the Sandinista run government through economic blockade and a war which lasted 
for the rest of the decade. 
An additional economic part of trying to overthrow the Sandinistas 1981–90, was to try to 
block all commercial credit from abroad. Although lines of credit were officially still open due 
to the acceptance of the Somoza debt by the FSLN, the US government tried openly to 
16 The 1981 report is the last WB economic report from the 1980s currently available publicly, but there is no reason to 
believe that the views of the WB changed subsequently.
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discourage any further credits. Often this was done by directly threatening potential lenders. 
From 1981, Nicaragua was on a list of countries to which United States officially tried to deny 
loans, and in 1983, the United States credit rating agencies downgraded Nicaragua’s 
creditworthiness rating from ‘substandard’ to ‘doubtful,’ which made it more difficult for the 
FSLN to obtain credit. This continued throughout the Reagan presidency, and institutions 
such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) were used as leverage to push through 
the ‘no loans’ strategy the United States decided upon (Leogrande 1996, pp. 331–334). 
Involvement of Western Europe / countries allied with the United States
In 1979, the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD, Federal Republic of Germany), Belgium, 
Brazil and Spain turned down Sandinista requests for arms. Only France sold Nicaragua 
$15.8 USD million ($33.9 USD05 million) worth of military equipment in 1981, but due to 
pressure from Washington, all subsequent sales were halted (Berrios 1985, p. 113). 
Nevertheless, in the years 1979–82, Western Europe was actually a greater provider of aid 
than all the state socialist countries combined. During this period 38.42% of the economic 
value of the total amount of aid sent to Nicaragua came from Western Europe, and only 
21.16% from the Soviet allied countries (Berrios 1985, p. 121). 
Even though the United States tried to block aid, often times Western Europe voted with the 
Soviet Union and the nonaligned countries, the group to which Nicaragua counted itself (D. 
Ortega Saavedra 1979). In 1983, when the IDB was to vote on a $2.2 USD million ($4.3 
USD05 million) loan to finish a rural road project already 90% complete, 42 of 43 countries 
voted for the loan. The United States vetoed the loan. In the end it was given as part of a 
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bilateral aid project from the Netherlands (Leogrande 1996, p. 334). When in 1985 the 
President of the United States, Reagan, announced a full trade embargo on Nicaragua 
without approval of the USC by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA), even such close allies as the BRD and the United Kingdom openly opposed the 
move (Leogrande 1996, pp. 338–339). 
Involvement of Eastern Europe and other Soviet allied countries
The biggest giver of aid, in terms of health and education, during those years was Cuba, 
accounting for 23.37% of all help with approximately 4000 citizens on the ground in Nicaragua
in 1985. The Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR, German Democratic Republic) helped 
with education, building a polytechnic institute in Jinotepe17, and gave food in the form of 
wheat. Additionally, Nicaragua received help during extraordinary crises, such as the 1982 
flood disaster, as well as $148 USD million ($290.2 USD05 million) worth of farm machines 
and raw material in 1983, and $24 USD million ($45.1 USD05 million) in credit in 1984 
(Berrios 1985, pp. 120–123). 
Since no western countries were willing to sell arms to Nicaragua, requests were made to 
socialists countries, which were more willing to accommodate them (Berrios 1985, p. 113; 
Dijkstra 1999, p. 299). In the first year, between July 1979 and July 1980, Nicaragua doubled 
the number of countries it had economic and political relations with, most of which had to do 
with its new connections to the Soviet allied countries. 
Starting in 1984, kerosene was imported from the Soviet Union, producing energy which 
accounted for as much as 50% of Nicaragua’s total energy needs in 1985. From 1980 on, the 
17 Jinotepe is a city in the departamento Carazo.
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main export to the Soviet Union was coffee, while the main imports were machinery and oil, 
financed by a 2.5–5% trade credit to be paid back over a period of 10–25 years. The second 
biggest trade partner, and in 1983 the biggest overall trade partner, was Bulgaria (Berrios 
1985, p. 115). 
The Soviet Union became Nicaragua’s main supplier of oil. Until then oil was obtained from 
Mexico (Dijkstra 1999, p. 299). The Soviet Union gave almost no economic aid in the first 
years, 1979–80, when Nicaragua was classified as more a friend than a close relative. In the 
years 1981–83, somewhat more money was given (Berrios 1985, p. 120). This trade with the 
Soviet Union and its allies created friction inside Nicaragua, principally because most 
production was still in private hands, and these private investors didn’t particularly like the 
idea of trading with the Soviet Union (Berrios 1985, p. 117). Writing in the mid-1980s, Berrios 
(1985) predicted the continued existence of the private sector for many years to come. Leftist 
theoreticians Ernest Mandel and Oskar Lange warned third world regimes who were trying to 
introduce socialism, that nationalizing gradually would not work, as the remaining private 
sector, in fear of being exterminated, would sabotage the economy or flee the country (Harris 
1988, p. 28), and Nicaragua seems to have been a good example of just that. 
FSLN leaders argued the economy was not developed enough to be nationalised entirely. As 
late as 1989, Ortega Saavedra argued the speed at which socialism could advance was 
different for different societies, and that in Nicaragua, a speed in accordance with the special 
conditions of Nicaraguan society needed to be pursued (Wall 1993, p. 1). 
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Economic reality
In spite of all efforts, Nicaragua did not do very well during the 1980s in terms of economic 
development. The war drained the economy tremendously, and the economic policies did not 
help alleviate the situation. Full land reform was not in the immediate future. In delivering real 
and measurable economic growth for the masses, Nicaragua hardly improved and towards 
the end of the decade the situation worsened. 
In 1979, $618 USD million ($1.66 USD05 billion) in debt payments were due, 70% to go to 
private banks (Berrios 1985, p. 119). Nicaraguan foreign debt rose from 107.6% of the Gross 
National Income (GNI) to 1210.1% in the period 1979–89 (WB 2011a, see also illustration p.
145). In 1985, the private sector still represented approximately 50% of all trade and did not 
reinvest significant money in Nicaragua (Dijkstra 1999, p. 298). In 1979, Nicaragua had a 
current account surplus of $220.1 USD million ($592.1 USD05 million). By 1985, it had built 
up a current account deficit of $726.5 USD million ($1.32 USD05 billion). This change was 
largely due to the increasing trade deficit and both fell simultaneously until the end of the 
decade (Banco Central de Nicaragua 2010a). Nicaragua kept a trade deficit during the 
1980s18, and the growth in both exports and imports from the Somoza period was effectively 
halted (Banco Central de Nicaragua 2010a). In the beginning of the 1980s, the exports to 
other developing countries went up slightly, while imports from them went down. In relation to 
the CMEA a trade surplus at the beginning of the decade turned into a deficit by 1982 and it 
remained throughout the 1980s. Inflation rates also increased rapidly, and went beyond 
1000% every year in the period of 1987–90 (IMF 2010; IMF 2000, see also illustration p. 203).
18 Nicaragua’s total trade deficit was $344 USD million ($815.3 USD05 million) in 1980 and declined to $241.7 USD 
million ($361.2 USD05 million) in 1990 (Banco Central de Nicaragua 2010a, p. 114).
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Illustration 2: During the time of Somoza and Liberal governments, both imports and exports increased. 
During the Sandinista years of the 1980s, imports declined, but exports declined even more, leaving the 
country with a permanent trade deficit. Before 1979, exports and imports balanced each other out for the 
most part. But since the Sandinista insurrection, imports have always been greater than exports. Instead 
of becoming less dependent on foreign countries, the way the Sandinistas had hoped their policies would 
work, ever since 1979 the country has been more more dependent on the outside world. After 1990 both 
imports and exports have increased once more. Yet, while exports have barely reached the level of the 
1970s, imports are almost twice as high. Values have been adjusted for inflation to 2005 value of USD 
using the US Urban Consumer Price Index (USCPI-U). Source: Banco Central de Nicaragua (2010a); 
USDL-BLS (2011) 
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Much of this did arguably not have to do with the policies of the Sandinista regime directly. 
Foreign investments were generally unattractive due to the initial Somoza debt, so very little 
new capital flowed into the country. According to the CEPAL, Nicaragua did end up doing 
fairly well in the economic slump of 1983, considering a collapse in exports to its neighbors of 
the MCCA (Berrios 1985, p. 129). The economic embargo by the United States and the war 
aimed at destroying the nation’s finances, made economic planning increasingly difficult. 
Besides the war, the negative development in terms of trade would also have to do with the 
fact that most trade shifted from being mainly with the United States and western Europe to 
the Soviet Union and the countries connected to the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) (Berrios 1985, pp. 113–114; Dijkstra 1999, p. 299). In the later years it was the 
gigantic inflation rates which made most economic planning impossible. 
Due to all these problems, plans meant to lead to more equality and to build up national 
industries were abandoned or simplified. It was initially planned to set up a cotton-textile plant 
in northwestern Nicaragua in order to export cotton cloth rather than raw cotton fibre. This 
was meant to decentralise the cotton industry. The project was abandoned, but two similar 
plants were installed in Managua. Several other projects that were built, and meant to 
increase national production in areas such as milk production and hydro-electric power. 
These projects, all built in the subsequent years, were financed by aid money and were highly
technical to such a degree that Nicaragua and Nicaraguans were unable to maintain them 
(Wall 1993, pp. 6–9).
Transition from power
Known as the piñata, the FSLN used the months between February, when they lost the 
election, and April 1990, when power was handed over to the election winners, to redistribute 
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ownership on a large scale. 20% of all land distributions under the FSLN were done in this 
period. Some of these were redistributions for farmers who technically had been using the 
land already and been working on it for a long time. Critics claim much of the redistributing 
was in reality handing over property to FSLN leaders (Cupples 1992, pp. 299–300). The 
newspaper La Prensa listed a number of claimed property transfers, among others: 16,000 
land reform titles were given to Sandinista cooperatives (Mayorga 2005a), Tomás Borge and 
his Fundación Verde Sonrisa obtained USD$ 600,000 through sales of land they obtained 
during the piñata (Mayorga 2005b), Bayardo Arce Castaño became a millionaire and the 
FSLN created 44 companies to administrate the wealth obtained by the party (Mayorga 
2005c, Rodgers 2008b).
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Illustration 3: Official data show that undernourishment fell considerably during the period of Liberal
governments (1990–2007). Source: FAO (2010) 
Liberal economic politics
The Liberal regimes after 1990 started another phase of giving access to international capital 
and limiting state intervention. This was clearly in line with neoliberal ideas about 
development. In Nicaragua, the term ‘neoliberal’ is also what is used to describe the economic
policies of these governments. The years between 1990 and 2006 are commonly referred to 
as ‘the 16 years of neoliberalism’ due to the high rate of privatisations of major areas of 
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economic life, such as the pension system (Téfel et al. 2000), and the principle of constantly 
lowering social program expenditures as instructed by the IMF (Vargas 2006, p. 56). 
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Illustration 4: During the Sandinista years of the 1980s, dependence on foreign money lenders 
increased. It had been hoped that such dependence would decrease. Nicaraguan external debt as a 
percentage of Gross National Income grew from 32.6% to 74.7% following the 1972 earthquake 
(1971–78). Yet the biggest increase happened in the Sandinista years of the 1980s, when it increased 
from 107.6% to 1210.1% (1979–89). In 2007, the external debt was down to 67.4% and that was the 
first time it hit pre-revolution levels. In 2009, it rose once again to 76.2%. The increase during the 
current Sandinista government is much less than what was the case in the 1980s. These figures do not 
include the $17 USD billion ($30.29 USD05 billion) in war-reparations, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in Den Haag had awarded Nicaragua from the United States in 1986 (Equipo Envío 
1991).“Total external debt stocks to Gross National Income [(GNI)]. Total external debt is debt owed 
to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum of 
public, publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of International Monetary
Fund (IMF) credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity 
of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. GNI […] is the sum of value added by all 
resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus 
net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad.” 
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Illustration 5: Foreign debts, including those to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have grown 
constantly since the mid-1990s, under the Liberals and the current Sandinistas. In 2006, the IMF 
forgave Nicaragua its entire debt (Beachy 2006). The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) agreed 
to forgive Nicaragua’s debt in 2007 (IDB 2011). The Nicaraguan debt to the IMF and to other 
multilateral organizations has again grown under the current Sandinista government. In that sense, 
Nicaragua is not moving away from control by the IMF under the current government. Source: WB 
(2011b)
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It was the first non-Sandinista president, Violeta Barrios Torres de Chamorro, who opened the
country for trade with South America and the United States. The Montealegres and Pellas 
were returned large parts of their respective properties, and promises were made to give 
some properties to decommissioned members of the military and the Contras (Everingham 
2001, pp. 71–72). La Prensa and other media claim that among the biggest economic winners
of this period were also those leading Sandinistas who had obtained large properties during 
the piñata, which they now made economic use of (Mayorga 2005b; Mayorga 2005a; 
Mayorga 2005c). 
International economic ties also changed fundamentally. The economic situation on a global 
level changed when the Soviet allied countries fell away as trading partners. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in Den Haag decided by 1986 that the United States was obliged to pay
damages for the war on Nicaragua – a total of $17 USD billion ($30.29 USD05 billion). The 
government of 1990 forgave the United States this debt (Equipo Envío 1991), sold off most 
national industry, and did away with the country’s train system (Grigsby 2005). Instead of 
sanctions from the United States, Nicaragua was integrated into a free trade zone with the 
United States as part of the Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(DR-CAFTA), which was ratified in 2004. 
Among the most prominent parts of privatised public infrastructure is electricity, which was 
privatised in 2000 when Unión Fenosa, S.A., a Spanish utility company, obtained a contract to
run the Nicaraguan electricity system. In 1998, the applicable laws were changed with the 
votes of all parties in a way that allowed for the subsequent privatisation of the electricity 
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network. Two smaller companies, Dissur and Disnorte, were set up to bid on the electricity 
net. There were no counteroffers. Unión Fenosa, S.A. then bought Dissur and Disnorte and 
has since been the sole operator of the Nicaraguan electricity network. Some Nicaraguans 
have since accused Unión Fenosa, S.A. of trying to make a profit by not reinvesting into the 
Nicaraguan electricity system. This was the cause—it is oftentimes claimed—which led to the 
power outages of 4–12 hours in major cities by 2006 (Tortuga – Grupo anti-militarista 2006). 
Discrepancies exist in the views on what counts as Nicaraguan exports. Up until 1996, all 
sources seem to agree Nicaragua had a negative trade balance with the United States. 
Nicaraguan statistics show the same for the following years, but according to figures provided
by the United States, in the years after 1996 Nicaragua exported to the United States more 
than it imported. According to these figures, all trading between Nicaragua and the United 
States totalled just $612.6 USD million ($762.5 USD05 million) in 1996, with the balance 
being $88 USD million ($109.5 USD05 million) in favor of the United States. In 2008, it had 
grown to $1.7 USD billion ($1.54 USD05 billion), with $677.6 USD million ($614.6 USD05 
million) in favor of Nicaragua (US Census Bureau 2009; USDL-BLS 2011). Nicaraguan 
sources show an increase in both imports and exports, yet the balance continues to be in 
favor of the United States rather than Nicaragua. The difference in methodology between how
Nicaragua and how the United States obtained their numbers is that the United States 
included the production data of free trade Export Production Zones and Nicaragua did not. 
The US government sees these as part of the Nicaraguan export, while the Nicaraguan 
government does not. Singer (1950, p. 475) was the first to point out, that in cases where the 
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production is completely and only connected with foreign investment, it creates more wealth 
in the country from where the investment originates than in the country where the production 
takes place. Also Baran (1957, pp. 190–193) made this point. In relation to all trading 
partners, exports and imports once again increased, but different from the time of Somoza, a 
constant trade deficit remained (Banco Central de Nicaragua 2010a, see also illustration p.
139). 
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Illustration 6: The infant mortality rate of Nicaragua has sunk faster than that of neighboring 
Honduras, although government spending on health has been larger in Honduras 1997–2008. 
Liberal and Sandinista governments in Nicaragua have not shown remarkably different results nor 
have Nicaraguan government investments in public health during the Sandinista government 
developed remarkably different than those of Liberal controlled Honduras. Exceptions are found in 
the most recent years: In 2009, when Honduras cut spending markedly following the military coup, 
and in 2010, when Nicaraguan infant mortality rate fell from 2.2% to 1.8% within just 1 year. 
Values have been adjusted for inflation to 2005 value of USD using the US Urban Consumer Price 
Index (USCPI-U). Source: WHO (2011); UNSTATS (2010); UNIGCME (2010); USDL-BLS (2011) 
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Even though the Liberal policies did not emphasise poverty reduction and social 
development, many statistical development indicators for this period point to an overall minor 
improvement of the situation for the majority of Nicaraguans. Infant mortality fell (UNIGCME 
2010), the rate of undernourished Nicaraguans fell (FAO 2010, see also illustration p. 142), 
and the unemployment rate was kept stable (BCN 2007; BCN 2009; BCN 2011). Since the 
late 1990s, even the difference between rich and poor Nicaraguan families seems to have 
diminished (CIA 2011a; Fundación Internacional para el Desafío Económico Global 2009).19
Nicaraguan economics during the second Sandinista government
Ortega Saavedra was sworn in as president of Nicaragua in January 2007, shortly before a 
global financial crisis hit. Employment figures have increased since (BCN 2011; BCN 2009), 
and most other economic development indicators continue in the same positive direction as 
before. Statistics are not yet available for all indicators up to the present, but among almost all
of those available, no radical shift in any direction can be noticed. There are some social 
programs and major economic development projects in place that may affect future statistics 
positively. In a sense, the current situation is somewhat similar to the 1980s, in that positive 
change is promised for the future, yet in many areas and look hopeful, but have not been 
achieved yet. 
The social programs Hambre Cero and Usura Cero, which the Ortega Saavedra government 
started, are aimed at changing production patterns, although with much lower expectations 
19 Although I have tried to find statistics that are verified by international organizations and parts of the Nicaraguan 
government, after having worked with Nicaraguan statistics and Nicaraguans who handled such statistics for decades, 
and who have very little confidence in any statistical figures obtained in Nicaragua, I am not overly confident that not at 
least part of these numbers were made up somewhere along the line. In particular, most of my informants were highly 
doubtful as to statistics that showed that the Gini-index had fallen during the time of Liberal governments.
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than some projects of the 1980s. These are two profiled programs that make up part of a 
series of programs. Hambre Cero is a program which provides a little livestock (one pig, one 
cow, five chicken), shelter for the animals, food and seed to grow more food and training and 
monitoring by the Ministerio Agropecuario y Forestal (MAGFOR) to women in the countryside 
who control between 0.7 and 2.1 hectares of land. The woman then pays a total of $300 USD 
of the money recovered from the sale of piglets, eggs, and other products that originate in the 
livestock back into a fund for her neighborhood. This money is then accessible for future 
collective investments, and is supposed to encourage collective decision making and the 
creation of cooperatives. The program is meant to benefit 75000 families during the period 
2007–11 (Kester 2010). Usura Cero is a program that gives out micro-credit loans to women 
with small businesses, such as small shops in the cities. For 2010, the goal was to benefit 
42000 women and at least a fair share of the money comes directly from donations from 
countries such as Taiwan (Navas 2010). The nationally owned bank ‘Banco Produzcamos’ 
started in 2010. It is supposed to handle the money for the two programs and all similar 
programs and give credits to small and medium producers in the agricultural production 
sector. The creation was for a long time blocked and dragged out by opposition politicians in 
the national assembly. 
While land redistribution is not a policy of Ortega Saavedra, it can be seen in some places. 
The common practice used seems to be to put in doubt land claims of rich landowners 
through the legal system which is dominated by Sandinistas, and thereby unofficially 
redistribute some lands. Presumably such actions only affect a few families. 
Ortega Saavedra has partially retaken control of some of the privatised infrastructure. Unión 
Fenosa, S.A. was forced into selling 16% of the local company in Nicaragua to the 
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government in a deal which gave the government a seat on the board of Unión Fenosa, S.A. 
in Nicaragua in 2009 (Reuters 2009). Energy prices are politically controlled in Nicaragua and
do not entirely follow fluctuations in world markets. For Nicaraguan consumers prices rose 
around 9% in 2007 during a global energy crisis. During this time, government subsidies were
given to public transport. General power outages due to incapable infrastructure happened in 
2007 but were about to end (Fonseca Terán 2007). 
When it was clear that Ortega Saavedra was elected and would assume power, Venezuela 
invited Nicaragua to participate in the Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra 
América (ALBA) network of countries opposed to current global trade structures. It included 
Cuba and Bolivia at the time, and has since grown also to include Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Commonwealth of Dominica, Ecuador, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The ALBA was 
initiated in 2006 with a stated goal of organising trade between its members. Unlike other 
trade networks, the ALBA aims not to liberalise trade, but rather to work as an economic 
mutual aid network. The ALBA is meant to evolve into more and more of a controlled 
economy in common among countries with a similar economic levels of development. This 
seems to be much in line with Radical Dependency Theory. Since 2006, the ALBA has grown 
to include a project of a common virtual currency for trade between the countries and is also 
linked to numerous cultural and educational exchanges (AlianzaBolivariana.org 2011). ALBA 
negotiations in December 2007 ended with a decision to create a telecommunications 
company to be set up by the ALBA members by 2008 and the making of “huge advances” in 
talks to set up a common bank for the ALBA countries to gain more independence from 
changes in the economies of western countries (END 2007). Ortega Saavedra signed 
Nicaragua to the ALBA as the first thing after assuming position (Rodríguez 2007b). The 
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ALBA network was used to bring oil from Venezuela to the Central American republic starting 
immediately in January 2007. By November 2007, a total of 1.55 million petroleum products 
had been imported through the ALBA (N. García 2007). 
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Illustration 7: During the time of Somoza, imports came primarily from
the United States, with the European Union in second place. During the
1980s, Eastern Europe temporarily took the place of the United States.
During the Liberal years, imports from other Central American
countries became ever more important. Mexico became a major source
of imports in 2006–07. In very recent years, imports from Venezuela and
Asia have become almost as important as imports from Central America
and the United States. Despite the political talks about renewed links to Russia during the current 
government, imports from Eastern Europe have not increased significantly since 2007. While in the 
1970s Nicaragua imported from only one major trading partner, imports are now much more 
diversified. Source: Banco Central de Nicaragua (2010b)
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Illustration 8: Exports show a somewhat different picture than imports: exports to most markets topped 
in the late Somoza years and have since been much lower. Only exports to Venezuela are greater now 
than ever before, and the amount of that is still much smaller than exports to the United States, the 
Central American neighboring countries and the European Union. Exports to Eastern Europe were 
never significantly large. The data does not include productions in Export Production Zones (EPZ). 
Source: Banco Central de Nicaragua (2010b) 
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Even though the trade pattern of Nicaragua is in the process of change, a strong connection 
to the United States is still present both in terms of imports and exports. Imports have been 
diversified somewhat in recent years, with the share from Asia and Venezuela growing 
significantly. The share of Central American imports has been even with that of the United 
States since 1990. Exports look somewhat different. The shares going to the United States 
and Central America are the largest, with the European Union share at about half that and 
Venezuela at about a third, but growing rapidly. For all the talk there is of the renewal of 
relations to Russia and the negative view the current government has of the United States, 
trade relations at this point do not (yet) reflect that. 
For Nicaragua, private ownership still stands quite central, more so than in some other ALBA 
member countries, reflecting in the way the Nicaraguan part of the agreement was set up. 
Through a layer of two sub-companies, revenues from oil sales in Nicaragua are paid to the 
company ALBA de Nicaragua, S.A. (Albanisa), which is 60% owned by Venezuelan state oil 
company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and 40% by ‘unknown partners’ in 
Nicaragua. Albanisa then splits the revenues, sending 50% to the Venezuelan state, 25% to a
social development fund controlled by ALBA and it is not quite clear where the remaining 25%
goes. José Francisco López Centeno is at the time simultaneously secretary of finances of 
the FSLN and vice-president of Albanisa (N. García 2007). 
The role of the FSLN in relation to private capitalists is at times unclear. At the celebrations on
19 July 2009, Ortega Saavedra officially thanked the Pellas, for staying in Nicaragua 
throughout the 1980s, and Sandinista controlled labor unions held celebrations in honor of the
company, for the stated reason of the company having helped Nicaragua. At the same time, 
during much of 2009, protesters against the Pellas installed themselves at the Rotonda 
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Metrocentro, claiming they are former workers of the Ingenio San Antonio who now suffer 
from chronic renal insufficiency. According to them, up to 3000 workers died due to renal 
insufficiency they believe is caused by the usage of pesticides. Those organising these 
workers seem to at least unofficially be directly connected to the FSLN. The official line of the 
FSLN leadership is to recognise the continued importance of the oligarchy, which according to
them consists of the same families that were rich in the time of Somoza (Cuadra Núñez and 
Fonseca Terán 2010a, p. 2) and according to others the leaders of the FSLN have 
themselves turned into part of the oligarchy. There seems not to be universal agreement on 
this issue among FSLN Sandinistas. According to an article in the Christian Science Monitor 
as well as reports of certain academics, drawing on statements from La Prensa and 
opposition politicians, Ortega Saavedra himself has become one of the richest people in the 
country (Rocha 2004; Rodgers 2008a, p. 113; Rogers 2009). 
The newspaper La Prensa has brought forward allegations that the daughter-in-law of Ortega 
Saavedra was involved in a corruption scandal relating to the take-over by Albanisa of 
previously foreign-owned parts of Petronic (Enríquez and Martínez 2012). Similar charges 
have been made by opposition media since the beginning of Ortega Saavedra’s second 
presidency. The government has generally not responded to these allegations, and according 
to the journalists investigating the stories, the FSLN and the government have been extremely
unhelpful in their investigations. It can not be said with certainty whether and which properties
Ortega Saavedra controls. 
The Sandinista policies of today seem a bit contradictory at this stage. There seems to be 
more of a willingness to cooperate with private capital and much less ambitious plans for 
fundamental economic changes than was the case in the 1980s. At the same time, grassroots
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organisation against big capital continues, and the state is taking some control back and 
helping some poorer sectors in becoming more independent. If the official data is to be 
believed, class differences among Nicaraguans are in rapid decline (see also illustration p.
212). Some of these data may be easier to understand in a few years, when one knows 
where the current development leads.
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Chapter 7
The politics of history
In chapter 5 we looked at some of the highlights of the past century in Nicaragua. In this 
chapter we will look at how this history is seen by different groups of Nicaraguans. It must be 
emphasised I cannot say anything about Nicaraguans I did not speak to and the debates 
about some of these themes may be limited to a small number of people. The same event 
can be seen in several ways. Other events are focused upon only by one or a few groups. 
The philosopher Hodges (1986) tried to intervene in this debate and determine the true 
course of events surrounding the years of Sandino. This is not what I will do here. Instead, I 
seek to investigate some of the more common versions of the past which exist and look at 
what makes them similar – the relation between Nicaraguan activists and international 
movements. The following sections give a basic overview of some of the main historical 
points discussed. Even more about the theme of history telling can be found in the following 
chapters, and should give the reader an idea of the magnitude of this phenomenon. 
Sometimes it is possible to see the same event as having been caused by either Nicaraguans
or non-Nicaraguans. In most cases, the version which emphasises Nicaraguan historical 
agency is preferred by all Nicaraguan groups I met, even though they disagree on most 
everything else. Also Hodges claimed the Sandinistas learned from revolutionaries all over 
the (third) world and had then tried to reinterpret Sandino in this sense. Hodges sees this as a
systematic and efficiency-oriented program used by the FSLN-leadership in order to go 
beyond the program of the initial Sandino, and he sees this as a major reason why some 
Contras claim that the FSLN has betrayed Sandino. I seek to expand this to go beyond the 
Sandinistas and to go beyond the individual Sandino and to more concretely show a pattern 
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of reinterpreting history in a manner that puts Nicaraguans at the center point of all events. 
I start out by giving an overview of the anthropological debate concerning culturally 
dependent concepts of memory, then explain how the concept of historical memory applies in 
Nicaragua. I give an overview of the discussion about political history and historical agency in 
Nicaragua. The term ‘historical agency’ has been used in various ways within the field of 
anthropology. I use the term in the way Graeber defines it, “the capacity to make history,” with 
history defined as “the record of those actions which are not simply cyclical, repetitive, or 
inevitable” (Graeber 1996). The understanding employed here is generally looking at agency 
on the level of the individual. What it means to have ‘power’ is a bit more complicated. Having
historical agency implies power the way it is used in Nicaragua, but also countries or groups 
(or foreign individuals) can have power without having historical agency in that what they do is
not influencing the course of history, but rather makes it stay on its inevitable course. To 
describe this type of power, I have throughout this thesis chosen the word ‘mechanical.’ 
For this chapter, I draw first and foremost upon the general political journalism I undertook, 
which gave me an insight into how non-Sandinistas tend to explain historic realities, and I 
conducted interviews with old revolutionary fighters who started the organisation ‘Amigos,’ as 
they tended to be the most thorough in their explanations of the recent historic realities of 
Nicaragua.
Political identities in Nicaragua
Individual identities in the Spanish-speaking part of Nicaragua contain a very important 
political aspect. A typical introduction of a person introducing himself to a group of 
Nicaraguans he has never met would be: “Hi, I am Jorge, Sandinista and worker.” This Jorge 
need not be a member of one of the Sandinista parties in order to state this. He could be 
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participating in an explicitly Sandinista cooperative or some other organisation which is not 
directly linked to the Sandinista parties. He could also not be member of any group and just 
voting for one of the Sandinista parties or even not voting at all and just trying to follow what 
he sees as Sandinista principles in conducting his life. Nevertheless he could claim to be a 
Sandinista if he feels he is one. The popular participation and identification with political 
groups connected with different economic interests, has been present for a good while in 
Nicaraguan society, at least the among the workers of western Nicaragua (Gould 1989: p. 
160).
The two groups with most political influence in Nicaragua are currently the ‘Liberals’ mostly 
connected with the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) and the Sandinistas aligned with 
the party Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). Two other fairly large groups are 
Sandinistas aligned with the party Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS) and 
‘Somocistas.’ Somocistas are the only large group which generally will not speak about 
themselves as a group. Smaller groups are the ‘Conservatives’ and those affiliated with the 
‘Contras’ (from ‘contra-revolutionaries’), who fought against the Sandinistas in the 1980s and 
who now tend to use the term Resistencia to describe themselves rather than Contras. This 
term is still used by other Nicaraguans to describe them. In addition, countless tiny groups of 
people, mostly without formal organisation, cross all the above categories in very local ways. 
What all groups have in common is they refer to a group that was in power in Nicaragua some
time during the last century, with very abrupt and mostly not very democratic shifts between 
them. For the Sandinistas several phases exist which are thought to have exerted power and 
which are referred to with differing importance by different Sandinistas. That is an important 
factor as to why history lives in everyday life. When a Nicaraguan is currently affiliated with 
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one particular group, it normally also means that in his interpretation/discussion of the past he
will emphasise certain historical moments in a way which makes his particular group seem 
significant. 
Ideological differences between the groups mean differences in how historical events are 
understood and how history progresses. The fact that the same history can be understood in 
several ways has a tradition in Nicaragua from before the time of the Sandinista movement 
(Gould 1989). An idea of dependency between the core and peripheral countries manifests 
itself in most accounts from members of all political groups, but with different amount of 
emphasis. In general Sandinistas have a strong overtone of Dependency Theory included in 
any history telling (Velasco 2002). That applies also to written historical works that originate 
within the Sandinismo project, written by high-ranking activists of the FSLN such as Román, 
Fonseca Amador, and Fonseca Terán (2008c). Pronounced supporters of the Contras or the 
Somozas seem to largely agree on the exploitative aspects the first world has towards 
countries like Nicaragua. Liberals and Conservatives emphasise this aspect less. 
The controversies around historical representations in Nicaragua
Historical representations in Nicaragua are selective and have to do with the politics one tries 
to promote in current times. This has been shown among others by the historian Elizabeth 
Dore (2006). She looked at the influence particular history writings had on the politics of 
Sandinismo of the 1980s and how leading actors in the state used their interpretations of 
history to further a political program. In particular, it is Jaime Wheelock Roman's Imperialismo
y Dictadura: Crisis de una Formación Social that she explains was the basis for the politics of 
the party. Additionally, the FSLN quickly established historical studies after taking power in 
order to further their own version of the past. Given her own research on the village of 
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Diriomo, Dore quickly discovered the town/village does not appear in the Sandinista discourse
on history, not because nothing has happened there, but because Sandinista historians 
decided to focus on other events used as the official history at a national scale.
The historian Jeffrey Gould (1990) explored the history of agricultural workers in 
North-Western Nicaragua, and through that he also focused on how history is often employed
to legitimise one's own action in the present. Gould's analysis is locally focused in just one 
departamento of Nicaragua, and it was done with the backdrop of an official, state-sanctioned
Sandinista version of historical events, against which farmers build up a counter-hegemonic 
version which put a positive emphasis on historical figures that the campesinos he talked to 
believed followed a political line that would have favored themselves. 
David E. Whisnant (1995) looked upon the difference in how certain historic persons were 
portrayed -- Augusto Sandino Calderón or Ruben Dario by the Somoza regime in comparison 
with the Sandinistas of the 1980s, as well as Sandinista activists during the Somoza years. 
He makes it clear a significant amount of myth building was involved that related to legitimise 
current political actions, or to delegitimize these. Much like the other two authors, Whisnant 
seems to write about a period during which it was very clear that the state sanctioned a 
certain version of historical events in a much more specific way than what is the case now.
Different from Dore, Gould and Whisnant, I do here not seek to find the official history of the 
Nicaraguan state during a certain period -- a task which it would seem would be much harder 
now than in the 1980s, given there are so many versions of the past among state officials -- 
nor a version of history that contradicts such an official version. I investigate versions of the 
past I could find among my informants and then to look at what points they have in common.
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I present some of the main points of how history is discussed by my informants and, through 
that, give an idea how these themes are discussed generally in Nicaragua today. The point I 
make with this is, although some parts of Nicaraguan history remain highly controversial and 
are presented in very divergent ways generally linked to the ideological group of the person 
telling it, all versions seem to put agency in the hands of Nicaraguans and very seldom 
acknowledge some thought or action originated outside the borders of Nicaragua. 
From the 1850s to 1920s
It is generally accepted today, from the 1850s to the 1920s the United States could invade 
Nicaragua without having to face too much resistance. This worked until the advent of the 
anti-imperialism movement of Augusto Nicolás Calderón Sandino in the 1920s. Among 
Sandinistas, the invasions of the United States are not presented as a result of a conscious 
decisions. Instead, the United States merely acted mechanically like any empire would. Those
portrayed as having historical agency are those Nicaraguans who—ultimately unsuccessfully
—opposed the interventions of the United States or those who are claimed to be responsible 
for inviting the US military to Nicaragua. 
My Sandinista informants today generally identify with the Liberals of this time period. Those 
Liberals and Conservatives to whom I spoke with generally do not have much to say about 
the time period. My Sandinistas informants claim the Liberals invited the troops from the 
United States who Andrés Castro Estrada fought, and the Conservatives brought the 
intervening troops from the United States which then removed President José Santos Zelaya 
López. When I asked Carolina Fonseca Icabalzeta when US interventionism in Nicaragua 
started in the 20th century she answered:
That was in 1909/10, when the Conservatives invited the United States to intervene against 
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President Zelaya [López].
Her father, Fernando Fonseca, proudly explained how his grandfather had first fought with 
Zelaya López and how that also was part of the foundation that inspired some of his later 
deeds as a Sandinista:
As a family we have an ancestor […] my grandfather, who [fought] in the revolution of 
Zelaya [López]. […] But after a while he lost faith in Zelaya [López] because he saw his 
project as unrealistic and later opted for [Calderón] Sandino, as a Liberal. So as a child I 
was influenced by my grandfather. Not because he made me… convinced me of anything, 
but rather because I saw how certain people came to visit him. They were very old and 
came from Honduras, because he had been exiled in Honduras for 11 years.
Two of the three main national heroes from before 1920 recognised by the Sandinistas today 
were Liberals – Zelaya López and Benjamín Francisco Zeledón Rodríguez. Those Sandinista 
informants who I pressed on an opinion about the party political affiliation of Castro Estrada, 
admitted he was most likely a Conservative, but generally not much focus is put on his party 
affiliation. All three from this time frame are now celebrated by the Sandinistas for their acts of
defying the United States, and not by Liberals or Conservatives. Castro Estrada is pictured as
throwing a stone at a US American soldier. Oftentimes he stands next to Calderón Sandino, 
as part of the branding on many government products and websites under the current FSLN 
government. The explanation by Sandinistas as to why they focus more on these persons 
than other political groups, generally centers around their nationalism and struggle against 
intervention by the United States. 
Calderón Sandino
Calderón Sandino is today regarded as the founder of the modern-day anti-imperialist 
struggle in Nicaragua by all my Nicaraguan informants, although anti-imperialism in the form 
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of native American struggle against European invasion existed earlier. According to Fonseca 
Amador (1969, p. 29), Calderón Sandino’s actions were part of a Nicaraguan tradition of 
violent resistance as a response to the very violent exploitation, and this tradition was not the 
same as what existed in other parts of Latin America. Perhaps as an explanation, Sandinistas
often recount how Calderón Sandino, at 17, watched the lifeless body of Zeledón Rodríguez 
dragged through the streets after his death (Calderón Sandino 1929), and how this had a 
profound effect on Calderón Sandino’s view of the world. Yet, anyone who stays in Nicaragua 
for a few minutes and takes his first taxi ride will very likely hear about Calderón Sandino and 
how he initiated the struggle, as it is one of the most discussed themes, both among Liberals 
and Sandinistas. A great deal of the ideology and organisational model of those calling 
themselves Sandinista has changed since the days of Calderón Sandino. The concept of 
imperialism as a force negatively influencing the people in Nicaragua and other third world 
countries, continues to play an important role as part of the Sandinista ideology (D. Ortega 
Saavedra 1979), but also many Liberals seem to have taken parts of it to themselves. 
Calderón Sandino in this sense is strangely less controversial among my Nicaraguan 
informants than one may have thought given that one of the two main political groups invokes
his name and the other does not. 
Sandinismo and the forgotten debate on Imperialism
Although the Sandinistas today often refer to Calderón Sandino and all that he did, the 
version they focus on is somewhat tainted. One of the more important concepts connected 
with Calderón Sandino is that of ‘anti-imperialism.’ In his 1933 proclamation To abolish the 
Monroe doctrine, written to defend the establishment of a small rebel army to rid the country 
of US occupation soldiers, Calderón Sandino specifically named imperialism as the enemy:
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…Deeply convinced that the grotesque Yankee imperialism, day by day is infiltrating the 
domestic and foreign policy of Central America, turning our cowardly leaders into 
mummies – the vibrating spirit of the Indo-Hispanic race becomes at this time the 
Autonomous Army of Central America to save its racial dignity, flinging militarily, 
politically and economically away from its territory the Wall Street bankers, even if to do 
this we will have to leave our bodies dead, lying face up towards the sun (Calderón 
Sandino 1933).
When I first read of Calderón Sandino and his reference to the term ‘imperialism’ and 
‘anti-imperialism’ I was reminded about the discussion of the same terms in Europe just a few 
years earlier. ‘Anti-imperialism’ was a concept developed in the international socialist 
movement only a few years before Calderón Sandino’s entry into Nicaraguan politics (Lenin 
1917c; Luxemburg 1913; Bukharin 1920). Around the First World War and the time of the 
creation of the Soviet Union, the issue of imperialism was highly debated in various forums 
worldwide. Different Marxist theorists pointed to slightly different aspects. To a certain degree 
Marxist theoreticians clearly disagreed, but in the end their common framework was that they 
saw the entire world as part of one single capitalist system, which evolved and now spanned 
the entire planet and had an exploitative character. 
Closely linked, was another term often used when discussing Calderón Sandino, that of a 
‘nation’s right to self determination’ (Lenin 1914) – a concept that continues to be a central 
part of Sandinista ideology (Hoyt 1997, p. 16). At the time of Calderón Sandino, this concept 
was somewhat more controversial, and critics said it is not always clear what constitutes a 
nation and why these nations’ interests—which they saw as nothing more than a product of 
the establishment of capitalism—should be part of socialists’ program for change (Luxemburg 
1908–1909). Altogether the theories of ‘anti-imperialism’ and ‘nations’ right to 
self-determination’ do deliver the ideological groundwork for the organising of revolutions in 
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third world countries such as Nicaragua with the objective of not only overthrowing the local 
government, but also hurting the international capitalist system. Thus it is not strange 
Calderón Sandino would make use of these terms. 
H. Ortega (1980, p. 53), brother of Ortega Saavedra and leader of the armed forces during 
the 1980s, claims in his writings that Calderón Sandino was about applying concepts and 
ideas present at the time to Nicaraguan reality. Fonseca Terán (2010a, p. 48) defends the 
same hypothesis, that Calderón Sandino referred to the international debate occurring at the 
time, when he invoked the term ‘imperialism.’ 
Interestingly, while my initial idea seemed supported by those written by Nicaraguan sources, 
I never heard about the influence of the European debate in conversations with Sandinistas or
other Nicaraguans. It is often argued that Calderón Sandino’s anti-imperialism came 
‘naturally’ through living under such exploitative conditions and seeing what happened to his 
country. This interpretation of the ideological origin of Calderón Sandino’s struggle places all 
historical agency in Nicaraguan hands and it leads away from any possible European or 
outside influence. 
In the case of third world countries, the concepts of anti-imperialism and of the right to 
self-determination were and are attractive concepts not only to left-wing revolutionaries who 
want to change the entire structure of society, but also for those from the elite who are quite 
pleased with their position within their own society, as the perpetrator of most exploitative 
mechanisms is placed outside the country. Potential political support from the local 
bourgeoisie may be a factor why leading Sandinistas chose to leave out the connections to 
international radical movements the term had in the past, when speaking about 
anti-imperialism in a Nicaraguan context. 
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Calderón Sandino – nationalist or socialist or ?
In the many conversations I had with Nicaraguans of all types, Calderón Sandino sometimes 
is portrayed as having gained knowledge about radical politics through his stay in Mexico and 
meeting left-wing ideological groups of different types. Others deny all ideological connections
to Mexico. The denial of Mexican involvement is generally assumed by those Sandinistas who
put a lot of emphasis on the nationalist character of the early Sandinista movement, who 
prefer to focus on the nationalist aspects of Sandinista ideology. 
The disagreement is part of a wider disagreement among Sandinistas today as whether 
Calderón Sandino was a nationalist or a socialist, and if he was a socialist explicitly or 
implicitly. Most Sandinistas I met who believe he was a socialist, believe he was so implicitly 
through his belief in anti-imperialism, having lived under very exploitative circumstances in 
Nicaragua and reject his alleged learning experience in the Mexican class struggle (Leiva 
1982, p. 165). Part of the proof employed to defend this view is that Calderón Sandino, at one
point in time, is said to have claimed land for his soldiers, to be run as cooperatives. This, 
they believe, gives some insight into Calderón Sandino’s general view on how society should 
be run. 
In contrast to this stands Somoza García (1976, pp. 150–151), who portrays Calderón 
Sandino as a communist by linking him to communist contacts in Mexico. Calderón Sandino 
tried in some of his letters to combine liberalism with communism and Christianity, calling 
Jesus of Nazareth a revolutionary and communist (Calderón Sandino, cited in Somoza García
1976, pp. 251–255). Calderón Sandino made this alleged statement without any reference to 
any of the greater socialist theoreticians. Some of the most well-studied of my Sandinista 
informants claim that the documentation of Somoza García is a falsification, yet among 
171
Sandinistas, similar viewpoints about the character of Calderón Sandino remain present. 
Fonseca Terán, who describes himself as a ‘Marxist–Leninist,’ focuses on the involvement of 
cadres sent by the Communist International in Calderón Sandino’s group. In addition, 
Fonseca Terán mentions that Calderón Sandino made an international call for workers to join 
the labor union associated with the Communist International (Fonseca Terán 2010a, pp. 
48–49). This view is the one which makes Calderón Sandino most explicitly a socialist. It is 
generally agreed that Calderón Sandino was not a studied Marxist, but those who follow less 
prominent radical ideologies within Sandinismo, generally try to base their belief in the actions
of Calderón Sandino. Carolina Icabalceta Garay, a Sandinista and history teacher in 
Managua, sees herself as an anarchist:
When [Calderón] Sandino worked in Mexico, in the petroleum company […] there was a 
lot of presence of the labor union movement which was very influenced by the 
anarcho-syndicalism that came from Europe. I think […] that the anarcho-syndicalists 
have greatly influenced the political left of Latin America. Yes I know that in the Sandinista 
party, when you speak of anarchism you receive a reaction like “argh, crazy-talk! Marx 
and Lenin!” I really think that’s sad, because one has to learn from all.
Icabalceta Garay did not try to say that Calderón Sandino was an anarchist, but it is clear that
she thinks he must have been influenced in his political thoughts by this ideological tradition. 
In some of the written literature I find similar claims. Muro Rodríguez et al. (1984, p. 42) 
describes how Calderón Sandino encountered anarcho-syndicalists and socialists groups 
while working in the Mexican oil sector some years earlier. This may have provided him with 
direct access to the European debate on anti-imperialism and nations’ right for 
self-determination. Icabalceta Garay is the only one of my informants who used the precise 
word ‘anarchist’ to describe herself. However, this exact passage is essential for most who 
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claim that Calderón Sandino had a left-wing ideology of some kind. Instead of anarchism, it is 
generally whatever ideology they follow themselves they claim Calderón Sandino picked up in
Mexico in this way. It is as close to an admission of foreign influence on the thoughts of 
Calderón Sandino as one can get among Sandinistas. 
Some of my Nicaraguan informants claimed they adhered to the original Calderón Sandino 
and the vision of anti-imperialism he held, but that he did not hold the socialist views that 
Sandinismo later entailed, and this misrepresents Sandinismo during the time of Calderón 
Sandino. Some of these people today identify with the Contras. I also meet Sandinistas with 
this same view. These generally think the current government should act more nationalist and
less socialist. 
One focus point when it comes to Calderón Sandino’s possible rejection of radicals, is his 
treatment of the El Salvadorian Marxist Farabundo Martí. Martí, according to most 
descriptions, fought together with Calderón Sandino against occupation of the United States. 
The stories diverge on how their cooperation ended. Rigo Sampson Davila, who is said to 
represent the right-wing of the FSLN, explained the issue to me as that once Calderón 
Sandino discovered Martí’s Marxist belief, he told him to leave the country within a day or so. 
Sampson took that as proof that Calderón Sandino was not particularly fond of Marxism or 
socialism. Fonseca Terán (2010a, pp. 48–49) describes the situation as a product of the 
Mexican communist party thinking which complied with the newest party line of only working 
with movements who explicitly worked towards socialism, and that Calderón Sandino honored
Martí upon his death in 1932, and made it clear that he never was in disagreement with the 
ideology of Martí. The difference in opinion on who Calderón Sandino was and how he should
be classified using today’s political categories seems to be present at all times in the 
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self-presentation of anyone who claims to be a Sandinista. 
In all versions of Calderón Sandino’s encounters in both Mexico and with Martí, the ultimate 
decision making power is portrayed as lying in the hands of Calderón Sandino and whatever 
may have come from outside Nicaragua only came as inspiration and a starting point for his 
own ideological development. Historical agency lies again with a Nicaraguan. The difference 
in opinion as to what ideology Calderón Sandino really held, is not reflected in the way 
Sandinistas generally present what Sandinismo means to them. An example of this can be 
seen at the start of the interview with one of the members of ‘Amigos’, Víctor Cienfuegos, 
previously a revolutionary fighter now in charge of a social club for common people in a 
poorer area of Managua:
I think that in order to understand Sandinismo, to understand the nationalist character of 
Sandinismo, one needs to understand the figure [Calderón] Sandino. One needs to know 
where [Calderón] Sandino came from, what Sandino fought for. Because we, the 
Sandinistas, follow [Calderón] Sandino. He is the base, and we also have [ideological] 
fathers, [like] Carlos Fonseca [Amador], who also formed Sandinismo. […] Generally, 
people come who don’t know the history. They come and ask us very basic, very 
fundamental things […about] the spirit of Sandinismo, the nationalism of Sandinismo. […] 
So we are continuing this nationalism of [Calderón] Sandino. We are not communists, not 
orthodox [Marxist-Leninists], nor do we have anything to do with internationalism. We are 
very nationalist. [Calderón] Sandino was a guy who was nationalist, who fought to give 
Nicaragua back to the Nicaraguans. […]
As this passage from the interview shows, Cienfuegos seems to be irritated by the fact that 
foreigners do not know the real Calderón Sandino, yet his own definition of Calderón Sandino 
and Sandinismo is very specific and is not shared by all other Sandinistas. Observing the 
difference in ideas about what Sandinismo means for different Sandinistas may very well 
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have been what led other foreigners to ask him what it means for him in the first place. The 
description of Cienfuegos once more falls into the pattern of placing only Nicaraguans into the
center of all attention. Possible foreign influences on Calderón Sandino or Sandinismo are not
considered. 
Calderón Sandino – a foreign agent?
A version of the history of Calderón Sandino not getting any attention, is one in which the 
concrete actions of Calderón Sandino may have been much more influenced by another 
country. While some Sandinistas put some focus on the ideological influence from Mexico, no 
Nicaraguan I have met, no matter what ideological camp, ever focuses on the possible 
importance of economic support for Calderón Sandino from the Mexican government. While 
all other aspects of Calderón Sandino receive a lot of attention, any possible connection with 
Mexico is at best portrayed as being of an ideological kind. 
Historian Toynbee (1927–1930, pp. 21–90) argues that the main cause for Mexico 
considering involvement, besides the ideological support it gave to leftist groups in all of Latin 
America, was that Mexico could play a role it could not in conflicts with the United States at its
northern border. Culture, language and geographic proximity allowed Mexico to play a much 
stronger role in Central America than it could at the US-Mexican border. 
Some of my informants attacked Toynbee for representing a tradition of British and US 
American historians and for being heavily influenced by the propaganda of the governments 
of those countries. His book has been translated into Spanish in Nicaragua and sold as one of
very few books on Nicaraguan history at one of the very few university book shops in 
Managua. One of my informants, a young and critical intellectual, referred to the book when I 
confronted him about the issue of possible Mexican financing of Calderón Sandino. I tried to 
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question a small group of Sandinistas in Managua with the version of the events as presented
by Toynbee and it did not seem to surprise any of them. 
It can be concluded that some Managua students have heard about this theory. Although they
generally discuss history a lot, none of those I meet sees a point in pursuing this particular 
theory or ever pointing to it. Given that just about all aspects of Calderón Sandino are 
questioned and quite a lot of Nicaraguans strongly oppose Calderón Sandino or the 
Sandinismo that grew out of him, it is surprising this version of events has received so little 
attention. Different from all the other accounts, it would place historical agency outside the 
borders of Nicaragua. 
The Somoza years
Sandinistas today generally see the Somozas as puppets of the United States. Somocistas 
focus on the difference in leadership style between the three different Somozas. According to 
the Somocista version, each Somoza governed and had an alliance with the United States, 
rather than that the United States governed through the Somozas. It is important to note here 
that while the Somozas were three different dictators, Somocistas are those Nicaraguans who
either ideologically were and are in favor of the Somoza-regimes, those who materially 
benefited from it, and those who fall into both groups. Largely both groups are treated as if 
they were the same, although that is not always the case. 
The Sandinista version of Somocismo lends little historical agency to the individual Somozas 
or to the United States. The actions of the Somozas are just mechanical and follow the 
general pattern of how empires behave. The Somocista version of events does lend much 
more agency to each Somoza. That is why they were free to be different in their government 
style. It would seem another purpose of their leadership styles was to show they were not 
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all-out dictatorships. In neither version is historical agency admitted to lie outside Nicaragua. 
Historical agency does not exist or it lies with a Nicaraguan and within the national 
boundaries. 
First oppositional voices
Some events, such as the assassination of Somoza García, are today commemorated by 
Sandinistas of both the FSLN and MRS, who often claim López Pérez and the 1950s social 
movements represent their own beginnings. Similar to the treatment of times before Calderón 
Sandino, FSLN Sandinistas commemorate people who were members of other political 
groups in the time before the forming of the FSLN, while Nicaraguans who serve as members
of these groups now, often do not celebrate them. Individual Nicaraguans and movements 
that went against the otherwise given order, i.e. those engaged in historical agency, are 
universally celebrated by the Sandinistas as part of their past. 
One such date is the 23rd of July in León, when the students who were killed on July 23 1959
are commemorated in the form of a gigantic street party in downtown León. This celebration 
follows a number of other important celebrations in June and July, during which mainly 
Sandinista historical events are commemorated. The high point of these celebrations is the 
celebration of the triumph of the insurrection on the 19th of July. The 23rd of July is the first 
day when the Sandinista red-and-black can be seen less than during all the previous events. 
Some disputes always seem to exist as to how these events should be commemorated. Both 
years I was present, the event was eventually taken over by FSLN Sandinistas who claimed 
the student movement was exactly about what FSLN Sandinismo stands for today. They then 
went and turned on the popular FSLN Sandinista music which one hears for most of the early 
summer. 
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The initiative to put less emphasis on the FSLN in such commemorating events which cannot 
directly be linked to the FSLN, generally comes from students connected to the MRS who 
claim to see a historic parallel between the Somoza dictatorship of the past and what they 
claim to be the José Daniel Ortega Saavedra dictatorship of the present. They claim to see a 
historical connection between themselves and these activists of the past. 
Organising for revolutionary insurrection
It is my experience from discussing with many Sandinistas who were active in the early years 
that although the FSLN represented a break from the Soviet-allied Partido Socialista 
Nicaragüense (PSN), the influence of Marxism nevertheless could not be neglected within the
FSLN. They used several concepts from Marxist terminology—most prominently ‘class war’—
in their descriptions of how and why they were organising. 
The emphasis on the importance of the Soviet Union in the pre-revolution years differs among
Sandinistas. Very few portray it as Fonseca Amador following a new model that came from 
the Soviet Union. Most see it as Fonseca Amador having the historical agency and it was he 
who changed his strategy because he was annoyed with the previous strategy of left-wing 
revolutionaries, because it gave no hope to any revolutionary effort in Nicaragua. Fonseca 
Amador (1964) described himself as a radical and an anti-imperialist who had some respect 
for the Soviet Union and its achievements. 
German Bravo Urbina, whose mother operated a Sandinista safe house and who was 
fundamental in running arms in the last period before the revolutionary triumph, according to 
Bayardo José Fonseca Galo (brother of Fernando Fonseca and uncle of Fonseca Icabalzeta),
explains he started involving himself in Sandinista politics “because all youths were 
repressed, independently of whether they were actually guilty [of being active Sandinistas] or 
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not” Many of those who see themselves as Sandinistas today, explain they initially became 
opposed to the Somozas because they suppressed all youths. The repression, due to false 
accusations of subversive activity, led, according to their own accounts, to their getting 
involved in precisely such activity. According to this version of events, the reason for the 
revolution can be found entirely within Nicaragua and not in the Soviet Union or anywhere 
else. 
The state under Somoza presented those organising against the government as ‘terrorists’ as 
one can notice when looking at old news clips. While that term is not used much any more, 
Somocistas today generally focus much on the amount of chaos the Sandinistas brought 
through their actions. 
The FSLN as an underground movement
Palmer (1988, p. 93) claims that Fonseca Amador spent much of his time between founding 
the FSLN and his murder by the Guardia Nacional in 1976, appropriating Calderón Sandino to
the Sandinista movement. As a conversation starter, I often asked informants what they 
thought of the idea that Calderón Sandino as known today is largely the product of Fonseca 
Amador. Surprisingly I received no protests when making this claim, neither from Sandinistas 
nor others. Some Somocistas today claim it is unknown whether Fonseca Amador’s death 
was due to any wrongdoings of the Somoza regime or whether the Sandinistas were 
complicit, either by committing the murder or by informing the Guardia Nacional of his 
whereabouts, in order to martyr him for the movement. Most others seem to believe the 
official story. Many MRS Sandinistas claim that if Fonseca Amador had survived, he would be 
a member of the MRS rather than the FSLN. This theory is based on the fact that Fonseca 
Amador had a background from the university, which most MRS Sandinistas also have. Given
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his generally left-wing agenda, which the MRS abandoned, it seems rather far-fetched. 
Fonseca Amador is generally portrayed as being a person of great thoughts and fundamental 
principles by all those seeing themselves as Sandinistas. The Sandinismo of Fonseca 
Amador stands in contrast to the day to day Nicaraguan politics in which horse trades of 
every kind are fairly common. The FSLN put Calderón Sandino, who had been displayed as 
an outlaw and an enemy of order in the Somoza-rhetoric (Palmer 1988; Jansen 2004), up 
among Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara and other revolutionary leaders as one of the great inspirations
of any revolutionary (Palmer 1988, pp. 91–92). 
The tendencies that emerged in 1975 remain present today, at least unofficially, in that they 
represent different views of the past. Most of my informants who were politically active before 
1979, can still easily be classified according to the tendency they followed then. For many of 
them, their tendency in this period continues to be integral in explaining how they define 
Sandinismo. I am able many times to correctly guess to which one they belonged. 
When I interviewed Margarita Guevara Montano from Managua—another one of Fonseca 
Galo’s connections—she explained what the Sandinista struggle was about in the late 1970s 
in her view:
At that time there were masses of people who did not know how to write or how to read. But
of course they had their own experiences with Nicaraguan political life. […] And so we 
students took it upon ourselves to organise the popular masses; the peasants, the factory 
worker… most of all the factory workers. They had experiences with repression, but they 
lacked clarity in their political analysis. They knew they were repressed, but not why…
I guessed correctly that Guevara Montano belonged to the Tendencia Proletaria (TP). 
Generally speaking, most of those who were active at that time give their own tendency a 
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more fundamental role in the process than the other ones. Many of those identified with the 
TP now claim that those from the Tendencia Tercerista (TT) had no clear class analysis, many
coming from bourgeois backgrounds, and the majority of them left the FSLN in the 1990s and 
are now members of the MRS. When they left it was at least in part as protest against Ortega 
Saavedra – a former member of the TT. 
Strategic alliances
A large part of Sandinismo today is the concept of strategic alliances with non-Sandinista 
sections of the population to achieve a concrete goal – a strategy borrowed from the TT. The 
criticism from abroad and from foreigners since 2006 largely centers around the alliances of 
the Ortega Saavedra government with right-wing political sectors. The origin of these policies 
of alliances must be seen in the years of the three tendencies. The TT not only cooperated 
with right-wing groups, but also cooperated with the PSN to form a common front, and invited 
other similar groups of organised laborers to do the same (Miranda, D. Ortega Saavedra, and 
Gorman 1979, p. 117). The three tendencies in the party made it possible to attract 
proletarians and peasants simultaneously, but I have never spoken to a Nicaraguan who puts 
much emphasis on a tendency to which he did not belong. 
It struck me during many conversations, how those formerly belonging to the TP today often 
speak of the alliance with bourgeois sectors of society that the TT argued for, as meaning the 
TT itself consisted of members of the bourgeoisie. I have not been able to investigate whether
this concept of what the TT stood for or consisted of has changed over time, or whether it was
just always assumed if one spoke for cooperation with bourgeois sectors of society, it was 
because one belonged to that part of society. 
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Under the Sandinista in the 1980s
When speaking to non-Sandinistas about the 1980s and how the government was set up, 
they generally leave out the initial years with the junta and the fact that non-Sandinistas 
participated. Those with a background from the MRS are often, but not always, more critical 
towards what they claim to be an authoritarian government style. Nevertheless, both MRS 
and FSLN Sandinistas generally look upon this phase positively. Sandinistas generally view 
the elections of 1984 as being the first free elections. The next ones, in 1990s, which the 
FSLN lost, generally are portrayed as a choice between “an end to the war or continued 
freedom.” Those against the Sandinistas generally point towards the 1990 elections being the
first free ones. The international context in which the decision was made to have a multi-party 
system is not mentioned. 
Direct democracy or surveillance society?
The political scientist Hoyt (1997) who spent large amounts of time in Nicaragua in the 1960s,
1970s and 1980s, pointed out that Sandinista views on the role of both participatory and 
representative democracy underwent changes in the period before the revolutionary 
insurrection and up until 1990 – towards more understanding of the need for real elections at 
parliamentary level and towards understanding that institutions of direct democracy needed to
be controlled from the bottom up and include non-Sandinistas. 
According to Hoyt (1997), the Sandinistas at first saw elections for parliament as not needed, 
then as needed for tactical reasons and finally as a necessary part of a truly democratic 
society. The CDSs were used until 1988 mainly as a top-down vertical organisation to spread 
the politics of the Sandinista leadership, before they started to transform into more of a 
bottom-up organisation.
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None of my informants communicated such differentiated views of the relationship between 
the Sandinismo of the 1980s and the question of democracy. The Comités de Defensa 
Sandinista (CDSs) that existed in the 1980s are described in very differing ways, yet not with 
an emphasis on change/development. 
According to Liberals and some Sandinistas the CDSs took control of absolutely every local 
decision to the point where the individual could not decide anything independently. Another 
accusation against the CDSs is they made out an extremely tight surveillance network that 
would report anything its members deemed inappropriate to the government. These 
accusations mainly remind me of westerners speaking of the Staatssicherheit (StaSi) of the 
Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR, German Democratic Republic). 
On the other hand, those who liked them explain that together with popular militias and trade 
unions, the CDSs made it harder to influence parts of the upper party hierarchies to 
fundamentally change the political course of the country during Sandinista reign, because 
major decisions had to be carried by a popular majority. Corrupting the upper strata of political
society was how it was done in other countries where aid packages from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) were given in return for privatisations and investment access for foreign 
companies (Irvin 1982, p. 41). In this sense, those positive to the CDSs describe them as 
having been a way for the public to have a say in politics, and they in effect forced the 
government into more rapid implementation of already promised reforms in such areas as aid 
for the peasants, health, education and housing programs (Irvin 1982, p. 42). 
Some of the wording both sides use when describing the CDSs is even the same. Nicaraguan
informants of all types told me they functioned as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the revolution 
(Mayorga 2007), but while supporters read this as positive, those opposing it see it as a 
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negative. Another allegation is Marxists/Sandinistas allegedly used them to control and 
radicalise the revolutionary process. Sandinistas in favor of the CDSs generally see that as a 
heroic action which also included ‘educating’ the non-Sandinista members of the CDSs and 
the neighborhoods about the revolutionary process, while other groups see it as 
fundamentally undemocratic. 
Whether the CDSs and the general setup of government were the result of foreign influences 
is not generally discussed. No-one asks why Nicaragua would adopt a government instrument
from Cuba and whether the plan to do so ultimately originated in Nicaragua, in Cuba or in the 
Soviet Union. My Nicaraguan informants either blamed the FSLN Sandinistas for these 
instruments of government or credit them for it. In that way, no matter whether they are in 
favor of or against the setup of the government of the 1980s, historical agency is at all times 
placed in Nicaraguan hands. 
Sandinista relations to foreign powers
The Soviet Union still holds a very central place for most of my Nicaraguan informants since 
its involvement with the country in the 1980s. To the Liberals among them, it serves as a 
scare and the FSLN Sandinistas see it as a power for good. Most MRS Sandinistas I met, did 
not mention the Soviet Union. I only heard two basic versions of the relationship to the Soviet 
Union by both Sandinistas and anti-Sandinistas. According to one version, the Sandinistas 
were allied with the Soviet Union the entire time. The other version claims the alliance with 
the Soviet Union was something certain Nicaraguan leaders decided upon right after the 
revolution. No emphasis is put on agency on the part of the Soviet Union and no president or 
important decision makers from the Soviet Union are ever mentioned. Also, it is not 
questioned whether the main decision concerning the possible cooperation between the two 
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countries could have been taken in Moscow and not Managua. 
The relationship between the United States and the Sandinistas in this period is generally 
explained as the result of one of three: According to some MRS Sandinistas it was Ortega 
Saavedra who overstepped the line as to what the United States could not accept – such as 
first promising to not send aid to the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional 
(FMLN) in El Salvador and then doing just that. According to those who identify with the 
Contras or the Somocistas, the US government gave aid to the Contras after they had made 
an appeal for support and after the Sandinistas had instituted a bloody dictatorship which the 
United States “could no longer ignore.” 
The third position can be seen in what the Sandinista Cesio Argentina García López from El 
Rama told me. In El Rama the Contras were somewhat stronger than in Managua and León, 
and he explained the reason for the confrontation between Contras and Sandinistas as: “It 
was the capitalist system which made us fight, poor against poor. Neither side benefited from 
the war.” This is much in line with how most FSLN Sandinistas portray the actions of the 
United States and of Contra revolutionaries. For the FSLN Sandinistas, the actions of the 
United States and the Contras are mechanical and go against any revolution in the third 
world. They are done without any consciousness (historic agency) behind it, due to a 
combination of world capitalism and imperialism. 
In all three versions, the United States seems to lack agency, while Nicaraguans are those 
who changed the path of history. 
Reasoning the electoral failure in 1990
The electoral failure in 1990 was internationally seen in connection with the falling apart of the
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Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Castro Ruz (1990) tried to explain the logic of the election
campaign by the Violeta Barrios Torres de Chamorro camp in 1990:
…[T]hey said to the people: the economic crisis will end, if the opposition wins, the 
economic embargo [by the United States] will end, if the opposition wins, large sums of 
money will come. In addition they added: the Sandinistas are not able to resolve the crisis; 
the Sandinistas will not receive help from the United States; the Sandinistas cannot 
continue to receive the help, the cooperation they have received hitherto from a number of 
socialist countries, because – they said – your friends [the political establishment of 
Eastern Europe] have been overthrown. (my translation, Castro Ruz 1990, p. 282).
Castro Ruz may be right that international circumstances were the most important argument 
to vote against the FSLN at the time. Few Nicaraguan informants talked about such external 
influences on the elections. The Liberals I spoke to generally saw it as a victory of democracy 
against antidemocratic forces, which were responsible for a war and for sending young 
Nicaraguans into this war during their military service. Those informants I discussed with what
a Sandinista victory in 1990 might have meant, commonly held that the war might have 
started again. The explanation Sandinistas give for the electoral loss is generally implicit, and 
only when I asked directly did they say it directly. The main point given by Sandinistas seems 
to be that the United States was aware of the Nicaraguan people’s strength and that a Liberal,
more or less democratic government was the closest they could have to the direct dictatorship
they really wanted. 
For my Sandinista informants it seemed to be a given fact that the majority of Nicaraguans 
wanted Sandinista policies and only voted against the FSLN out of this fear of more war. 
Icabalceta Garay in her explanation was a little more complex. Instead of blaming the election
results on the change in international circumstances, she explained how she and her 
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compatriots did not notice what the sacrifice of participation meant for many Nicaraguans at 
the time:
We signed up for the popular militias, we signed up for the CDSs, we signed up for the 
harvesting of coffee and the help that needed to be done voluntarily…many of us. We did 
that with a lot of love. Yes, it is true there was some institutional pressure, I think. I wasn’t 
able to observe those who felt forced to go, there was a line to follow… Given that I went 
voluntarily, I didn’t notice those who went without wanting to do so. Yes, there were some 
autocratic, dictatorial measures. I think it’s hard to determine how much of this was a 
culture of colonialism and dictatorship which preceded us, and how much of this was the 
reality of war which changes everything and which is the exact opposite of development.
Icabalceta Garay accepts some collective guilt for the Sandinistas, but then rapidly defuses 
much of this into cultures of dictatorship and colonialism and the general logic of war. The 
Sandinistas are presented as a group that acts or reacts; whereas other Nicaraguan groups 
are seen as being part of a culture that seems to have come into being mechanically. In her 
case, groups outside of Nicaragua are not even mentioned. The difference between the 
explanation of Castro Ruz (1990), which is consistent with most European explanations, and 
Nicaraguan explanations is that, historical agency lies in the hands of Nicaraguans while in 
the international explanations events in Nicaragua are more or less dictated by worldwide 
developments. 
Three neoliberal governments
‘The 16 years of neoliberalism’ and not being in power, (really closer to 17 – 1990 until 2007) 
are treated as a dark part of history by FSLN Sandinistas. FSLN informants do recognise at 
least in part distinct periods during those years. In that sense, the concrete political reality is 
portrayed as a combination of mechanical empire type politics from the United States 
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irregardless of who heads the United States, and the concrete stupidity and corruptness of 
the Nicaraguan in possession of the presidency at any given time. 
The MRS Sandinistas point out that Humberto Ortega made sure to leave his position in 1993
with as much money as possible and that he started his business in Costa Rica. That 
generally gets mustered as evidence to show José Daniel Ortega Saavedra is corrupt through
and through and has no principles. When I point out that they are two different people, 
Humberto Ortega being José Daniel Ortega Saavedra’s brother, I am often reminded that 
other Sandinista leaders also are said to have walked out with great amounts of money after 
losing the 1990 elections; however, without showing what advantages José Daniel Ortega 
Saavedra may have gained. This is generally used to discredit the morals of FSLN 
Sandinistas. FSLN Sandinistas often point out that the MRS Sandinistas were still part of the 
party in 1990, and then claim it was really the current MRS Sandinistas who became rich 
during that period, and that’s why they gave up on the struggle of the classes. 
The term of the first neoliberal government, that of Barrios Torres de Chamorro (1990–97), 
generally is viewed by my Sandinista informants as a time of economic sellout, and disarming
the country. Barrios Torres de Chamorro is not generally seen as having been corrupt, but 
people around her are seen as such. Barrios Torres de Chamorro is often accused of having 
sold out the Nicaraguan railway in a heartbeat and to have forgiven the debt the United States
needed to pay Nicaragua as war reparations, something people from all sectors of 
Nicaraguan politics continue to be angry about. 
The second presidency, that of José Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo (1997–2002), is generally 
viewed by Sandinistas as a time of outrageous corruption and further economic sellout of the 
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country in a way that Barrios Torres de Chamorro had not been able to accomplish. One 
favorite tale is that Alemán Lacayo at a party sat in a small pool with all his ministers, and 
relived himself into the water. He then announced that anyone who would get up, would be 
out of the government and everybody sat still. Whether true or not, it gives an idea of how 
Alemán Lacayo is perceived. Of all the figure heads of the political right, Alemán Lacayo 
seems to be generally respected by FSLN Sandinistas as having a ‘real’ following. “He 
represents the petty bourgeoisie, so it’s better to make a deal with him than with [the banker] 
Montealegre,” I am told at the municipal office of the FSLN León. Those views seem to be 
shared by many FSLN Sandinistas. 
When speaking of the presidency of Enrique José Bolaños Geyer (2002–07), informants of all
types focus on his helping to imprison Alemán Lacayo. He is seen as much less of an activist 
type and more of a laissez faire type president in that he is said to have claimed he could not 
do anything about power outages in major population centers. Although the influence of the 
United States is acknowledged, no similar focus is paid to the difference between the 
presidencies of Bush Sr., Clinton and Bush Jr. The actions of the United States generally are 
portrayed as being the same at all times and not the result of historical agency. The fact that 
the United States chose to support a dictatorship up until 1979, and after 1990, a series of 
formally “democratically” elected presidents with a very different record on human rights 
issues receives little attention. Such a focus could be seen as lending historical agency to 
individual factors outside of Nicaragua. 
The FSLN out of power(?)
For many Sandinistas, their strategy of continuing to exert some power despite having lost the
elections seems to have been legitimate in that they feel the country was hijacked by the 
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political right and under the control of the empire. Others seem to be rather irritated by this 
intervention on the part of the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas are criticised for their strategy 
during their time in opposition as having undermined the democratic rule of law. The criticism 
comes from the current Liberal opposition and is reported in much of the right-wing media. 
This criticism is also heard from Liberals in the streets. “In Nicaragua it’s always the 
Sandinistas who govern,” one anti-Sandinista taxi driver told me, “If they don’t govern from 
above, they govern from below. Be sure to write that in your book!” The difference in views 
can be seen as being based upon two different views in concern to agency. While Sandinistas
see the period as lacking historical agency if it were not for their actions, Liberals see this as 
the period in which they legitimately were to govern and the interference by Sandinistas was 
uncalled for. 
Governing without a majority
FSLN Sandinistas generally portray the whole liberal-democratic setup as being foreign to 
Nicaragua and the third world in general, and nothing more than a way for the United States 
to ensure continued oppression of Nicaraguans. According to them, it took 16 years to 
understand how to work the system, so the political right in the end had no other choice but to
hand power back to them. They believe all election results when the Liberals were in charge 
to be fraudulent. Some FSLN Sandinistas use that to explain how the they could score below 
50%. Another very common explanation for why it is acceptable to govern against a majority 
in parliament from FSLN Sandinistas comes from Rigoberto Irurzum Alonso Moreno, a 
Managua friend of Fonseca Icabalzeta from university, who is not a member of any political 
party, yet counts himself as Sandinista:
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There is no opposition in Nicaragua that wants the best for the country. […] 40% are 
Sandinistas. The other 60% had 16 years to fix this country, and they could not manage to 
do it. So now it’s our time to try again.
FSLN Sandinistas, with their explanations, put an emphasis on the need to take historical 
agency upon themselves. The appearance of Venezuela on the international stage as a 
means of financing another Sandinista experiment of state power does not receive much 
attention. Explanations are sought only within Nicaragua, even though FSLN connections to 
Venezuela are well-known. 
The two groups who emphasise change between the 1980s and now are the MRS 
Sandinistas and the Contras. The Contras generally approve of the current government and 
disapproved of the old one, and the MRS Sandinistas feel the opposite. The Contras now 
generally explain that the Liberals in the 1990s did not help them in any way, and it is only 
now with the current FSLN government their voice is heard. Sometimes it is explained that 
Ortega Saavedra finally understood how to listen, other times they admit it was they who 
finally understood their real friends. Noticeably absent from both MRS and Contra 
explanations as to what the difference between the 1980s and now constitutes foreign powers
such as the United States, Venezuela and the Soviet Union. When a Liberal or a MRS 
Sandinista does focus on Venezuela, it seems to be a portrayal very similar to that which the 
Sandinistas have of the United States: An empire that acts mechanically. The historical 
agency and choice to follow Venezuela lies under all circumstances with Ortega Saavedra 
and other Nicaraguans and not with Hugo Chavez or other Venezuelans. 
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Problems understanding the discussion of Nicaraguan history
Some readers may argue that Liberals, Conservatives, Somocistas and Contras are not 
fundamentally different groups. It seems easy to cross from one to the other. Historically they 
are somewhat distinct (Hüeck 2006, p. 9), and in my experience people classify themselves 
as belonging to one of them specifically rather than to a mix of all of them. It seems it has 
more to do with their personal preferences of what they like to be identified with rather than 
with any clear ideological distinctions. 
Calderón Sandino and the FSLN up until 1979 are generally presented as individualists and 
makers of history, while the general populace is left out. After 1979, there is more focus on 
the collective involvement, rather than the involvement of single individuals. The extent to 
which the FSLN changed its policies according to popular demand are not mentioned. This is 
not by accident. When talking to people who experienced the time from before 1979 until now,
it is very common for them to tell how they first started their involvement in the movement, 
then what they did at the precise time of the insurrection and maybe what their own position 
was in the 1980s. After that, their own persona tends to get lost and I am presented with a 
general history of the country – “We lost. Then Violeta Chamorro…”. For some, this collective 
history sets in right after insurrection, while others focus on their own lives during the 1980s. 
Any distinction between self and Sandinista state seems to be nonexistent in their 
explanations. For many, this likely has to do with their personal experience being intensely 
negative or positive. For others, it may be seeing themselves as being of little importance in 
comparison to what happened around them. 
More confusion lies in the fact that several of the main historical actors also figure as 
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historians who publish written material, mostly on periods preceding their own time. This 
underlines the importance generally given to historical descriptions, and I have found it 
confusing to try to find out when an explanation is part of political argument in the present for 
a certain cause and when it is the most objective description a certain political actor manages 
to produce. 
The material presented here may at times resemble a patchwork of very different ways of 
citing historical accounts. That is mainly due to the different nature of the sources. Some 
points or accounts are the same or very similar and I have heard certain points made many 
times by Nicaraguans who declare themselves to belong to some certain faction. Usually the 
setting for gathering this type of information were informal interviews, i.e. when sitting in a 
public bus, sharing a cab or just randomly being approached by unknown Nicaraguans in the 
street who felt they needed to explain ‘historical facts’ to me. I have included most of that 
material in a generalised form. Other points I first heard in this manner, before I decide to 
investigate further by asking more questions in the same direction to members of the same 
faction or approaching those from another faction with it, to hear their reaction. The next time I
confront someone from the first faction with that reaction to get a counter-reaction, etc. Many 
of these accounts are described with a particularly concise answer which I felt beneficial to 
the reader. 
Other types of data contain written accounts, which are cited according to common citation 
standards. It is not to be understood that these written accounts represent the real and 
objective history, while the spoken accounts represent an imperfect and partisan account. 
Both types are really of the same quality, and I have treated the material similarly. In addition 
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to what is discussed within Nicaraguan society, I have in some cases included material which 
goes beyond the explanations given by Nicaraguans in order to show what alternative 
accounts of the same phenomenon could be given if Nicaraguan agency were not prioritised. 
Terms such as ‘Liberal,’ ‘socialist,’ ‘Conservative’ and ‘anarchist’ are used by my informants 
and within Nicaraguan society and they are not always used in the same way, I chose not to 
use these same terms to try to classify informants, historical actors or ideologies. I use 
broader categories such as ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ to describe some informants who I 
believe need to be classified further within the Sandinista movement. 
Concluding remarks
The internal power structure and implementation of democracy and participative ways 
available to the population have been common problems for revolutionary movements that 
drifted away from their original path. The exception of the former might exactly have been 
Nicaragua, as the loss of the FSLN in the 1990 elections showed. After all, the red-and-black 
of the Sandinista flag does represent anarchism in many parts of the world, but the question 
of popular participation in the actual decision making process was an essential issue in 
Nicaragua. The acceptance of a popular majority may have been the main reason why the 
Sandinista movement was not discredited completely after the fall of the Soviet Union the way
many similar movements fared. It is likely one important cause of different accepted versions 
of history being present in Nicaragua. 
Much in the same way that the FSLN taught about Calderón Sandino in the 1980s and also 
again does currently, under the regime of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) from 
1946-200020 in Mexico, Mexican schools taught about the Mexican revolutionary Emilio 
20 The party operated under other names since 1929.
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Zapato (Gilbert 2003) to justify the Mexican government’s current political line (Gilbert 1997). 
The PRI is seen by much of the left as a party that may have been socialist once, but by the 
time of their electoral defeat had degenerated and just clung to an image of revolutionary 
icons while having lost much of the meaning behind them. Icabalceta Garay made the same 
connection:
Sometimes I think—as a Sandinista it hurts me—I feel like the PRI – the Mexican 
revolutionary party. It hurts so much, but yes I know there are ugly things, bad things that 
happen.
The difference between Nicaragua and Mexico is that in Nicaragua it is not only the FSLN that
follows this pattern of transferring all historical agency to Nicaragua and Nicaraguans, it also 
holds true for all other Nicaraguan parties. As we have seen, Sandinistas today focus very 
little on the financing Calderón Sandino may have received from Mexico. The Frente de 
Liberación Nacional (FLN)/FSLN 1961–90 quite clearly followed that strategy and was 
financed by Eastern Europe and Cuba. They are viewed as acting completely on their own 
and without any links to these powers. Similarly, the Somocistas see the Somozas as acting 
on their own without any US influence, and the Contras see their actions as rather unrelated 
to decisions made by Washington. The same holds true with the Liberals for their time in 
office. Even when a foreign power is mentioned as having provided resources or troops, it is 
qualified with a story on why some Nicaraguan individual or group convinced them to do so. 
Lancaster (1988, p. 46) saw the ultimate base for Nicaraguan revolutionary consciousness of 
the 1980s—through the local version of liberation theology—to lie in Nicaraguan traditions 
and history and the foreign revolutionary concepts and theories employed would 
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consequently be removed from the context of their original (foreign) origin. My field data from 
the current period seems to show the opposite: A pattern that can be seen throughout the 
entire current presentation of Nicaraguan history is the absence of agency on the part of 
foreign powers. All parts of history are universally attributed to Nicaraguan actors. Even when 
a foreign power is clearly involved, it does so because a Nicaraguan actor has mobilised it to 
do so, according to the thinking of Nicaraguans. In other examples, agency is transferred to 
individual revolutionary leaders in tales of a revolution at a later stage when the revolution is 
taken as part of a nation building project under much more institutionalised conditions than 
those the revolutionaries lived under. 
There may have been a shift in Nicaraguan in the period between the two studies, which may 
account for the difference in conclusion. Marx, Lenin and other non-Latin American thinkers 
seem to be studied less than before. Another part of the explanation may be the difference in 
perspective: While Lancaster seems to look at the roots of the Nicaraguan situation almost 
purely in terms of the consciousness/opinions of Nicaraguans, I also look at material factors 
that restricted or permitted what options were available. 
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Chapter 8
Perceptions and expectations of economic development
In this chapter we will look at the Nicaraguan perceptions of economic realities and ways of 
judging different regimes of the past in view of the economic reality of those times. Although 
views differ, the economics stands quite separate from the views on politics previously looked 
at, which is why it needs to be treated separately. 
The fact that Nicaraguan economic policies followed international patterns is not always 
acknowledged by all Nicaraguans. My informants tended to put more emphasis on the wishes
and views of the Nicaraguan government at the time than on international trends. At the same
time as we have seen, Nicaragua does switch between different theories for how 
development can be achieved more so than other countries, and it can be argued that this 
switch is the result of decisions made mainly by Nicaraguans and not foreign powers. 
Most foreigners I met initially think when arriving in Nicaragua that all Sandinistas are in favor 
of a Soviet-style command economy and all Liberals favor laissez faire style capitalism. 
Nicaraguan reality is much more complex, and most Nicaraguans seem to favor at least some
state intervention and some level of decentralised decision making on issues relating to 
economics. As part of this chapter, I show how Nicaraguans use very different criteria for 
judging the success of the three governments. The Sandinistas of the 1980s are judged by 
where their policies could have led, had foreign intervention ceased and the Sandinistas not 
lost the 1990 elections. The Somozas and Liberals are instead judged by what the economic 
reality for Nicaraguans was during the time they were in power. 
While the discussion on political history showed us how in many aspects Sandinistas and 
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other groups legitimise themselves through their historic past, in the aspect of economic 
policies, Sandinismo stands out in that it is legitimised through possible improvements in the 
future, rather than the past or the present. In order to demonstrate this difference, it is 
necessary to look at both the actual economic realities of the different regimes Nicaragua has 
lived and compare it with how Nicaraguans talk about economic aspects of different times. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the Sandinista ideology of Dependency Theory are, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, of importance to their understanding of history and they 
are important in relation to economics when comparing to actual economic situation that 
existed in the 1980s as they show how far off target the country actually moved. We will come
back to the Sandinista preference for Dependency theory when discussing relations to 
Eastern Europe in a later chapter. It is also important to understand the difference between 
this and other theories of development in order to understand the differences in economic 
policies and differences in expectancies and ways of judging other governments that have 
existed in Nicaragua. 
In the first part of this chapter, I outline the international discourse about development on a 
world scale since the Second World War. In the second part, I focus on how the economic 
situation of Nicaragua and its government’s economic policies changed between the Somoza 
government until today. I also show what theories were employed when creating these 
policies. In the fourth part, I look at the differences in how Nicaraguans judge the different 
historic periods and the governments that stood and stand behind the economic policies. 
The research for this chapter mainly took place among Sandinista professionals and ministry 
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workers and the founders of the organisation ‘Amigos.’ These groups were happy to engage 
in discussions about economic policy in the past, and the professionals who were still working
were the most interested in relating it to the current government and what possibilities exist 
today. Both groups discussed it at a very theoretical level. They helped me find important 
Nicaraguan literature on the subject. This help does not show in terms of quotes as much as 
coherence in my presentation. I would have to read about a particular fact many times and 
then discuss it with informants before I would understand whether it is generally seen as 
important.
Popular ideas about economic realities and models of the past
The difference in economic policies between the different governments over the past decades
is a major point of political controversy in today’s Nicaragua. Very few seem to believe it 
possible to return to the economic policies of Zelaya López, but the late Somoza years, the 
Sandinismo of the 1980s, and the policies of the subsequent Liberal governments, all seem to
be seen as offering possible policies for future governments in the view of most Nicaraguans. 
Simultaneously, most of my informants judged the economic policies of a given historic period
rather independently of their own political affiliation. The criteria used to judge the Somozas 
and the Liberal governments is very different from the criteria by which most Nicaraguans 
judge the Sandinista government of the 1980s. I think it is important to look at some common 
judgments about the last one or two decades of Somoza government and the years since, in 
order to understand how Nicaraguans evaluate the economic realities and policies of these 
times. 
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The 1970s
Today, a surprising number of Nicaraguans want to go back to how things were in the 1970s. I
found this opinion primarily among urban elites. These Nicaraguans generally want someone 
to be put in charge as president who tries to re-implement all the economic policies and follow
the same plans of development the Somoza regime of the time used. Their argument is that 
economically everybody was better off before the revolution. “Back then, everybody who 
wanted to work to make money did make money,” my second host in León explained to me 
once. She owns a large downtown house and her family operated several buses during the 
times of Somoza. The defense of the Somoza times does not focus on political freedoms or 
the amount of capital created by foreign companies due to their economic activities in 
Nicaragua, but rather on the total amount of money accessible at the time. Somocistas seem 
not to focus upon the fact that opportunities to create wealth were extremely unevenly 
distributed.21 Another aspect they tend to leave out is the earthquake in Managua in 1972, the 
bombarding of cities at the time of the Sandinista insurrection, and the Contra-war which all 
greatly contributed to the loss of wealth, and for which the Sandinistas cannot be held 
responsible. 
Those Nicaraguans in favor of the revolutionary insurrection of 1979 focused on how Fonseca
Amador’s plans would change Nicaragua as well as the exploitative aspects of the Somoza 
era and end the unequal distribution of wealth of that time. They did not talk about how the 
overall amount of wealth present in Nicaragua at that time may have been greater than now. 
None of the Nicaraguans I talked to seemed to wonder how Somoza’s economic plans would 
have developed, had they been allowed to continue. When talking about the economics of 
21 Whether opportunities in reality were less evenly distributed, is something I have arrived at purely by letting myself be 
convinced by the majority of my informants. To my knowledge the Somozas recorded no data on economic inequality.
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Somoza, Nicaraguans describe what concrete economic realities were at the time of Somoza.
I never heard anyone claiming Somoza’s policies, had they been extended for another few 
decades, would have led to better welfare and prosperity for a greater share of the population 
or that they would have let Nicaraguan business owners enjoy increasingly greater returns. 
The 1980s
The 1980s economic history seems to be largely simplified by both Sandinistas and Liberals. 
Liberals often claimed that the land reforms of Sandinistas scared away all owners of capital. 
Some Sandinistas claim that all lands were redistributed to the land workers, while others 
claim it was something in-between. The various political acts which still left three quarters of 
agricultural production under private control and were not portrayed as particularly 
communist/socialist. Some of those Sandinistas who had studied political theory pointed out 
that transition periods of nationalisations are necessary when socialists come to power. 
A few professional Sandinistas, who realise that socialism in much of Eastern Europe was 
less popular than Sandinismo in Nicaragua, portrayed this as a virtue of Sandinismo. The 
Sandinista Fernando Fonseca explained how he believed Nicaragua in the 1980s was 
different from its East European allies as part of an explanation of why it made sense to work 
for the return to power during the 1990s, when the ‘real socialism’ of Eastern Europe had 
disappeared:
Yes, we did use Marxism, but we used it as a method to analyse reality. […] We never gave 
up on Christianity. We took that in. Here, we never did away with private business. On the 
contrary, we said that Nicaragua would be a mixed economy.
According to most theories by Sandinistas I have come across written in the 1980s, 
201
Nicaragua followed a development path which eventually would lead to a more prosperous 
society for all. According to these, complete nationalisation of all oligarchy property may have 
been planned at a later stage, when the country would be ready for it. At the same time 
several Sandinistas told me things such as: “It has to be recognised that the Grupo Pellas 
stayed during the entire period.” This seems to show they were unaware of the 
nationalisations of Grupo Pellas property in the late 1980s. Such statements were mostly 
made by those Sandinistas who emphasised the nationalist aspect of Sandinismo. 
Most Sandinistas saw the economic involvement of the United States and the meddling in 
Nicaraguan politics of the US government as through-and-through evil and directly opposed 
to the plans of the Sandinistas and the interests of the Nicaraguan people. The economic aid 
the Carter regime gave in the very beginning was not considered by any of my informants, 
independently of political views. The differences between Carter and Reagan were also never
discussed. The actions of the United States seemed to be seen as mechanically linked to its 
role as an empire and not as the result of any decisions by individual people. The fact the 
worsening of terms for loans to the third world happened globally to allies of both the Soviet 
Union and the United States, was also not considered by any of my informants. 
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Illustration 9: Inflation rates were more stable in the Somoza and Liberal years than in the Sandinista 
years in the 1980s, reaching 13109.5% in 1987. Also during the second Sandinista period, the years 
2007 (11.127%) and 2008 (19.826%) showed the highest inflation rates within a decade.“Due to 
political and economic events (civil war and hyperinflation), data [after 1979 and] prior to 1995 are less
reliable.” (IMF 2010). The two databases of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) do not agree on 
inflation rates for several of the years in this period. Data from the 2010 database has been given 
preference over those from 2000. Source: IMF (2000); IMF (2010); CIA (2011b)
 Due to the Cold War, some Nicaraguans from both political camps argue the radical policies 
eventually adopted were mostly due to external pressure from trading partners in Eastern 
Europe, rather than any internal ideology. In that sense, it is difficult to determine whether the 
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use of Dependency Theory was central due to the will of the Sandinistas, or because this was
expected by the Eastern European governments they dealt with. Most Sandinista informants 
who spoke about their own involvement and experiences since the time of Somoza left out 
the late 1980s or just mentioned them in general terms, stating what happened to the country 
rather than to themselves. Carolina Icabalceta Garay was one of very few Sandinistas willing 
to mention the economic problems of the late 1980s and how these were felt at the time:
…It was quite hard. It was not only a war, but also an economic embargo which meant that 
certain measures were taken, such as the condensing of the state apparatus, which meant 
letting thousands of people go. If there was a source of employment in Nicaragua, it was 
the state. It was always the state who maintained the people and kept them busy. Obviously 
when they let people go that means there are things happening in the economic sphere that 
are very serious. 
Now we from the popular classes and those with some… let’s just say: level of culture, 
didn’t feel that the 3000% inflation hurt us much. We felt, that we were always reimbursed 
every week and it was only hard to manage so many bills. Other than that, however… 
Maybe it’s because we didn’t have a culture of economics, knowledge of economics – it had
been negated: about how a budget works or that what was happening wasn’t good. 
We didn’t feel alarmed by it. There were so many things to do – the health campaign, the 
vaccination campaign, campaign for cleaning up, the campaign to plant trees… All that we
liked and were very animated to do. We were many who just didn’t feel like getting into the 
structure [of state or party], because we felt there were certain people who wanted their 
position of power there. Many of us simply wanted to do things.
Serafín García Torres is a friend of Bayardo José Fonseca Galo, the brother-in-law of 
Icabalceta Garay, from the days of the revolution. When I interviewed him, he described it as 
one of the initial tasks of his group before the revolution to go out into the countryside of 
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Nandaime22 and explain to the population, they were fighting for an agrarian reform to 
empower the poor. García Torres then went on to explain:
It is a historic conquest. And it continues to be a struggle today, because the revolution did 
not manage to achieve this goal and for other reasons – the economic situation, and the 
war – it didn’t permit us to develop an agricultural reform that would permit the 
Nicaraguan citizen, the poor, to be a fundamental part of the economic and social 
development of the country.
Lancaster (1992, p. 284) reported a marked shift in the views of Nicaraguan prospects of 
most of his informants became significantly more pessimistic between 1984 and 1988, with 
hyper-inflation being a significant reason. I have not heard any histories of personal hardship 
due to the inflation from either Liberals or Sandinistas is significant. 
I have often heard, the land redistributions and social policies were meant to benefit the 
populace immediately, and it was due to factors outside the control of the Sandinista 
government, especially the war, that made this impossible. The difference between dreams 
and reality in the 1980s is considered by many Sandinistas today. “See, in the first phase of 
the revolution we had war,” one informant told me, “In wartime you cannot plan anything. Now
in this second phase, the war is gone, and we finally get a chance to do something.” 
Sandinista informants generally blamed the blockade and war perpetrated by the United 
States for all the problems of the time. Most Sandinistas pointed out that the Contras 
destroyed crops and infrastructure, and this was a major detrimental factor for the economy. 
They believed it would have been much easier to turn the economy around without the war 
and that the economic problems would eventually have vanished. Sandinista informants often
speculated on how their policies would have continued, and they seemed to believe that 
22 Nandaime is a small village situated in the departamento Granada.
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eventually all the problems the government faced would have been resolved had the same 
politics continued. 
Some informants opposed to the Sandinistas did not focus on blaming the Sandinistas for 
where the country was economically at during the 1980s, but rather for where they allegedly 
were going to lead the country – some kind of central economy with no freedom for the 
individual. Other anti-FSLN informants blamed the FSLN for corruption of their own principles 
– that they were about to establish a system quite different from what they had initially 
promised. 
No matter whether the story was told by Sandinista or Liberals, the economic problems that 
did exist do not seem to count much against the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas seem to be 
judged more by their plans or where things would eventually end up, rather than the reality of 
their accomplishments. In a sense, this has a certain similarity to the form of Rostow’s phase 
model and several other non-socialist theories of development: The economic welfare of the 
masses is seemingly the focus of economic policies. Yet, it is assumed by these theories that 
improvements in overall living standards are not achievable in the short term and a phase of 
economic hardship, which temporarily may even worsen the individual’s position, is necessary
before an improvement will be possible.
The transition from power
Some Sandinista informants interpreted the Piñata as the government trying to bring at least 
parts of the dream of the future into the present. Informants opposed to the FSLN generally 
talked about the piñata as proof of massive corruption within the FSLN. None of those 
opposed to the Piñata discussed whether the incoming non-Sandinista government should 
have reversed the Piñata based on moral considerations of justice. This is quite different from 
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the moralistic judgments often passed upon the actions or inactions of the FSLN during the 
1980s. 
207
  
Illustration 10: The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita rose for most of the period from 1950 
until the revolutionary insurrection of 1979, with cyclical downturns in 1958–59 and 1968 and drastic 
downturns in 1975–76 and 1978–79 which likely were caused at least in part by the fights between 
Guardia Nacional and Sandinistas. In the period 1950–77, GDP grew at an average of 5.0% a year. GDP
rose again 1979–84, although it only reached 3/4 of the 1977 level. 1985–90 it fell again drastically until 
it had reached just 48% of the 1977 level. The Liberal governments stabilized GDP with a moderate 
increase of 1993–2004 of 1.7%, but did not manage to increase it overall as GDP fell in 1990–93 and 
2004–06. In 2006, GDP was under the 1951 level. GDP has been rising again during the current 
Sandinista government again at an average 1.7% a year. The Gross National Income (GNI) per Capita 
which is used by many newer data sources closely follows the development of the GDP in the case of 
Nicaragua (WB 2011c).The figures presented here do not seem to be accepted universally. Large 
discrepancies were noticed in comparison with other data sources, some of which showed up to a 300% 
overall increase in GDP in the period 1960–2009. The data source chosen here is the only data source 
that includes the full data range from 1950 to 2009. Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011) 
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The 1990s–2007
Some informants looked back at the period between 1990 and 2007 as a period of economic 
opportunities. This was a small group which able to build up business during this period. Most
of them in opposition, but also a few Sandinistas saw it this way. It was easier to find 
Nicaraguans with a positive opinion of the economic policies of Somoza than of the Liberal 
regimes after the Sandinistas, even though it was a formally democratic period. Largely this 
seemed to have to do with the slow (but overall positive) economic development according to 
several indicators during this period. One typical subject just about all informants seemed to 
agree on was that the Unión Fenosa, S.A. operation of the Nicaraguan electricity net was 
scandalous. All of those I spoke to agreed that the privatisation of 2000 was wrong and that 
Ortega Saavedra did not go far enough in his re-nationalisation. 
No Nicaraguan I met fantasised about some better future that may have come if only the 
economic plans of the Liberals had they been allowed to continue without interruption. This 
period was judged differently than the Sandinismo of the 1980s. It seems that while some 
Nicaraguans wish to revive the Liberal party as a stronger political force, the economic part of 
their time in government hardly finds any proponents, even though economically this period 
was more prosperous than the war-torn 1980s. 
As the above example of opinions of the Unión Fenosa, S.A. well illustrates, most had an 
issue with the development model used at the time: The neo-liberal model. Among my 
informants I could not find any proponents of this model. Many seemed to define it as just the 
lack of a development model, while others saw it as having failed. Particularly Sandinista 
informants often portrayed the access given to multi-national companies as a type of 
corruption on the part of Nicaraguan political leaders. 
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Illustration 11: Even though Liberal economic policies are seen as
unconcerned with the poor, official figures show that economic differences
between rich and poor have been diminishing, similar to Mexico and
opposite to what has happened in the United States. One explanation for
this could be that the governments indeed were successful in promoting the
cause of the poorest. Other plausible explanations could be, that the figures
have been manipulated before publication, that the rich have discovered
more ways of hiding their money efficiently, and that Nicaraguan capital
lost in the struggle with multinational, foreign-owned companies. None of those I talked to 
knowledgeable about this type of analysis were confident in their explanation of how this could have 
happened. Source: CIA (2011a); Fundación Internacional para el Desafío Económico Global (2009) 
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The current FSLN government
When the second Ortega Saavedra government took office, many Sandinistas explained that 
they hoped for the return of some of the economic policies of the 1980s, but that expectations
were somewhat limited, because when the position of mayor of Managua was won by the 
Sandinista candidate Herty Lewites in 2000, it did not bring with it leftist economic reforms. 
After the Sandinistas had regained national power, party officials emphasised that the system 
about to be created would focus not only on the material well-being, but equally on spiritual 
satisfaction without any loss of freedom of expression (Fonseca Terán 2009a). As some saw 
it similar to Vargas (2006, pp. 85–86), the neoliberal development model had been made 
compatible with Sandinismo, while a few Sandinista informants expected to switch to another 
development model. 
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Illustration 12: The government of José Daniel Ortega Saavedra has to
deal with higher official unemployment figures than its predecessors. The
problem is global. It touches countries such as Mexico and the United
States during these years. The 2010 figure for Nicaragua is based on the
average of a new monthly survey, whereas the older figures where based
on annual more general surveys. Both in the case of Mexico and
Nicaragua and to some extent also in the United States, underemployment rates are large. Therefore, 
unemployment rates say little about whether most people are working or not and cannot necessarily be 
compared meaningfully between countries. Nevertheless, the curves of these graphs are similar when 
including various types of underemployment and give a somewhat accurate picture of developments 
within each country. Source: BCN (2007); BCN (2009); BCN (2011); BLS (2011); IM (2010)
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The attitude that state-intervention could not go back to the level it had been at during the 
1980s was widespread. “See, we have already had an agrarian reform,” one Sandinista told 
me, explaining why it was not possible to once more redistribute lands. Many informants 
believed that conventions with the IMF prohibit any further land redistributions. 
Nevertheless, most Sandinistas had some hope for change, and explained the programs 
Hambre Cero and Usura Cero to me, and portrayed them as positive measures. Even though 
poverty levels had not changed much since they were put in place, many FSLN Sandinistas 
expect this to change in the future. “Nicaragua will be a very different country,” I was told more
than once in relation to these programs. Those Sandinista informants who spoke about it, 
mostly hoped for the state to buy portions of lands that could then be distributed among those
without land. Most FSLN Sandinistas realised some type of wider land distribution was 
needed, if the goal was for the poorest sectors of society to benefit from Hambre Cero, 
because the minimum requirement for participation in Hambre Cero of owning 0.7 hectares of
land. Without this land ownership, they would never be eligible to participate and advance, it 
was argued. 
Some felt the need to explain that a change had taken place, even though there was no 
immediate visible effect in terms of dramatically increasing living standards of any group. 
Their general claim was Ortega Saavedra’s policies were preventing a worse scenario. The 
exact effect cannot be measured because it is impossible to know how bad a crisis otherwise 
would have been. Their claims followed much along the lines of Fonseca Terán (2007) in 
claiming that subsidies given for public transport in 2007 would have been unsustainable if 
not for the arrival of Venezuelan oil and according to Albanisa officials, who claimed the price 
hike in 2007 would have been around 16–18%, instead of 9%, if prices were not subsidised 
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(Rogers 2007). 
Hidden criticism came from the side of Sandinistas who were working for more radical 
reforms. Fonseca Terán (2008a) clearly not speaking in name of the party as a whole, 
continued to argue that Nicaraguan capitalism should be replaced by a Cuban style socialist 
economy. Such a system he distinguishes from a social-democracy where capitalism 
continued to exist and in which only gains are redistributed at a higher rate. He portrayed the 
ALBA as a stepping stone in that direction. 
Those who saw Sandinismo as a socialist ideology, always saw this as a project of the future 
and not something to be implemented right away. At times this project stood in contradiction 
with the day-to-day policies of the party. This shows in an underlying debate on what to do 
with the ultra rich. Even though Ortega Saavedra officially pronounces support for the Pellas 
family, ‘the oligarchy’ is a term frequently used by Sandinistas today to describe their enemy. 
At the celebrations on 19 July 2008, banners with slogans such as “Our enemy is the 
oligarchy” were evident. Such banners may at the time mainly be targeted at the Montealegre 
family and Eduardo Montealegre’s bid for the presidency or any other political office. No 
Sandinista I found said openly that the properties of the Pellas or Montealegres should be 
nationalised immediately. All the Sandinistas I spoke to seemed in some way to accept such a
contradiction which would lie in the proclamation of socialism in combination with the 
continued existence of such oligarchy groups. 
In economic relations with other countries, there is a discrepancy between currently existing 
trade flow and of what Sandinistas talked, and what is to happen in the future. While the 
importance of the United States clearly had not faded in real economic terms, the way it was 
discussed and seen as if the connection to the United States already was terminated, and 
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Venezuela already was the main economic force in Nicaragua. Besides Venezuela, a few 
other countries were often mentioned as delivering economic help and being future trading 
partners. Among these are Taiwan (“Ma highlights Taiwan-Nicaragua ties” 2009), Russia, 
Libya (Castro 2007) and Iran (Morrissey 2007). These countries were mentioned as a 
secondary level, with their support seen as less significant when compared to the support 
provided by Venezuela. 
During the time of my fieldwork, almost no Liberals I spoke to considered any of the current 
government programs positively. For them, everything the government did was corruption and
the development model had not changed. A few Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS) 
followers had some positive things to say about the programs when I asked them, but 
immediately pointed out that while “socially this government is doing great, in terms of 
democracy it’s much worse [than during the Liberal governments].” The lack of democracy 
seemed for them to be equal to corruption. 
Most pronounced was this view when discussing the ALBA. I heard two main interpretations 
among Nicaraguans of what the complex setup with the ALBA-related businesses meant. 
Those critical of the government claimed the FSLN used aid money for private financial gain. 
They said that the usage of the state for private gains was not the first time in the history of 
the FSLN. Whereas those in support of the government claim it is just an accounting trick to 
get around the regulations the IMF had on caps of employment in the public sector, and to get
the money around the national assembly, where the opposition had a majority. The same 
informants who claimed the Piñata was first and foremost a rush to make land deals official, 
and had already been put into practice but for which the corresponding paper work had not 
been filled out were those who defended the ALBA. Those who claimed the Piñata was only a
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scheme of corruption were also the same ones who claimed that the ALBA was a scheme of 
corruption. 
As in the case of the first Sandinista government, the new Sandinistas were in charge of a 
country which was not doing well during the time of my fieldwork, with future plans for a 
completely different economic system that will not be implemented fully for a long time. 
Nevertheless, my informants did not judge the FSLN by this in the same way as Liberals were
judged by the economic reality of Nicaraguans in their period of government. FSLN 
Sandinistas expected economic success some time in the future, given that Sandinista 
policies are continued, while Liberals did not complain about bad present economics, but 
rather what it would eventually lead to.
Concluding remarks
As The last chapter showed, the political outlook is highly informed by the past. Yet in this 
chapter we have seen that ideas of the economy are for a great part concentrated on the 
future. The measure of success for most seems never to be the current economy as much as 
the future economy if the developments started during Sandinista governments are allowed 
continued indefinitely. In this sense, a marked difference in how the groups are seen as 
compared with the last chapter, in which it was presented that largely two groups (Liberals 
and Sandinistas) have two equally valid versions of history upon which they hope the future 
will be based.
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Chapter 9
The forming of the politics under the FSLN
I want to present some of the main political events during my time in Nicaragua. Several, for 
me, surprising events took place during this period, but having followed the country closely 
before and after my fieldwork I think that overall it was fairly average for the current 
presidency (2007–11). The following presentation should, give an overall insight into the 
political life of Nicaragua since 2007. 
Most significant political events in Nicaragua have an element of popular participation. In each
of these events, Nicaraguans interpret them as being in line with well-known historical events.
Since then, several of those events happened during my time have turned into historical 
events of their own, and Nicaraguans refer to them as such. These events demonstrated to 
me how FSLN Sandinista politics are influenced by a combination of events on the world 
scale and the organisation efforts of the popular masses within the country. Similar to how 
Nicaraguans portray their national history, also when describing current events it is common 
that they place agency in Nicaraguan hands, even when they relate the actions taking place 
in Nicaragua to international movements. Complicating matters even more, different groups 
believe they speak in the name of Sandinismo as much as the government does and try 
actively to shape the politics of the José Daniel Ortega Saavedra government. These factors 
jointly make up a dynamic which means popular participation and interpretation of 
international events is an essential part in shaping the country’s policies. This, coupled with 
popular participation in Nicaragua, is at times used to try to achieve gains internationally. This 
chapter demonstrates Nicaragua is not as centrally controlled by President Ortega Saavedra 
as the Nicaraguan right tries to make the international media believe. Following the daily 
217
politics also made me realise the Ortega Saavedra government and the FSLN Sandinista part
of the population can be creative in their portrayal of international politics, in order to achieve 
gains at a national level. To gather material for this chapter, it was vital for me to be present 
when politically relevant events happened. Subsequently interviewing people who heard 
about the event while being unrelated to it, gave me another side of the what transpired. 
Several other political groups engaged in campaigns of import to them, I focus exclusively on 
events related to the FSLN. These were events important to my FSLN Sandinista informants.
Transport worker strike (May 2008)
This strike showed me how an international event (a rise in oil prices) influenced the premises
for inner-Nicaraguan conflicts, although this was not recognised by most of the Nicaraguans 
with whom I discussed the issue. One of the first events of political significance I witnessed 
during my stay in Nicaragua was a transport workers’ strike. It lasted for 12 days, during 
which transport in-between cities in theory came to a complete standstill. In the city of León, 
where I stayed, all transport stopped, and transport workers stood at the entrance road to the 
city from Managua to hinder anyone from entering the city. From other parts of the country, I 
heard that the situation was not as serious. León is known as the most Sandinista of cities, 
and most of the transport workers I spoke to used that as the explanation for why the protests
were the largest there. 
The issue fought over was gas prices. The government obtained petroleum at favorable 
prices from Venezuela, in a scheme in which Venezuela sold oil to the Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional (FSLN) party at market prices. Only 50% had to be paid within 90 days, 
and the remaining 50% were to be paid 23 years later, with a favorable interest rate of 1–2%. 
Nevertheless, the FSLN decided to sell gas at market prices to consumers, and allegedly 
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spent the money they saw as a loan for 23 years, to finance social projects. 
Before and during the protests, the right-wing media tried to prove that gas prices in 
Nicaragua were higher than anywhere else in Central America, despite the favorable terms 
with Venezuela, and hinted that the money was going into the personal pocket of Ortega 
Saavedra. At the time, oil prices peaked, and because the government regulated the fare 
price for the intercity transport, profits and wages of the transport workers shrank. 
During the days of the protest, I ran back and forth between strikers and FSLN headquarters. 
Until then, transport workers were one of the strongest bases for the FSLN. Also, it is a 
common rumor that the police force is heavily infiltrated by Sandinistas. The police were sent 
to stop the transport workers from blocking the road. The city of León was where the biggest 
clash between demonstrators and police occurred, and at the press conference, the transport 
workers held after the clash, the spokespeople of the transport workers publicly stated: “We 
have not seen a massacre of this magnitude since the time of [dictator] Somoza”. The 
newspaper La Prensa announced that one of the transport workers had died in the clash. 
They did not retract this statement when FSLN officials pointed out that this had not, in fact, 
taken place, but they acknowledged it quietly by not reporting on it any further. The León 
police and local party officials showed some sympathy for the demands of the transport 
workers in their public announcements. When speaking to me, the party officials highlighted 
that the money recovered from the Venezuela oil deal was not only meant to benefit the 
transport sector, but also other areas, therefore, the transport workers should not win the 
conflict. 
At first, I believed I witnessed the end of the FSLN as a united political force; It seemed logical
the party would split into various factions. At one time, I sat on the curb while the transport 
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workers blocked the road, and next to me sat the La Prensa reporter covering the 
confrontations. La Prensa had been positive towards the strikers, and I wondered why, given 
that the La Prensa normally is a newspaper of the right. “This is a battle in-between ‘them,”’ 
the reporter explained to me. This `them` is the certain Sandinista part of the population. Both
the Sandinistas and those not belonging to the them, all seemed to believe that 40% of all 
Nicaraguans identify with FSLN Sandinismo. Most transport workers I spoke to and asked 
about the Sandinista connection saw themselves as part of said 40%, but explained they felt 
cheated by Ortega Saavedra. One of them stated:
For all those years we have been helping them in all the campaigns, so of course we 
expected them to give us something [once in power].
As the strike drew to an end, Ortega Saavedra went on TV and showed how the government 
spent the money they obtained from the oil deal. The explanation seemed to satisfy most 
Sandinistas, but some of my informants remained sceptical. The cynicism did not seem to 
have reference to any concrete point in Ortega Saavedra’s explanation, but was a general 
scepticism as to whether any information originating from any Nicaraguan government could 
be accepted as truth. The government promised to give transport workers a discount on gas 
prices at certain gas stations, and it seemed the transport workers forgot about the alleged 
‘massacre.’ Half a year later Liberals and FSLN Sandinistas clashed under entirely different 
circumstances, and the transport workers once again held with the FSLN. I learned through 
the Sandinista part of the population uses such physical manifestations as part of their 
repertoire of internal negotiations. Although all the people involved used strong words, it 
seems to be clear to all involved that they can retract these at a later stage without any 
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permanent damage. When the arch enemies, the Liberals, show up in the political arena, the 
Sandinistas forget all about their internal disagreements. 
At the end of the same year, the government withdrew the transport subsidy. At this time, 
prices had fallen considerably, and the transport workers did not complain much about the 
re-institution of market gas prices. Although made into a Nicaraguan event, the transport 
worker strike was ultimately caused by fluctuations in the international oil markets. The focus 
by all parties involved in the conflict is the part that played out in Nicaragua. Protests did not 
launch against international oil companies, but against the Sandinista government. 
Award given to last Minister of Education of East Germany and alliance 
with Honduras (19 July 2008)
The following showed me how Sandinistas invoke international relations symbolically, even 
though this may make little sense in gaining any foreign aid or cooperation. 19 July 2008 was 
the date of the celebration of the 29th anniversary of the Sandinista revolution. The day is 
usually celebrated in Managua by the FSLN supporters who gather in the John Paul the 
Second plaza near Lake Managua. This year the celebrations were planned with more 
international guests than usual. 
The MRS also planned celebrations. They had for the past years held their celebrations in 
alternating places around western Nicaragua. This year they held them in León, in the part of 
the city called Subtiava, a somewhat poorer neighborhood with a partly indigenous 
population. The celebrations were to take place in León because the MRS allegedly had a lot 
of support there. I loitered around the MRS office at the time. I knew the MRS did not trust 
their local chapter in León with the preparations, and they had sent people from Managua to 
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take care of all planning efforts. For them, the celebration of the 19th of July was just as much
a protest against Ortega Saavedra and the loss of their license to run in elections, as it was a 
commemoration of the revolution they fought together with the FSLN and which they now (at 
times) believe only themselves to be the true representatives. 
Most international FSLN guests came from allied South American countries. The two 
exceptions were José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, President of Honduras, the neighboring 
country to the north and traditionally not an ally, and Margot Honecker, last minister of 
education and wife of the late general secretary of the central committee of the Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) of the Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik (DDR, German Democratic Republic). 
Zelaya Rosales declared that day the Honduran people had “always” followed the social 
struggles of their neighbors to the south, since the time of Calderón Sandino. Honecker was 
present to receive the Ruben Dario medal for the help of the DDR in the literacy campaign of 
the 1980s. Zelaya Rosales was not yet ready to sign any concrete agreement with Nicaragua,
but his mere presence and what he said was enough to be the talk of the town. The concrete 
signing of various treaties came between that date and 28 June 2009, when he was deposed 
through a military coup. 
The fact Honecker received the medal, a somewhat minor event no Nicaraguans I met saw as
controversial, caused headline news in Germany. Honecker had been absent from public life 
since her escape to Chile together with her husband in the early 1990s, and it came as 
somewhat of a surprise that she reappeared in this way. German media highlighted her 
nickname in East Germany was the ‘purple witch’ (a reference to her hair-color) and what 
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horrible policies the media believed she was responsible for in East Germany. In Nicaragua, 
not everybody knew who she was. To find qualified opinions, I went to the FSLN headquarters
in León and asked about what the significance of the visit a few days after the ceremony had 
taken place. Instead of putting me in contact with those giving the official party line, the 
secretary asked everybody waiting in line to explain the matter to me directly. She had by now
seen me many times, and seemingly was not worried about what those waiting would tell me. 
I told them, that in Germany reactions were rather negative. The secretary looked somewhat 
angry at me and then said: “The entire German working class should be proud of this prize!” 
Everybody cheered. 
The Sandinistas I met all had rather positive views of East Germany in comparison to West 
Germany. In terms of terminology, it is common in Nicaragua to shorten the official term for 
East Germany, ‘The German Democratic Republic,’ to ‘The Democratic Germany,’ and to 
shorten the official term for West Germany, ‘ The Federal Republic of Germany,’ to ‘The 
Capitalist Germany.’ ‘Capitalist’ for them has a clearly negative connotation, so the terms they 
use clearly position the value they place on the two countries. 
Openly allying oneself with the former minister of education of a nonexistent, and in some 
parts of the world almost hated, country can hardly have been done in order to receive more 
economic assistance or other political support. This was in effect a move highly influenced by 
the historical past of Nicaragua and an understanding of international relations originating 
from it. The relation to Honduras may to a higher degree be relevant to Nicaragua today, yet 
the reinterpretation of Honduran history by Zelaya Rosales hardly helped him gain any 
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support in Honduras. This must have been aimed at the Nicaraguan audience. Both 
appearances seem to have caused problems for the Nicaraguan government and its allies at 
an international level. The popular support from sectors of Nicaraguan society for these 
appearances must have been the most crucial factor when the government decided to invite 
them. Although the MRS was able to organise an event in León in spite of their undisciplined 
local planning, it ended up being the FSLN that drew the largest crowd. 
The Georgia conflict
The following showed the Sandinista understanding of the importance of what happens in 
Nicaragua has an impact in an international context, and at times can impact on the country’s 
politics. The next major conflict focused upon in Nicaragua was the conflict between Georgia 
and Russia of August 2008. Two territories of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, had not 
been under Georgian government control since the end of the Cold War, and the majority of 
those living there were Russian citizens. Georgia attacked South Ossetia immediately after a 
joint Georgian-US military training exercise (Wikileaks 2008; Centre for Research on 
Globalization 2008). The conflict quickly spread to Abkhazia (Harding and Tran 2008). After 
the initial Georgian attacks, Russia retaliated and after securing the area, continued to send 
its ground troops far into Georgian territory (Agence France-Presse 2008). In the end, the two
territories declared themselves independent from Georgia, but no country other than Russia 
accepted their independence (Levy 2008). 
In Nicaragua I initially followed the Georgia conflict through European Internet sources. 
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Nicaraguan papers certainly did not make this their main theme at the start of the conflict. I 
wrongly assumed this mater would not have any importance for Nicaraguans. Some days into
the conflict, at the UNAN–León, I attended a lecture about Nicaraguan history for 
Nicaraguans – part of a series heavily controlled by Sandinistas who tried to give their 
students a revolutionary perspective. The issue of Georgia was discussed there. One of the 
lecturers, representing the party line, used part of his lecture to criticise the United States and 
its role in the conflict of supporting Georgia. Russia was described as merely being 
responsible for keeping the peace in the area. Nobody seemed to disagree. Shortly thereafter,
Nicaragua was the second country in the world officially to recognise the independence of 
these two territories (NYT 2008). When I discussed this with Sandinista informants, they all 
seemed to think this is the most natural step for Nicaragua to take. 
Russia is seen uncommonly positively, and any foreign intervention the United States is 
involved in is seen as negative by most FSLN Sandinistas. Initially, Nicaragua had no stake in
this event, and none of Russia’s allies initially recognised the independence of the territories 
from Georgia. Thus, it is only logical to assume the most important reason for the Nicaraguan 
government’s actions was their own political opinion and that of the majority Sandinista part of
the population. The event led to Nicaragua renewing relations with Russia. This included 
several visits by the Russian the Vice-President, a visit of the Russian navy and the signing of
various aid packages. One of these included a donation of 130 buses (RIA Novisti 2010). 
Russia donated these buses directly to the FSLN party (Potosme 2009), who then sold them 
to Managua cooperatives for $25,000 USD each (Morales A. 2009). 
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It is noticeable the help was sent to the FSLN instead of the Nicaraguan state. I can only 
speculate, that this setup was arranged to prevent the Liberals from having access to the 
money. Ortega Saavedra said as part of a speech during those days that Russia was 
"illuminating the planet" by struggling for "peace and social justice," and that the United States
"turns its military force against these in an attempt to shatter them" (Silva 2008). These words 
seem exceptionally sharp and as if Ortega Saavedra would be speaking of the Soviet Union 
of the 1980s rather than Russia in 2008. In my experience, Nicaraguans use ‘Russia’ and 
‘Soviet Union’ interchangeably and Russia is not seen as something fundamentally different 
from what the former Soviet Union. Ortega Saavedra’s statement reflects that. The entire 
incident shows two points of understanding of the world on the part of the Sandinistas. They 
see Nicaragua as significant enough to play a role in incidents that take part in Eastern 
Europe, and the country can have a policy independent of the United States, Western Europe
and all the regional Latin American powers. Furthermore, an understanding of the 
continuance of Soviet Union and Russia is unique to Nicaragua. 
It can not be disregarded that the situation shows through this understanding, the 
international communication of this Nicaraguan perspective on the events, did allow for a shift
in the international positioning of the Nicaraguan state in relation to Russia and the United 
States. While I initially viewed the Nicaraguan intervention in the conflict as a product of an 
ill-informed picture of the world in which Russia would help Nicaragua and other countries in 
similar situations escape the domination of the United States, I came to recognise the 
application of this view in the forming of Nicaraguan state policy led to geopolitical realities 
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moving closer to the initial Sandinista perspective. 
León FSLN candidate for mayor clashed with police (September 2008)
To me, this showed how not only the actions of the government, but also how grassroots 
activism is believed to be a reflection of worldwide events on the part of the Sandinistas. A 
much talked-about ‘clash’ between police and FSLN supporters took place as part of the 
election campaign in fall of 2008. I was not in León on that day, but the next day I saw a 
number of pickup trucks with Sandinista flags drive up and down some of the main streets. I 
asked if I could join them and was allowed to sit on the back of one. A girl sitting next to me 
explained:
See, the political right at a world level is trying to halt the revolutionary process by 
arranging these marches. Here in Nicaragua, it is the Liberals who try to take León, 
because it was the first capital of the revolution.23
As we drove around, it turned out to be a victory parade with Calderón, on the day of the 
clashes photographed hitting a policeman, and Gladys Báez, a local FSLN member of the 
national assembly, mounted on the back of pick up trucks. The trucks went through some of 
the poorer parts of León, cheered on by the masses. The episode of the day before 
apparently did not hurt Calderón’s imagine as much in León as in Managua and other places. 
In León, this was one of several such events during the next few months with many forceful 
FSLN marches, which looked as though the liberation from Somoza’s forces were re-lived by 
those participating. It is the only logical explanation why the FSLN, while in control of the 
23 A reference to the fact León was liberated by the Sandinistas before Managua, and that it has always had FSLN city 
governments since.
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government, the police and the military, took the step of digging trenches and chasing small 
groups of Liberals when these wanted to march in a city where the FSLN had a clear majority.
The incident of the clashes between Calderón and the policeman was noticed nationwide, 
and most other places it was not seen as positive. Calderón since then had a reputation for 
not being equipped for the job of mayor. Outside of León, it was mainly the scene of that day 
to which people referred when talking about him over the next year or so. In León, other 
rumors about him seemed more prominent in giving him an image, such as the rumor 
according to which he allegedly ate at a fish restaurant without showing the proper manners 
of cleaning his hands at a time when he was mayor. 
The matter of Calderón’s clash seemed relevant to many Sandinistas, especially in Managua.
While there may have been a certain class difference between those approving and those 
going against the actions of the candidate for mayor with middle-class Nicaraguans less likely
to support his attack on the police, and an undeniable difference existed between León and 
Managua in what events were taken as fundamental. My informants in Managua talked about 
the incident as an isolated act by Calderón. For the Leónese participants of the marches, the 
Calderón incident seemed to be part of the marches against the Liberals and was not 
attributed much importance. 
No-one I met questioned whether the clashes between Liberals and Sandinistas represented 
an international tendency. The difference in understanding between León and Managua, and 
many other places, must be something of which many Sandinistas are aware. From that they 
should have been able to deduct that the perspective from outside of Nicaragua would be 
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even more different, yet somehow this seemed not to have been done. 
FSLN wins local elections (November 2008)
Nicaraguan elections are events which take on significance for both Liberals and Sandinistas 
that go beyond electoral politics and are seen not only as a formal process, but as a part of 
popular organisation. This was apparent during the preparations for the 2008 municipal 
elections, and in the reactions to the results. Also, the elections showed how central 
international relations are for Nicaragua, while Nicaraguans again place agency on the 
Nicaraguan side. 
International observers from the European Union and United States were not allowed to 
observe the elections but various Latin American countries did receive observer credentials. 
This was somewhat new and reflected the fact Sandinistas were in charge. It also caused the 
election results to be questioned by those excluded from observing. It seemed just about 
everybody remotely related to politics was somehow involved in the electoral process. On the 
days before the election, I circulated with Javier Díaz, a former student of mine in his late 40s 
who lived in Ciudad Sandino, just outside of Managua on the road to León. On the night 
before the elections, we visited his mother-in-law. The family of his mother-in-law was 
preparing food for the FSLN fraction which sat at the election stations in a certain sector of 
Managua the next day. Instead of organising food for members of all parties who sit at an 
election booth together, the food preparation is done party by party. It is just one of several 
election related activities which involve the public, and it reinforces the personal alliance of 
the food preparer with the party. 
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Díaz was involved in the Juventud Sandinista (JS) in the 1980s and studied in Cuba in the 
late 1980s to early 1990s. Now he said he was disappointed by the movement, without 
specifying the overall reason. Nevertheless, he still voted for the FSLN. He explained his vote 
was part of what is popularly known as the ‘voto duro’ (hard vote) which refers to those who 
will always vote FSLN, no matter how much they disagree with the day-to-day politics of the 
party. No equivalent term exists for voters of other parties. Manuel Corea, one of those who 
went to the cadre school Wilhelm-Pieck in East Germany at another time presented to me a 
category of Sandinistas which seems to cover the same group, and he explained the 
distinction between them and other Sandinistas this way:
There are those Sandinistas who are Sandinistas because it is where they receive 
something. They will dance to the tune of whoever feeds them. And then there are those of 
us who are Sandinistas out of conviction. We will always be Sandinistas, even though we 
recognise that the Frente… the upper leadership of the Frente, commits errors.
During election day, Managua remained calm, and in the early afternoon, I stood at the 
Rotonda Metrocentro. FSLN Sandinistas were already present before polls closed, waving 
Nicaraguan flags. Once election booths closed, they exchanged their flags for red-and-black 
Sandinista flags. At this time, I joined one of the JS gatherings a few blocks away and 
encountered a friend, Ninfa Patricia Ramos. Ramos was involved in the student section of the
Sandinista movement for a prolonged period, and she had worked at exit polls on election day
and already knew the FSLN had won in Managua before the official results were in. She 
introduced me to another type of voter, the ‘voto oculto’ (hidden vote). These are people who 
do not tell pollsters how they vote. Nicaraguan pollsters count them as likely voting in favor of 
one of the Liberal parties.24
24 The analysis of those who work with this terminology seems to be lose to that of Lancaster (1992, p. 286), who 
speculated that those who did not tell pollsters about their true intentions of voting in the 1990-elections did so out of a 
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The four types of voters pollsters operate with are: FSLN voters who vote due to the politics of
the FSLN, FSLN voters who vote in spite of the politics of the FSLN (‘voto duro’), open Liberal
votes, and hidden Liberal votes (‘voto oculto’). This indicates a vote in favor of the FSLN 
seems ‘more correct’ morally or otherwise, than casting a Liberal vote for Nicaraguans. 
The FSLN won the elections of November 9th 2008 overwhelmingly. The FSLN won 105 
mayors, while the PLC won 37 and the ALN 4 mayors (Hurtado 2008). Immediately after the 
preliminary result became known, the opposition cried foul and called for marches. I listened 
to all sides of the story. In the end, I must admit that Fonseca Terán (2008b) was right in his 
analysis that, at least at a formal level, the elections were legally and correctly won by the 
FSLN, as allegations of electoral fraud could not be substantiated. Even though this seemed 
to be recognised by most Liberals, it was of little practical importance to them. A protest 
against a Sandinista victory for them seemed only normal. The Latin American election 
observers approved the election results. The Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) leadership, 
and the two Liberal representatives within it approved the results of most major cities where 
the FSLN won according to their data. The two Liberal representatives were then 
consequently expelled from the PLC. 
The next days the Liberals in Managua tried to cause havoc by physically attacking 
Sandinista positions. They managed to capture a few of the rotondas, but as soon as 
Montealegre Rivas called one of the rotondas ‘liberated territory,’ the Sandinista activists took 
it back immediately. Fights broke out all over the city with several dead Sandinistas, and for 
the next few weeks, Ortega Saavedra disappeared from the public scene. He was replaced 
by the members of the CSE who seemed to lead the country during this period. Marches 
feeling of shame for not voting for the Sandinistas.
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broke out everywhere. The statements of the CSE members spread through mass media and 
mouth-to-mouth propaganda in a highly politicised atmosphere. 
In many cities like León, the PLC and MRS claimed to be the real winners and only electoral 
fraud kept them from taking over the city government. On the day of their first announced 
march in which Montealegre Rivas was to participate, FSLN activists blocked the roads from 
Managua, and a few thousand Sandinistas chased about 200 Liberals, who managed to 
arrive in León. Among others, I met Sandinista farm workers from the countryside who had 
come to León to ‘defend’ the city against the Liberals. When I asked what was taking place 
between Liberals and Sandinistas, Liberals claimed strongly they had been robbed of their 
victory, while the Sandinistas claimed their march was a demonstration of ‘yet another victory’ 
and the Liberals were to blame for all violence which may still occur. 
Young and old Sandinistas were in the streets that day, and both groups seemed mostly 
interested in the physical manifestation of political differences. Even the police looked very 
happy and did not actually try to stop the Sandinistas from chasing the Liberals. Some blocks 
from the front line between the two groups, one could see groups of young Sandinistas shoot 
homemade firecracker-arms at police lines, who ‘defended’ themselves with shields as if they 
were in a war. Yet, behind the police there were no Liberal marchers. One policeman filmed 
the confrontation with the young Sandinistas with his mobile phone. No attempts at arrests 
were made. It just seemed like a part of an action-filled happening for both police and activists
which both sides seemed to enjoy. 
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At first, I was amazed the Liberals dared march in León. The number of people they managed
to assemble showed quite clearly it was highly unlikely they could have won in León, whereas
other cities, such as Masaya, where the FSLN also won but has much less support 
historically, would have been easier targets for claiming voter fraud. After talking with the 
Liberal candidate Ariel Terán and some of the MRS people, I became aware of why their 
confrontation with the Sandinistas in León was so crucial for them. The reason for their march
seemed to lie outside of Nicaragua. Many representatives of western countries made 
comments during those days to the effect that cheating and fraud had occurred in the 
elections, even though none of their countries’ observers had been observing the elections. 
Had the Sandinistas additionally attacked the Liberals, not with demonstrators, but using the 
police or military, both firmly in their control, it would have received headlines throughout the 
United States and Europe, and could have ended in the funding of another Contra war. The 
opposition tried to involve international pressure, and attempted using the tactics of popular 
organising to take control the way the Sandinistas had. Ultimately, they were unsuccessful in 
their attempt. 
For the Sandinistas, the day held a different significance. Calderón explained it well, when he 
spontaneously tried to connect the events with its history as a Sandinista stronghold when I 
asked him what he thought about the events of the day:
Well, today was a momentous victory for the people of León, and I would say for the people
of Nicaragua. León has shown always to be able to bring victory to Nicaragua. Because in 
1956, the execution of the tyrant Somoza meant the beginning of the end of the 
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dictatorship. And the taking of the fort [of León] on 7 July [1979], finished the dictatorship
and made the establishment of the government of Nicaragua—here in León—possible. 
Today, with this victory over the [political] right, over the modern-day Somocismo, León 
gives Nicaragua the chance to recover the level of stability that is needed to fight and 
overcome poverty.
I did not hear Calderón’s specific way of connecting the event with history but the same event 
was explained in several other ways in the next few days by various León Sandinistas. Every 
time it was put in a historic context, somehow connecting it to 1979. For the younger 
Sandinistas who were not alive in 1979 and had not experienced the 1980s, the event 
seemed to be the closest they got to having participated in the revolutionary struggle. 
In municipal elections, it is essential that either ‘they’ or ‘we’ win, and not so much which 
particular candidate wins. This became apparent to me a few months later. In theory, the 
candidacies for most top posts are individuals, in that the elections are set up like elections in 
the United States which are more about individual candidates rather than a party. Yet, 
Nicaraguans typically see the importance of the candidate as secondary to his or her party 
affiliation. When in Managua Alexis Argüello (FSLN) was elected and the opposition fought it, 
there was a great uproar. When Argüello was replaced by the FSLN with Daisy Torres (FSLN)
the following summer, after Arguello committed suicide on 1 July 2009, hardly any grumbling 
was heard, even though many conspiracy theories would have it that Ortega Saavedra was 
behind the death. No-one suggested that new elections should be held which Liberals would 
have a chance of winning. Some of the other FSLN mayors were exchanged before their term
ended in the following years, and while, at times, it ended with two different factions within the
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FSLN supporting different candidates, at no time was it suggested having an open vote with 
participation of all parties to decide who should take over. 
Parliament stopped working (November 2008 – February 2009)
For four months, between the elections in November until February 2009, the country was 
ruled by presidential decree. The Liberals initially decided they would declare the municipal 
election results invalid through the use of their parliamentary majority. Ortega Saavedra 
explained that this was unconstitutional, and that he would write a presidential decree against 
it. For the next few months, a standoff ensued between Liberals and the FSLN in which 
neither was able to form a majority in parliament and nothing was passed through parliament, 
which, according to both sides, led to foreign help to be cancelled due to lack of decisions by 
parliament. A few marches by Liberals against what they claimed to be electoral fraud were 
organised, and the FSLN countered them with marches and celebrations in connection with 
the 30 year anniversary of the 1979 triumph of the Sandinista revolution. None of these later 
marches reached the size of the earlier marches at the end of 2008. 
The crisis was resolved when Liberals voted for the Sandinista proposal of parliamentary 
leadership and a group of judges lifted the house arrest of their leader Alemán Lacayo. The 
MRS people were quick to point out this proved the existence of the pact between Alemán 
Lacayo’s PLC and the FSLN. Meanwhile, Montealegre Rivas left the PLC again, and tried to 
establish his own group, the Banca Democratica (BD), to which several of the Managua city 
council members followed. Then Montealegre Rivas changed his mind and asked his 
followers to join the Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI)25, until that party decided they did not 
want Montealegre Rivas because he had too many connections to the Somozas. The Liberals
25 The PLI was a party believed dead by most Nicaraguans I talked to.
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then started to subdivide themselves into various groups, to the joy of the FSLN Sandinistas. 
The episode showed that after not being able to make advances in the popular arena, the 
opposition was for once again able to unite and pressure the government at parliament level. 
Also the FSLN was unable to counter this with any form of popular organising to force the 
opposition into accepting the result. At a general level, one can say the FSLN is willing to give
in to a more or less corrupt deals which give them most positions of power. Different from 
most other actions, which included popular organising in some way or other, the deal with 
Alemán Lacayo was universally criticised by all Sandinistas. Yet, few of them saw any other 
solution to the crisis in the country, and ultimately they accepted the actions of Ortega 
Saavedra as necessary. The issue they seemed to have with it, was that a critical decision 
was made without involving events of mass popular participation, as that is what usually gives
legitimacy to Sandinista initiated projects. 
Military coup in Honduras (June 2009)
The most direct way, Nicaragua politics were influenced by the international scene during this 
period, besides the cutting of aid, was when the military coup in the northern neighbor of 
Honduras took place. Since the appearance of President Zelaya Rosales on 19 July 2008 in 
Managua, Honduras joined two alliance agreements to which Nicaragua also subscribed, the 
political alliance/trade network Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra Américas 
(ALBA) and the Caribbean alliance to buy oil from Venezuela called Petrocaribe. Honduras 
then experienced a military coup on 28 June 2009, the day when President Zelaya Rosales 
planned on holding a referendum on whether the people wanted to hold a constitution 
assembly, to change some of the land rights and open up for institutions of direct democracy, 
such as the Consejos de Poder Ciudadano (CPC) in Nicaragua. 
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In Nicaragua, the reactions to the coup followed the classic divide FSLN vs. the Liberal 
parties. On one side, the Liberals decided they wanted to march in favor of the coup. The 
MRS parliamentary group had at this time split, with two of four members leaving. Most 
importantly the Movimiento por el Rescate del Sandinismo (MpRS) and their one member of 
the national assembly left, criticised the MRS for helping an electoral campaign in El Salvador
against the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). The MRS 
left-leaning elements exited, and the rest of the party did not object to the protests in favor of 
the coup in Honduras. 
At the time, I associated with younger FSLN party activists in Nicaragua. Erick Saul Rios 
Juarez, a 20 year old Sandinista radio show host and activist, spent many days occupying the
rotondas, to prevent the political right from showing their solidarity with the Honduran coup 
makers. Sandinistas in the border region with Honduras wrote protest songs and housed 
some of the Honduran exiles following the coup. I visited the Sandinistas in the border town of
Ocotal in early August 2009. They made the point that they did not help the Hondurans 
organise a revolution against the coup. “That has to be the work of the Hondurans 
themselves,” the guy in charge of the FSLN office explained to me, “Our help is humanitarian 
more than anything.” The theme of Nicaraguans planning a revolution in Honduras was 
extremely common in conversation during those days. All the Sandinistas I met agreed, a 
revolution was the solution for Honduras, and many of them were interested in helping 
Honduras do that. One of the Honduran youth organisers showed up in Nicaragua and went 
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on Rios Juarez’s show. “This guy suddenly said that ‘Zelaya [Rosales] is not the right person 
to lead this,”’ Rios Juarez told me after I came back from a trip to Honduras where I met the 
same youngster. Rios Juarez was hesitant in giving me contact details and the party 
ultimately decided against providing them. It was by coincidence I met the same fellow. This 
episode demonstrated the Nicaraguan understanding that popular mobilisation is essential in 
day-to-day politics. Even the Liberals, who by then had managed to build up some respect 
internationally through the elections they supposedly won, believed they needed to march, 
even though no government in the world officially was in favor of the coup. If international 
media were to focus on their marches, they would lose all credibility they had built. For 
Sandinistas, the coup marked a difficult time, and from some of the comments heard, there 
seemed to be a fear higher up in the party that individual Sandinista groups would try to 
organise a revolutionary effort in Honduras in disregard of the understanding of the events of 
Honduran activists who fought in the resistance against the coup. 
30 years of revolution and some advances (summer 2009)
On 19 July 2009, the 30th anniversary of the revolution was celebrated. Yet instead of saying 
‘30 years since the insurrection,’ my Sandinista informants insisted on calling it ‘the 30th year 
of the revolution.’ The director of the Oficina de Ética Pública (OEP) explained: “Well, during 
those 16 years, we did not stop. We just prepared ourselves for this phase of the revolution.” 
Her life seems to confirm that. It is remarkably similar to the life stories of many other 
Sandinistas I interviewed: during the early years of Liberal governments she studied for a 
higher degree as a lawyer and then spent the last few years working at the NGO-level. 
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Illustration 13: The literacy campaign is one area in which a marked difference can be seen between 
Sandinista and non-Sandinista governments. The latest campaign had already started in 2005 at a 
regional level in municipalities where Sandinistas were in charge. In 2007–09, it moved to the 
national level. The 2007 figure is an estimate by the Nicaraguan government. The 2008 figure is 
based on survey results, and the 2009 figure was calculated by taking the 2008 figure and subtracting 
the amount of people who had gone through the literacy program that year. The exact meaning of 
‘illiterate’ is not specified for any of the figures. Source: Arrien (2006); Paguaga (2006); MINED 
(2009); Hanemann (2005)
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 In August 2009, in the middle of the financial crisis, the FSLN declared a success in reducing 
illiteracy from 20.7%26 to 3.56%27 with the literacy campaign it started in 2007. The figure is 
approved by the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation (UNESCO) 
(Nicaragua Network 2009a). The government also celebrated the start of a hydro-electric 
energy program, that supposedly some day will generate 40% of all electricity produced by 
the Tumarin Hydroelectric Project on the Rio Grande de Matagalpa. With cooperation from 
the international company Eolo, S.A. and the international consortium Amayo, S.A., the 
government built wind farms scheduled to produce another 12.5% of Nicaraguan energy 
needs (Nicaragua Network 2009b). 
The government made several similar points at this time. Some of them, such as the literacy 
program, involved large amounts of popular participation, while others were highly technical 
and would most likely require the collaboration of highly skilled professionals. All these 
projects have as a stated goal the improvement of the standard of living of the general 
population and eventually to make the country more self-sufficient. The approval for such 
programs is almost always looked for in international organisations. Instead of using the 
26 The figure 20.7% is quoted in all news stories about the event. In my own calculation using the base numbers from 
Paguaga (2006), I arrive at 19.9%, which is the figure used in the graph.
27 The figure 3.56% is disseminated widely. Asking Sandinistas, it was explained that the UNESCO certified an illiteracy 
rate of 4.1% and that subsequently the figure fell to 3.56% during the same year.. See also illustration p. 239.
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numbers of the Ministerio de Educación (MINED), the government mostly refers to the 
numbers produced by the UNESCO. For all the talk of independence from the empire and the
unique national discussion, multinational companies and organisations were strongly involved
in these Sandinista projects.
Concluding remarks
We have seen how a diverse range of political challenges is handled by Sandinistas on 
various levels. This includes how internal Nicaraguan conflicts often originate from 
developments at a world level which are not referred to in the country. At times, actors on an 
international stage are called for by various Nicaraguan groups and this can mean the 
Nicaraguan reality changes quite concretely. Through all their actions, the Sandinistas seek to
make Nicaragua a more independent country. Sandinista leaders also seek approval for the 
success of their programs in international organisations and work on programs together with 
international companies. Various events have shown popular organisation is a central 
element in Nicaraguan political life, and some events such as elections, have a distinctively 
parliamentary connotation, and in Nicaragua are cause for popular organisation. At times, 
mass gatherings are staged in order to provoke a reaction internationally, and at times the 
international political scene is invoked in order to appease the Nicaraguan masses. 
Altogether, the whole structure of international influences, and uncertainty in the command 
hierarchy of the FSLN and the relationship between various groups all believing to represent 
Sandinismo, presents a picture of a vibrant, but chaotic, political landscape. This is truly 
representative of Nicaraguan politics. 
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Chapter 10
Ways for Sandinistas to involve themselves in politics
In the aftermath of the 1980s version of Sandinismo and a succession of different right-wing 
governments, the return of José Daniel Ortega Saavedra/Sandinismo in 2006 was cast 
against a much more variegated backdrop of sub-versions of Sandinista ideology. These 
different versions are not so much reflected in different fractional versions of Sandinismo, 
although such diffuse tendencies certainly exist. 
The current situation of the country is mostly portrayed in foreign media as being extremely 
centered around President Ortega Saavedra and the decisions he makes. In reality, the 
Sandinistas are in power (2007–12) in more than just the sense that the Nicaraguan 
President happens to be a follower of the Sandinista ideology. The last chapter looked at age 
as a major factor in terms of what it means to be a Sandinista. This chapter looks at different 
types of Sandinistas and how they act politically. We take a look at the historic structure of the
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), and how the party now works differently 
and has changed to a model in line with what is known as the ‘Socialism for the 21st Century.’
Then the significance Sandinistas attribute to political alliances and the different ways one 
can be a Sandinista activist are viewed.
The historic structure of the FSLN
When the FSLN first started in 1961 it consisted of only one ideological tendency with one 
national directory. In the 1970s, two other tendencies came into existence, and, for a few 
years, the party operated with three rather independent leaderships. In early 1979, the party 
held a unification conference in Honduras where it decided a group of nine Sandinistas, three 
from each tendency, would make up the national leadership. This organised division of power 
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remained the same throughout the 1980s. The party was not one unified bloc, and the 
divisions were institutionalised. In addition to participation in the ideological tendencies and 
work inside the party, a number of activities were offered to engage the general population so 
they could see themselves as part of the Sandinismo project. So-called ‘mass organisations’ 
were created to facilitate this. They were given formal representation at various levels. Party 
membership was not acquired by most people involved in these activities, yet they soon 
referred to themselves as Sandinistas. During the 1980s and into the 1990s the party 
controlled TV stations and the newspaper ‘La Barricada.’ Opposition newspapers were 
allowed during Sandinista rule, but complained about being censored frequently by Sandinista
authorities. Working in the Sandinista media outlets was nevertheless one way to become 
somewhat creative and independently involved in the Sandinista project. Most involvement 
with the politics and the FSLN party in the 1980s was rather hierarchically organised, most of 
my informants claim. In short: Many ways existed of being a Sandinista in those years. 
In the post-Sandinista years, around the time when the Movimiento Renovador Sandinista 
(MRS) split off from the FSLN in the 1990s, the national leadership of nine dissolved. After 
that, Ortega Saavedra has served as the General Secretary of the party. Several other 
individuals hold high party posts and are known for it. The names I heard people mention are 
the Organisational Secretary, Reinaldo Gregorio Lenín Cerna Juárez,28 Communication 
Secretary, Rosario Murillo, the International Secretary, Jacinto Juárez, and his media-savvy 
vice, Carlos Fonseca Terán. 
The formal structure of the party that decides how the individual leaders arrived at their posts 
28 The post of organizational secretary of the FSLN was suspended in May 2011 (Arévalo Alemán 2011).
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are conducted is of little concern to most Sandinistas. No-one I met outside the FSLN offices 
was quite able to explain how it worked, and no documents or charts existed on the web 
pages of the FSLN which explained what offices existed and who was elected to what 
position. After visiting the department of organisation of the FSLN León to ask specifically 
about this issue and searching for the statutes of the party on other websites, I discovered 
that the national leadership of nine in the 1980s was replaced by a national Sandinista council
of 40–50 members, which is appointed by national congresses of around 1300 Sandinistas 
every 5 years, and additionally includes the FSLN mayors of departamento capitals and 
political secretaries of the party at the departmental level. It appoints all the heads of the party
that I had heard about already, and additionally secretaries and vice secretaries for the areas 
of women, youth, political education, and finances, as well as two committees: one that 
organises party-internal elections and one that insures that all structures of the party stick to 
the statutes of the party. At a level in-between the national congress and national council is 
the national assembly of around 300 members. The national assembly includes the political 
secretaries and mayors at the municipio level. The assemblies make all decisions of major 
importance that come up in-between national congresses. The structure of the party at a 
national level is largely copied at the departamento and municipio levels. At a neighborhood 
level, the party consists of general assemblies and Consejos de Liderazgo Sandinista 
(Sandinista Leadership Councils, CLSs) (FSLN 2002). 
While the fact that hardly anyone knows about the formal structure of the party may at first 
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glance indicate an extremely closed leadership model, upon closer inspection it is only so in 
the limited sense of determining who the presidential candidate is to be. Power differences 
among Sandinistas exist, but the party does not function as hierarchically as one may initially 
think. When I visited Nicaragua for the first time (December/January 2006/2007), and was in 
Managua for the inauguration ceremony of Ortega Saavedra, I was amazed to discover only 
one party/group with one set of symbols making up the Left of Nicaragua. Compared to 
Mexico with its wealth of social organisations and parties, it was noticeable how in Nicaragua 
everything was centered around the FSLN and the symbolism connected to Augusto Nicolás 
Calderón Sandino. This gave me an initial picture that the FSLN had not changed much since
the 1980s. 
With time, I noticed marked differences among various parts of the Sandinista movement, 
involving many activities. Ortega Saavedra once called the FSLN an ‘anarchist party’ (Gaynor 
1999). For him, this seemed to mean the party was not as centrally controlled as was the 
case with many Soviet aligned parties. Similarly, with the FSLN in power, the party control of 
the country is not as tight as one might think. This is evident given the media coverage of 
Ortega Saavedra’s administration. At the same time, it cannot be denied the FSLN connected
part of the Sandinista movement exerts power. A good example of how the party functions 
decentralised, yet exerted limited power, could be seen in the current structure of the media. 
The only three daily papers in Nicaragua are La Prensa, Hoy and El Nuevo Diario. All three of
these are Conservative or center-Conservative. This would under other circumstances seem 
like a media scene controlled by Conservative forces. The papers only print 100,000 copies 
altogether daily– in a country with a population of 5.3 million. Radio is much more influential – 
95% of households have radios and 180 FM and 65 AM radio stations broadcast. The state, 
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much of which during Sandinista governments is an extension of the party apparatus, only 
owns one station – Radio Nicaragua. The FSLN owns one news program and holds shares in
the national station Canal 4 and nine of the many local radio stations29. In addition, another 20
stations call themselves ‘Sandinista,’ but they are outside the party’s direct control. Around 
80% of all Nicaraguans are reached by the Sandinista news program and around 30% by 
their other programs. William Grigsby Vado, current director of the Sandinista radio station La 
Primera, explained the relationship between the various stations this way as part of an 
interview with a German newspaper:
The various stations partially also pursue different political interests. We are all children of
the revolution, but these days every radio fights on its own. […] We are Sandinista and we 
are autonomous. (Berger 2008, 3, Wilm translation)
The independent Sandinista radio stations are still bound to the state, and partially sponsored
through government advertisements. The media are clearly not wholly controlled by the 
Sandinistas, although Sandinista media make out a crucial part of the media landscape. The 
Sandinista media are not entirely controlled by Ortega Saavedra, but have a number of 
different Sandinista groups controlling each of the various outlets. This structure of the 
Sandinista media is similar to the structure of the party overall. The rest of the chapter shows 
this. 
The principle of alliances
While the party is not quite united and decision making structures oftentimes unclear, in many
instances, alliances are sought with other groups outside the Sandinista camp to achieve 
single advances on certain issues. Tricks, such as passing laws to please one alliance 
29 The FSLN ownership of media outlets is changing rapidly. The data are from 2008–9; Canal 8 and 13 were also 
Sandinista stations by 2011, and are directed by the sons of Ortega Saavedra.
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partner, only to subsequently subvert it by not enforcing it or using other laws or judicial 
practices to counteract the initial law, and advanced schemes of short-lived alliances with 
various groups to achieve a certain goal by some Sandinista subgroup, I find to be typical of 
Sandinista rule. We now look at some of the most well-known examples of this in recent 
years. 
Therapeutic abortion
One of the two most known examples of Nicaraguan politics outside of Nicaragua is how 
Ortega Saavedra apparently finds Jesus just in time before the 2006 presidential elections 
and marries his partner of over 20 years, Rosario Murillo, in a Catholic ceremony in 2005 
(Gooren 2010). That same fall, the Catholic church mobilised against women’s right of 
abortion even in certain limited cases when the woman’s life is in danger and only the life of 
the woman or the fetus can be saved. This right had been part of the constitution for about a 
century. The right was first removed in 2006, and officially outlawed by 2008 – all with the 
approval of the FSLN and all the right-wing parties. In exchange for that, some Catholic 
priests supported the FSLN in the elections (Gooren 2010). “In the 1980s, the Catholic church
was against us, and now they are with us,” an elderly person at a León center for old 
revolutionaries tried to convince me as to why the step (on abortion) was needed tactically in 
December 2006. It gradually became clearer during my time in Nicaragua, that ‘forbidding’ 
abortion did not mean and was not meant to mean stopping its practice or even to stop the 
state from organising it. 
It took another investigator, Rakel Helgheim of the University of Bergen, Norway, to conduct a
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series of interviews with members of civilian society to find out what exact legal situation 
existed after therapeutic abortion had been made illegal. We stayed at the same place in 
León during the first months of my stay. She was furious about this change to the law. One 
day she came home and explained she had just found out, that around the time abortion was 
made entirely illegal, a change publicised in both national and international press, the code of 
conduct of hospitals had changed. According to the new code, hospitals had to prioritise the 
survival of the patient higher than any other law. This was not published anywhere at the time.
It was not before the summer of 2009 that the El Nuevo Diario carried a story attacking the 
FSLN for the Ministerio de Salud (MINSA) having conducted abortions after it was officially 
forbidden (Aguilera 2009b; Aguilera 2009a). I received some private talking points from 
Fonseca Terán (2010b) in July 2010. He used them in conferences with international 
participants who heard about the MRS version of events. Most of his points mirrored the 
conclusions I had arrived at after investigating the matter for months. In the end, both MRS 
and FSLN favor abortion in case of the mother’s life being in danger, even though the FSLN 
does it in a more hidden manner. In this case, I fell into the trap of taking remarks of a tactical 
nature to be representative of what my informants actually believed. 
El pacto
The second feature of Nicaraguan politics that people outside the country have heard about, 
is an alliance splits all powerful positions in the state between two powerful groups or two 
powerful individuals exists. The reality is many shifting alliances appear in Nicaraguan 
politics, especially between different parties. The FSLN seems to seek a political majority in 
parliament with whomever they can on any given issue at any point in time. One such alliance
is focused upon more than any of the others. This particular alliance carries with it a negative 
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undertone both in the foreign press and in Nicaraguan society that other alliances do not. This
alliance, known as el pacto, concerns at times the FSLN and the Partido Liberal 
Constitucionalista (PLC), and other times just their leaders Ortega Saavedra and José 
Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo. Alemán Lacayo and Ortega Saavedra are said to have made a pact 
in the late 1990s to divide all positions of state power between them, in return for the FSLN 
permitting Alemán Lacayo to govern more or less uninterrupted during his presidential term. 
It is true that when parliament stopped working for several months after the municipal 
elections of November 2008, a solution was found in which certain charges of fraud were 
dropped against Alemán Lacayo. This most likely happened through government intervention,
and the FSLN was simultaneously given control of most of parliament. El pacto may not have 
been the favored choice by the FSLN leadership in this situation. Cuadra Núñez and Fonseca
Terán (2010b) point out the constitution was changed in 1995 in a way which obligated even 
the larger parties to seek approval of other groups in parliament in order to be able to appoint 
a wide range of officials. At the time, neither PLC nor FSLN held many seats in parliament, 
whereas the MRS did and was part of the group which approved this change. Cuadra Núñez 
and Fonseca Terán claim the idea behind the change was to obligate the FSLN and PLC to 
negotiate with smaller parties such as the MRS in connection with handing out positions. 
In the case of the international press, it becomes easy to understand how el pacto is seen as 
evil: misinformation and half-information lead to strange conclusions being reached. Yet, this 
type of maneuvering is not all that uncommon for Nicaraguan politics. The FSLN specifically 
is much involved in such tactics, and it seems the result has been fantastic for them. 
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Therefore, I have difficulties understanding the controversy this generates for Sandinistas 
who are angry about el pacto. When I first found out about all the individual circumstances 
and understood that the foreign press was mainly just spreading anti-FSLN propaganda, I 
started asking more Nicaraguans about the circumstances and what made el pacto for them 
personally worse than other alliances. Most were not able to explain it to me or chose not to 
try. Some explained it like Jorge Madriz, who is active in the small party Alternativa por el 
Cambio (AC), which some other informants said is filled with Sandinista-spies and which ran 
in the 2011 national elections together with the FSLN:
It’s quite straightforward. When other parties do it, it’s called ‘an alliance’ and it’s normal, 
but when then FSLN does the same, it’s called ‘el pacto’ and it’s terribly hurtful.
This is the same conclusion I arrive at. Yet, it gives no further information of what it is that 
makes such an alliance negative for a Sandinista. Carolina Icabalceta Garay said something 
which points in the direction of what may be the background for Sandinista sceptics of 
cooperation with Alemán Lacayo and his party. She explained it this way:
I have studied the history of Nicaragua and the history of many other places, and the 
pactos are never acceptable; it’s always the ruling class pacting in order to stay in power.
If Icabalceta Garay’s analysis is the opinion of the average Nicaraguan, then that would 
certainly not be strange, given the high importance given to history and historical examples by
Nicaraguans. I never hear the historic comparison made by others. Later Icabalceta Garay 
specified what her issues with el pacto were:
I would like for you to write down two issues I strongly dislike about el pacto: 
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The first has to do with the [law on] therapeutic abortion. This concession to the church I 
find embarrassing, unjust and inhumane. […]30
The other has to do with popular participation. Before, you could create a new party with 
the signatures of I don’t know how many people. […]
The first of the issues Icabalceta Garay mentioned seems to be related to the cooperation 
with the Catholic church. It is not strictly covered by the term el pacto between PLC and FSLN
as the media and opposition parties use it, but the conflation of el pacto with other 
questionable deals the FSLN leadership has made with other groups is not uncommon. The 
explanations I received from other Nicaraguans were similar. This may explain why many 
Sandinistas exclaim that they are strongly against el pacto. The second of Icabalceta Garay’s 
issues relates to some changes made to the Constitution in the 1990s, which made it harder 
to form new parties than under the original constitution created during the Sandinista 
government of the 1980s. This may arguably be seen as part of el pacto. I heard this issue 
mentioned several times by academic Sandinistas, as one of their main criticisms of el pacto. 
The new FSLN as part of a Socialism for the 21st Century
The term ‘Socialism for the 21st Century’ is used in much of Latin America due to the book El 
Socialismo Del Siglo XXI (Dieterich 2007). Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his 
followers promote this book heavily. Dieterich (2007) mentions four main principles included in
the new type of socialism:
1. Equal pay for things that take the same amount of time to do. 
2. Incorporation of direct, participative democracy. 
30 At the time of the interview, the media had not yet reported the fact that Nicaraguan hospitals continued to conduct 
abortions.
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3. Democratic state institutions that legitimately represent citizens at a local level. 
4. Self-determination and criticism by the citizens. 
According to a private project file by Fonseca Terán and his wife Cuadra Núñez, “Logros de la
Revolución Sandinista en su segunda etapa.,” the parts on direct democracy planned and set 
up by the Sandinista government include Nicaraguan government’s plan to implement the 
project of a ‘Socialism for the 21st Century’ in Nicaragua. They claim this type of socialism is 
compatible with some of the policies of the Ortega Saavedra government (Cuadra Núñez and 
Fonseca Terán 2010a). 
It is noticeable I never heard any of my Sandinista informants refer to either the book or the 
term. The term ‘socialism’ was only used by some Nicaraguans who identified positively with 
the Sandinista experience of the 1980s in the first few years after 2006. Many of the younger 
Sandinistas had never even heard of it. Once, in the back of a pickup filled with Sandinistas in
León following other cars celebrating the Sandinista defense of the city some days earlier 
against a planned march by the Liberals, I was asked by teenagers, “What are you?” I 
answered: “I am a socialist.” They asked somewhat perplexed: “Does that mean you are right 
or left?”31
In spite of all the projects currently running in the name of Sandinismo, many of those 
identifying strongly with the socialist project of the 1980s doubt the revolutionary character of 
the current phase. Icabalceta Garay expressed it this way:
Look, I’d like for this to be a revolution, but it just isn’t. I will not let myself be fooled by 
that.
31 By 2011, this had changed, and ‘socialista’ was now one of three words used to describe Sandinismo as part of the next 
election campaign, together with Cristiano and Solidario.
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Even top FSLN officials, such as Fonseca Terán, see the current process and specifically the 
part of popular participation critically:
Due to a series of historic circumstances, the political culture of Nicaragua does not 
include the possibility for changes through nonviolent struggles nor through social 
struggles. The average Nicaraguan citizen can only understand changes as a product of 
wars or elections. This constitutes an obstacle for the establishment of direct democracy 
and for Citizen Power to be installed from below; in the subjective reality of Nicaragua 
‘taking power’ is not a demand of the people; what they expect is not to exercise power 
themselves but that it be exercised to one’s benefit. Therefore, change in the political system
can at this point only be promoted from above through the formal installation of Citizen 
Power(Cuadra Núñez and Fonseca Terán 2010a, 4–5, Wilm translation).
When I first came across this quote, I was rather astonished, as my personal experience of 
Nicaragua was that there was a comparatively high amount of popular participation in political
decision making, especially among the Sandinista part of the population. I will try to show how
diverse and complex the process of exerting power is for the Sandinistas, and they generally 
lie outside the scope of what a single individual can control. I will also demonstrate that the 
process of exerting power for the Sandinistas is a fundamentally collective process. I believe 
this sets the Sandinista example apart from many other socialist movements and permits a 
broad-reaching identification with what Nicaraguans see as a revolutionary process. 
Ways of exerting power by individuals and groups
While the alliances between Sandinistas and non-Sandinista groups takes up a lot of public 
discussion, the differences among and relations between Sandinistas are just as numerous 
and complex. With the different types of Sandinistas come different ways of trying to exert 
power. Just about all Sandinistas I met agreed, that the second presidency of Ortega 
Saavedra is the right time for them to collectively exert power, and they have a responsibility 
253
to do that. The ways of going about this differ. Some use the party hierarchy to obtain a high 
level job. Others use less traditional ways. In the following, I show a number of ways I noticed 
Sandinistas try to exert power. I do not assume this list is complete, but it gives an insight into 
the range of different ways trying to accomplish a change in society. 
Power through government positions
The most obvious and painless way of exerting power and trying to move society according to
one’s own ideals, is as an elected representative, implementing new laws and putting into 
effect laws forgotten about by the authorities, when this is convenient for their party. The 
FSLN won the elections in 2006 and 2008. A substantial part of their personal resources goes
into the work connected with holding their official positions. As part of a Sandinista 
parliamentary group, one is generally expected to vote according to party lines, but individual 
elected officials can influence how or if their vote is counted. The national FSLN member of 
parliament from León Gladys Báez is said not to have shown up and not have sent her 
substitute on the day the vote of the new abortion law took place, thereby, slightly changing 
the outcome of the vote. 
Several younger Sandinistas I spoke with would likely not reject a position as an elected 
representative, but different from my experience with party youths in Europe, there is 
generally remarkably little focus on arriving at this position in their daily discourse. That is, 
because, different from much of the European Left, parliamentary work is not universally seen
as being the highest level of revolutionary work. An excellent example is María Antonieta 
Blandón Montenegro, the Executive Director of the Oficina de Etica Pública (OEP) during the 
current government, a position roughly equivalent to a minister. Before she started in this 
position, she worked in the legal system on behalf of landless farmers. This she now only 
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does during weekends. After explaining this to me, she immediately apologised for not 
working more on it. In contrast, in Europe it would be highly unusual for leftist politicians to 
continue to work as activists while holding parliamentary or government office. I found it even 
more intriguing to hear Blandón Montenegro’s plans for her future after finishing her career as
a politician: To create a school for cooperatives in Matagalpa and teach them how to organise
themselves. “This work here [in Managua] is not really giving […] For someone who is an 
activist this is not a very good job,” she explained. The way of talking about their work for 
government officials, and to claim there is a ‘real world’ outside of it to which one truly 
belongs, is something I found to be typical among Sandinistas holding higher positions. It is 
such statements, which make me realise, that at least for them, their work is not the highest 
form of exerting political power, and other forms have to be taken into consideration when 
talking about Sandinista rule. 
The work of Sandinista office holders is valued so little among some Sandinistas that those 
who do see at least some value in it seem to feel the need to explain this. The cobbler and 
Sandinista, Armando Martínez in the village of La Esperanza, El Rama, felt the need to say, 
Ortega Saavedra was necessary for Sandinismo. I did not ask him how he valued the work of 
those in high government offices or anything related, when he said:
I have […] something which makes me stay with the Frente Sandinista. I am convinced for 
the Frente Sandinista to be able to give something, it needs to have power in its hands. It 
can not give anything without holding power. […] I know the role of our leader, Daniel 
Ortega [Saavedra], is fundamental. […] In the sense of being a leader. We can have a ton 
of people, intelligent, with all capacities, but they don’t have the experience or charisma of 
Daniel Ortega [Saavedra]. We have seen it over time – during winter and spring of the 
process of our struggle.
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In other countries and/or contexts, it is unlikely this statement would have been made, as it 
contains little beyond what is a fundamental part of government systems: one needs to have 
a high-ranking position within the state leadership in order to exert power or ‘give something’ 
as Martínez called it. 
Power through formal organisations in civil society
Another attractive way of exerting power is working through organisations of civil society. Civil
society consists mainly of a vast range of NGOs and some labor unions mostly directly 
connected with the FSLN. NGOs and labor unions usually try not to portray themselves as 
Sandinistas, yet it is not tremendously difficult to find out when talking to members 
individually. The clearest example for me of trying to exert power on the part of Sandinista 
labor unions/workers was the transport worker strike of 2008. In order to receive government 
help in times of a spike in petrol prices, Sandinista transport workers largely shut down all 
main transportation, until the government accepted a compromise. 
Several of the NGOs have foreign participation and funding. In some cases, this may be a 
factor in why they may be reluctant to show their party affiliation openly. A large percentage 
have a majority or exclusively Sandinistas working for them. Depending on the degree to 
which the participants are honest to one-another about their true affiliation and the lack of fear
of being labelled as Sandinista agents, they try to push for programs they see as being in line 
with the Sandinista ideology. The origin of the party-political background of many NGOs lies in
the events surrounding the change of power in 1990. Many Sandinistas tried to continue their 
work in the NGO-sector. ‘Governing from below,’ in this way is not only a strategy used in the 
past, when Sandinistas were not in power. In organisations such as the Fundación para la 
Autonomía y el Desarollo de la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua (FADCANIC) or the Servicio de 
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Información Mesoamericano sobre Agricultura Sostenible (SIMAS) there are people who are 
in line with the party and who through it try to influence civil society according to party ideals. 
Very seldom do they actively present themselves as Sandinistas. Similar to my surprise about
Blandón Montenegro’s continued involvement with grassroots activism, I was astonished to 
discover, that many of those who had reached high level positions within or close to the 
government, decided they liked to continue influencing society through the NGO-level. Such a
case is Guimar Aminta Arias, a Sandinista who moved between different high-level 
government offices during my time in Nicaragua. She emphasised she continued to work in 
the community radio station even after she took on a position in the town government. 
Power through the CPCs
Another new option, which did not exist during the 16 years of Sandinistas in opposition, is 
the participation in Consejos de Poder Ciudadano (CPCs). Since its inception in 2007, the 
CPCs promote government programs in their local area. Official spokespeople of the FSLN, 
such as Fonseca Terán (2009b), claim that while inspired by the direct democracy existing in 
Cuba, the Nicaraguan model of democracy will always be different due to its different history. 
According to Cuadra Núñez and Fonseca Terán (2010a), the CPCs are meant to fall under 
part 2 of the project of a Socialism for the 21st Century. The creation of the CPCs was one of 
the most talked about issues in the first year of Ortega Saavedra’s presidency. 
It started with the passing of a law on citizen participation in the parliament in January 2007. 
This was approved by both opposition parties and the FSLN. The Liberal PLC at the time 
went back and forth between allying with the FSLN and the Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense 
(ALN), even going as far as considering the creation of a common new Liberal party (Pantoja 
and Marenco 2007). Everyone initially saw the idea of citizen participation as the FSLN 
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reaching out to other groups and parties. When the CPCs were announced a few months 
later, with reference to the law already passed by parliament, it was seen by leading 
opposition politicians as trying to merge state and party. The FSLN claims the installation of 
the CPCs is only one of several steps to establish direct democracy to replace the current 
representative democracy. Other steps include the establishment of plebiscites in matters of 
strategic importance, and eventually when the opposition loses the majority in parliament, 
making the CPCs part of the legislative branch (Cuadra Núñez and Fonseca Terán 2010a). 
The CPCs were started in spite of the opposition, and have ever since been accused by the 
parliamentary opposition as being nothing but Sandinista councils and remarkably similar in 
their structure to Comités de Defensa Sandinista (CDSs) of the 1980s. In the view of 
opposition parties, the CPCs are the same as the CDS – which they believe were only 
created to control citizens. Additionally, they think they are to exert power by the presidency in
a way which circumvents parliament. A similar logic is apparent in the analysis made by many
academics. Anderson and Dodd (2009) describe the CPCs as an instrument with which the 
presidency can control FSLN mayors at a local level, given that they believe the CPCs 
respond directly to national leaders of the FSLN. The Equipo Nitlápan-Envío (2007a, 2007b) 
warned that the experience with the CDSs had not been taken sufficiently into consideration 
when forming the CPCs and that the reestablishment of such an organisation would 
reestablish a model in which state and party were the same, which they believed had been 
proven not to work during the 1980s.
Rosario Murillo, Ortega Saavedra’s wife and national coordinator of the Communication 
Council of the CPCs, described the CPCs in July 2007 in this way:
The Consejos de Poder Ciudadano are in reality the enlargement and putting into practice 
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of a policy, of a proposal, of a commitment […] of national reconciliation and unity among 
Nicaraguans, who can make use of this organisational form in order to participate in and 
to make use of their right to decide upon the programs of the government (Sandoval 2007, 
translation: Wilm).
In order to prevent the opposition doing away with the CPCs by passing new laws, Ortega 
Saavedra ordered by presidential decree that the CPCs were to be incorporated into the 
Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica y Social (CONPES), part of the executive 
branch (Diario Granma 2007). After some re-scheduling, the CPCs were initially planned to 
be confirmed on November 30th 2007, but the parliamentary opposition voted in mid 
November for a law that prevented the establishment of CPCs as part of the state-structure, 
forced the CPCs to become part of the FSLN structure, cut them off state funding, and 
prevented state secretaries from taking orders from the CPCs. The Sandinista delegates said 
the CPCs would be established, no matter what the law said “Because the public has the right
to participate in government decisions in whatever way they want” (Pantoja 2007, Wilm 
translation). In January 2008, the Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ) finally ruled Ortega 
Saavedra did have the power to establish the CPCs and to define the limits of their power, 
and that parliament had no right to overrule him on that issue (La Prensa 2008). 
The view of top opposition politicians is also reflected by some Liberals on a grassroots level. 
My experience shows that views on the nature of the CPCs go across party lines: Liberals are
involved in some CPCs and some Sandinistas are against CPCs. The CPCs at a local level 
work cross-politically in some places. Félix Gómez Morales, a gardener originally from 
Chinandega who now works in downtown León, was a Sandinista fighter during the 
revolutionary insurrection of 1979, and is well connected to the FSLN leadership in León. 
Over an extended period, we discussed why many opposition Nicaraguans had not been 
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convinced by the government to join them, even though the main argument against the FSLN,
the possible restart of the war, had been proven not to be an issue. He was quite negative 
about the subject and believed it must simply be in the Nicaraguan character: “The 
Nicaraguan is quite hard. You see, the government does all this! And still – they don’t join us!”
At another time, he tried to convince me the CPCs also were open to the opposition. He 
explained to me how his CPC consisted of 12 people, of which five were non-Sandinistas and
how the idea was to convert the opposition members to be supporters of the government bit 
by bit – but not through force:
See, she [pointing at name of one of the CPC members in his book] has been with party X 
and party Y. And we don’t say anything, but, of course, we hope that some day she realises 
that it is the Frente that represents her true interests.
While Gómez Morales seemed to at least in part admit that the CPCs are connected more to 
the FSLN than to other parties, that is not common. Gloria María Fonseca, sister-in-law of 
Icabalceta Garay, is general coordinator of the CPC in her neighborhood in Managua. When I 
met her the first time and asked her rather provocatively whether the CPCs were part of the 
FSLN, she explained the connection :
No, the CPCs is an organisation born out of the necessity of the people to better their living
conditions. Everyone is welcome, whether coming from the party or not. We don’t ask what 
party they come from nor does it interest us what they do. All we are interested in, is that 
they want to work [within the CPC], that’s all. […] What happens is the parties of the 
political right are molested by the fact that the poor people organise themselves, to express 
themselves and demand better conditions for their lives.
In other areas of the country, there is less non-Sandinista participation. Pedro Cerna, barber 
and Sandinista from El Rama explained why the political right did not want to participate:
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See, they don’t want to participate in anything. All they want, is to destabilise this country, 
[…] because what they truly are out for, is power. They already lost it, but in some 
municipios they still have power because they have the mayor.
Those non-Sandinistas who chose to join a CPC, do not seem to focus on their own political 
party, as relates to their CPC-related activities. The places with almost exclusively FSLN 
Sandinista dominated CPCs seem to be the majority. By 2010, the FSLN leadership accepted
it as a strategic error that too many FSLN leaders had taken positions in local CPCs except 
for some areas where an effort had been made to avoid this (Cuadra Núñez and Fonseca 
Terán 2010a, p. 5). 
Those Sandinistas participating in CPCs I talked to, seemed to think it necessary to have 
control on the part of the FSLN. In Moyogalpa, I spoke to Blanca María Nella, at the time a 
heavily involved Sandinista CPC member. She, like several other grassroots FSLN 
Sandinistas, saw the problem from the other side:
Of course, they can all come and participate and work with us… To rule, however, that’s 
what we do. We haven’t been waiting 16 years until finally winning only to let them 
continue to rule.
Many of those Sandinistas I spoke to who participate in the CPCs previously participated in 
the CDSs, yet most CPS-members deny they are the same. Pedro Cerna participated in both 
and gave a fairly average explanation of the difference:
The objective before [of the CDSs] was to fight the armed enemy. Today, the CPCs are 
about how to share work… to work, to help, to organise a piece of social work, like [when 
one notices] “This street here doesn’t work anymore, lets write a proposal to the national 
assembly [to have it fixed]. Before it was different, we had to look out block by block, 
because the enemy was around, and he was armed. Today that’s not the case. Now it’s 
different. It’s more democratic. […] One of the things the CPCs do here now is to build 
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rural schools, together with the Juventud Sandinista, but as the mayor here always is 
Liberal, we do not have good access. That’s why we want the mayor, to give it more thrust. 
Right now we do not have water here, just [a few] wells. That would be a project for the 
CPCs to take up, for the government.
It is extremely common that the explanation of difference between the two deals mainly with 
the historic circumstances rather than a difference in organisational structure. Many FSLN 
Sandinistas are not involved in the CPC of their neighborhood. Neither Carolina Fonseca 
Icabalzeta’s nor her parents or her uncle Bayardo José Fonseca Galo participate in their local
CPC meetings although they all are seriously interested in engaging in politics locally, and 
although none have achieved this through the party hierarchy. Fonseca Galo disagrees with 
members of the local CPC on political grounds. He explained, that most of those participating 
only did so because the FSLN was in power. One main criticism Sandinistas seem to have of 
the CPCs is how they function at a higher level. The local CPCs elect representatives for 
increasingly higher levels, until at the departmental level it becomes the departmental 
secretary of the FSLN who is in charge of passing on information to and from the highest 
level, Rosario Murillo. 
I was present at a few CPC meetings in León, and many times I just came by the meeting 
place to hear whether anything new had happened. My initial impression was the power of the
CPCs was limited to the local, and beyond that, they were just receiving orders from higher 
up. The CPCs members mentioned above also seemed to distinguish between participating in
a CPC and exerting power as two separate processes. My understanding of the importance of
the CPCs changed somewhat over time. As part of the election campaign 2008, many FSLN 
candidates for city council members signed a paper stating they would respect the decisions 
of the CPCs. Half a year later, the newly elected mayor of León, Manuel Calderón, ended up 
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in an open dispute with the CPCs of León, trying to retract some of the powers given to them. 
The conflict was eventually settled, but the CPCs showed they were independent decision 
making bodies. Several Sandinistas I spoke with predicted that eventually the CPCs would 
take over as the new representatives of civil society, the part NGOs have represented. “What 
we will see is a different civil society. This is the new civil society that is emerging,” Falguni 
Guharay explained. 
The installation of the CPCs is not unproblematic as the FSLN officially recognises. According
to them, two reasons are to blame. One reason is the history of Nicaragua in which this 
institution has never existed before. The other reason given, is the little importance that FSLN
militants attribute to the establishment of the CPCs as true representations of neighborhood 
opinions and they are used as tools for political maneuvering (Cuadra Núñez and Fonseca 
Terán 2010a, p. 5). This is also what I heard from those people close to the Sandinista cause 
who did not form part of their CPC. Icabalceta Garay stated:
Well, see, this local CPC here is one that consists of party militants who worked with the 
party during the 16 years. They are people they feel they can trust. 
[…] Now, I don’t know if they do it for free or whether they are paid or get some substitute 
for their work. Of course, I know it would be only fair to receive a little. 
At one time, we had a problem with the water [flow] and we started collecting signatures 
and the water company asked us “Are you a CPC?” and we answered “Ehm, yeah, of 
course. We are citizens making up a committee to gain power in that sense we are a CPC” 
Then they told us: “You should have the signature of so and so.” She is of the official CPC 
here. We went, and asked her and explained what we were doing and she gave us the OK 
and said: “Ah, that’s good.” 
These people use it for their political career. It is so they can show: “I have been working 
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in the CPC of so and so.”
It seems that, for Icabalceta Garay, it was not so much a problem who made up the local CPC
or that she had concrete problems with those involved, as much as she was bothered that her
campaign to better the flow of the drinking water in the neighborhood could help someone’s 
political career. 
Power through informal groups in civil society
Whereas the former two groups, labor unions and NGOs, offer opportunities for Sandinistas 
to exert power while hiding their party affiliation or at least not doing it in the name of the 
party, the opposite: cases exist in which the name of the party is invoked without the party 
officials having anything to do with the activity done in its name. 
I interviewed Manuel Corea, one of the former students of the Wilhelm-Pieck cadre school in 
East Germany. He lives in a poor neighborhood of Managua. It is so poor, that the taxi driver 
who took me there did not dare to drop me off outside the door by myself. I was asked to call 
ahead to make sure Corea waited outside the copy shop he operates. It is clearly a 
dangerous area of Managua. One of the first things he explained, was, that he and the other 
Sandinistas in the area started an organised soccer match in order to get children off the 
streets who otherwise would be warring street gangs. Initially, I understood it as a program 
officially run by the government, but I gradually came to understand it was in fact activists who
decided to put the soccer match together, and had chosen to do it in the name of 
‘Sandinismo’ as a reflection of their ideals. Later on he changed the story and emphasised the
games were also open to non-Sandinistas. It became obvious, that he wondered if he should 
have disclosed all these facts. 
Fonseca Galo also worked in similar ways when I met him. He organised Sandinistas who 
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had been active during the revolutionary insurrection and who now were ‘not quite with’ the 
current government in an organisation called ‘Amigos.’ Ideologically, these people were still or
once again are in line with the FSLN. Fonseca Galo’s project specifically included some 
revolutionary fighters who had joined other parties. I understood that in these cases, the idea 
behind organising the person was that such people would come back to the party, if only there
was a viable path to do so. With time, I learned that ‘not being with’ the party just meant they 
were not employed or otherwise involved in the decision making processes of the current 
government or the CPCs. Fonseca Galo and some friends of ‘Amigos’ had many plans on 
how to help Sandinismo along. One of them involved building a children’s center. This would 
be done in the name of Sandinismo in order to help the party indirectly, earning credibility 
among the youngsters who would make use of the center. 
At first I believed people simply were formed by their personal experience of the 1980s and 
their loyalties from those years could not change now. I discovered among those not 
connected to the inner circles of the FSLN, the common practice is to reinvent oneself as 
Sandinista rather than portraying oneself as a Liberal in favor of Sandinista programs. For 
many, such a shift represents a second change in their political affiliation. 
William Leiva Cardoza, the neighbor of Bayardo Fonseca and one of those Fonseca Galo 
recruited to his project, was one of few Sandinistas I met who admitted how this reinvention 
happens. After he explained how he had fought on the Sandinista side in the revolutionary 
insurrection, he went on to talk about the time after 1990:
I ended up in 1990 with absolutely no benefits. It was particularly hard for us Sandinistas 
to find work in some business. […] So then [in the 2000s] I worked for the Alianza Liberal 
Nicaragüense. […] I imagine many other Sandinistas did the same. In the end it worked; 
we split the Liberal vote… Many of us have said it was part of a tactic. But honestly… it 
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was out of necessity. […] But I have always been Sandinista. And I always will be 
Sandinista.
And for those Sandinistas who still had not seen a way to come back, he said:
I think Ortega [Saavedra] should call for a meeting of all those Sandinistas in the other 
parties and tell them: I know why you went there [to the Liberals], but now come back.
I saw several similar projects to ‘Amigos’ although I did not investigate them as much as this 
group. Most such groups are led by people intensely involved in the party previously but who 
are now either out of the inner circles or left the party for another group during the years when
the FSLN was in parliamentary opposition. At one point in León, there was talk in the news on
whether there would be armed contra groups in the mountains who were preparing to attack 
the government, I witnessed various groups of fighters from the revolution gather and prepare
to fight with them in the name of Sandinismo. The government in the meantime tried to calm 
everybody and claimed the reports of rebels in the mountains were highly exaggerated. What 
all these groups have in common is that they are composed of people previously active in the 
formal parts of the Sandinista movements, and more often than not during the 1979 
insurrection. 
Power through organisations influencing governments
Another group of organisations consists of those strongly Sandinista (FSLN and MRS), that 
try to influence the policies of the government. For me, these currently come closest to 
representations of ideological tendencies within Sandinismo. The two most prominent 
examples I encountered are SIMAS and the free software movement. Although their agendas 
relate to two vastly different areas, in terms of personnel, they are closely linked. Denis 
Cáceres works for SIMAS and heads one of the Linux groups. During my time in Nicaragua, 
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three of the most advanced programmers in the country were hired by SIMAS. In addition, 
SIMAS sponsors several of the events organised by the free software movement. The free 
software movement’s core agenda is to convert the state apparatus, private businesses and 
the universities to use only open source software. Just about all of those participating see 
themselves as Sandinistas on some level. They originally organised in a handful of smaller 
groups, each promoting and using one certain version of Linux, but during my time in 
Nicaragua they joined forces to push their common agenda in Managua. A few people work 
with free software in other locations – I taught classes in León. The groups in Managua did 
not often coordinate with these other groups. 
During a day of strategy talks for this movement I attended, I only heard the Costa Rican 
participant suggest trying to push their agenda through use of the CPCs. Most others seemed
to prefer direct connections to bureaucrats and politicians to push their agenda. In their view, 
one of their main enemies are those FSLN technicians who are not convinced of the 
advantages of free software. The members of the free software movement frequently accuse 
FSLN technicians of corruption or not having the necessary educational level to understand a 
free software solution would work better for them. 
SIMAS tries to promote sustainable agriculture with little or no use of pesticides. SIMAS has 
its offices right next door to the presidential house in the Parque El Carmen, Managua and 
tries to play a central role in the country's development through the use of development funds.
Head of SIMAS, Guharay, is not a member of the FSLN and is at times highly critical, but 
overall he is a strong supporter of the current government. Guharay explained the party 
internal conflict he had seen since the 1980s. One of the first things he said, was, that he set 
up the first agricultural information system in the late 1980s in northern Nicaragua, but that he
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was then ordered to delete all the data, because the project represented the sustainable 
agriculture tendency which SIMAS represents today. This was and is controversial within the 
FSLN. Those opposed to sustainable agriculture in the FSLN, claim that it is only a trick by 
the United States and other industrialised countries to convince third world countries to use 
inefficient agricultural methods in order to keep them from ever achieving the same results as 
first world countries. 
In the summer of 2009, the disagreement between the two tendencies manifested itself in the 
question of what corn processing plant Nicaragua should build. Ortega Saavedra and Rosario
Murillo had allegedly already visited an industrial plant in Venezuela and Murillo was said to 
have exclaimed: “We need one of these in Nicaragua” as Guharay explained. SIMAS helped 
write an application for a grant to build a plant that would be set up without using 
trans-genetic corn and be environmentally sustainable.
I am not sure how many other organisations of professionals with Sandinista leaning exist. I 
came across the free software groups and SIMAS in other connections in where I did not 
expect to find them. There may only exist a few such organisations in total. One organisation 
which looks similar because it works in the same sector, is the Centro para la Promoción, la 
Investigación y el Desarollo Rural y Social (CIPRES). Founded in 1990, this NGO is mainly 
compromised of Sandinista workers of the Ministry of Agriculture of the 1980s. They came up 
with the model of the current Sandinista government program ‘Hambre Cero’ and those 
working there are mostly professionals. When I asked Fonseca Icabalzeta’s father Fernando 
Fonseca, who works there, what he thought about the current government, he answered he 
looked at it favourably, and then immediately started to talk about the contribution of CIPRES:
The organisation I work for, CIPRES, is who invented ‘Hambre Cero’ – except we called it 
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the ‘Productive Food Program’… It was a battle about the analysis of the sociological 
reality of society in 1991. It was after [hurricane] Mitch we figured out what was key to 
make sure people would not sell the things we brought to them. […] We used to give aid to 
the male, as the head of the family, but they oftentimes sold what we gave them.
According to Fernando Fonseca, CIPRES in a certain sense prepared the current government
with studies and field tests several years before they could take power. When he said ‘we’ it 
sometimes seemed to refer to the Sandinista movement at large and at other times to refer 
only to those working at CIPRES. It did not seem terribly relevant for him to make a 
distinction. What all these organisations are defined by is that they work directly with 
government bureaucratic institutions. Another feature they make use of, is their knowledge as
professional to convince the government of policy in certain areas. They also operate in an 
environment where party affiliation with the FSLN is not directly expressed. 
Power through combining parliamentary and activist work
Political affiliations are a popular theme of conversations in Nicaragua much more so than 
elsewhere. A lot of activities are carried out through party-related networks, but they are not 
openly declared as such. My observations in this area stand in contrast with those of the 
anthropologist Babb (2004), who claimed to have encountered a Nicaragua in the 
post-Sandinista years that had left party politics behind. 
I first encountered this phenomenon of combining activism with parliamentary work when 
visiting the city of Granada in April 2008. I ran into Benjamín Garay, an older gentleman 
known popularly as ‘professor Benji,’ at the city square. When I told him of my purpose in 
Nicaragua, he invited me to an area outside the city recently occupied by what called itself a 
‘group of concerned citizens.’ I went along with him to the land occupation, and was 
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presented to some of the organisers. One girl wore a t-shirt of Calderón Sandino. She 
explained the setup to me and that there were areas for former members of the military, 
police, women and everybody else. Garay commented:
See, these people are not grateful! The Frente does everything for them, yet when you ask 
what they’ll vote, they’ll tell you they don’t know.
Another one of them said: “See, it’s better this way [that it’s not only open to Sandinista 
supporters] if we are to grow.” When I formally interviewed the woman with the Calderón 
Sandino t-shirt and asked about their party affiliations, she said: “Oh no, we are not affiliated 
with any party. We are people united from all backgrounds here.” 
A few weeks later I wanted to interview some of the FSLN members in the Granada city 
council about this issue. When entering the building, I immediately ran into the second 
organiser from the occupied areas. He clearly worked in the city council for the FSLN group. 
He immediately ran over to me, and I told him what I was looking for. He explained: “Yes, 
there is one [city council member] here who has been working a lot on that case. He knows 
everything about it.” 
He guided me over to the office of said city council member. I waited there with some other 
Sandinistas, while the council member, as far as what I was being told, still was out in the 
occupied territory. Once he returned I made it clear to him that I wanted to interview him about
that project. He answered:
What land grabbing exactly? Because there is one down south there which is illegal, and 
we as the FSLN are of course against that.
It was clear, that he talked about the area I had visited, and it was equally clear that although 
he claimed to be against it, it was organised both by him and his personal city council 
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workers. As it turned out through his explanations, the FSLN initially voted for a note 
condemning this grabbing of land. Before I turned the camera on to record his statement, I felt
he wanted to make sure we had an implicit understanding that he would not be able to defend
the land grabbing publicly. The FSLN strategy in the city council was to condemn the action, 
while simultaneously declaring there was no way to remove the land grabbers at this time and
one needed to focus on the humanitarian aspects of the situation. This meant one had to 
understand the people who sat on the land, were in immediate need of an affordable place to 
live. 
I witnessed another land occupation in Ciudad Sandino. It was instructive, because it showed 
how groups not belonging to the Sandinismo tradition are at times permitted to be part of the 
popular organising efforts within the overall Sandinista state. I reached the occupiers through 
my former student Javier Díaz. When I came by to visit him, he drove us to see them, as he 
believed it could interest me. I went back a few times by myself. The setup of this 
land-occupation seemed similar to Granada with a few activists leading the effort who were 
not in need of land, and the ownership of the land being in doubt with a nearby land-owner 
claiming that it was his and the occupiers claiming it was the property of the government. 
The local political forces at play are different. Instead of Sandinistas organising the 
occupation, the two main organisers of the land grabbing in Ciudad Sandino, José Santos 
Aguirre Pérez and Aracely Guillén, were former Contras who presented themselves as 
connected to the Partido Resistencia Nicaragüense (PRN). The camp was initially presented 
to me by them as consisting of a group of former Contras who had been in need of land. The 
action of grabbing the land was explained to me as having been taken in connection with the 
promise to Contras to be given land after the peace in 1990. This promise was hitherto not 
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fulfilled. Over the months, I saw them frequently. During the fall of 2008, they were largely 
concerned about attacks from a neighbor who claimed to own the land, as well as the 
bureaucratic process to receive official titles in Managua. 
The FSLN mayor of Ciudad Sandino in 2008 was Raymundo Flores Genet. His term ended 
with the elections of that same year. He had lost the position of political secretary of the FSLN
in Ciudad Sandino a year earlier (Rodríguez 2007a). He expressed opposition to the land 
occupation when I asked him about it. He was also angry that the police defied orders to 
remove them. The incoming FSLN mayor, Roberto Somoza, was said by the land occupiers 
not to mind them. I was never able to schedule a meeting with him, and the police of Ciudad 
Sandino decided not to comment on why they were not acting. 
For a while, it seemed to be an extraordinary favorable treatment of Contras by the higher 
strata of the FSLN, even though the story told to me changed after a while when Aguirre 
Pérez claimed that it was not only former Contras, but also former members of the military 
and the police who made up the camp. “We don’t go around with an ideology; we are the 
same,” he explained. I still wanted to know why he thought that three Liberal governments did
not help them as Contras and that they now expected the Sandinistas, whom they fought 
against for 10 years, to give them lands:
To be honest… One has to speak of reality. The Liberals were not concerned about us. They
are of money, and the poor people they don’t see. To be frank and say it legitimately: I am 
not a Sandinista. I am [part of the] Nicaraguan Resistance, but I speak about reality: They 
are helping us more than our people. Our people left us behind. They forgot about us. They 
continue with their millions and we with poverty. And these [Sandinistas] don’t remove us 
and so here we are. […] It’s not because I have the same ideology. I am [part of the 
Nicaraguan] Resistance. But one has to look for who gives you their hand.
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One day, I showed up earlier than what had been agreed upon, and none of the organisers 
were present. I waited in the line outside the main organising tent and started to converse 
with some of those living on the land. This was the first time I spoke to them without any of 
the organisers around. Those standing there explained they were simply people with a need 
for land and that the organisers had offered pieces of land for a nominal fee. When I asked 
them about their connection with the Contras or any of the other groups mentioned, they 
looked at me astonished and explained that this camp had nothing to do with the Contras. 
Suddenly it dawned on me, that the only ones who had said they were connected to the 
Contras were the two main organisers. I had previously wondered why two of the land 
occupiers had put out red-and-black FSLN flags and no flags representing other groups were 
to be found anywhere, but the organisers had just brushed it off as meaning nothing. The 
Contra-connection of the organisers was only used to legitimise a hand out of land to poor 
people in general. Some studying of past newspaper articles shows that the national PRN 
leadership had claimed in June 2008 that the two organisers were not members of their party 
(E. García 2008). When I showed up at the headquarters of the PRN in Managua once and 
asked about the land occupation, the officials I met, at first tried to tell me these would be part
of the ‘resistance movement’ but not of the PRN. When I insisted those I looked for were 
members of the party, they finally gave me the phone numbers of Aguirre Pérez. Only now did
I understand this was an effort to hide the connection. In October 2008, a few weeks after he 
stated the positive words on the FSLN government, Aguirre Pérez figured as the president of 
the PRN in the municipio of Ciudad Sandino in the same newspaper which previously had 
described him as not belonging to the party, when he announced his support for the PLC 
candidate in the local elections (Álvarez 2008). 
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I encountered many similar situations of hidden party connections behind organising efforts – 
with the 8th of March women’s march in León, controlled by the MRS, protesting sugar and 
banana workers in Managua organised by people with background from the FSLN, various 
NGOs in connection with the anti-government protests controlled by the MRS, and student 
groups in León coming from the FSLN. Also all the organised indigenous people in León I 
met, turned out to be party members of either the PLC or the FSLN. Had I not had many 
years of experience in operating in a political conspiratorial environment among the far left of 
Norway, I would likely never have thought of investigating whether a group that claims it is 
independent and not connected to any political party is correct in its claim. 
Power through infiltration
Some of the Sandinista political involvement may have been a lot more hidden than what 
anthropologists in Nicaragua have found between 1990 and 2007. In July 2009, I witnessed a 
bull race in Managua as part of the Catholic Santo Domingo celebrations. Erick Saul Rios 
Juarez, a 20 year old FSLN Sandinista and radio host had asked me to cooperate on filming 
the event. Different from similar activities in Spain, a whole series of bulls were involved, and 
(drunk) people tried to mount them rather than kill them. Also, the ‘bull always wins’ as Carlos 
Alberto Rocha Castro once put it, because only humans were seriously hurt and the bulls all 
went back to live in the countryside after the day was over. From the outside, this looked like 
many traditional celebrations in the third world. Initially, I assumed it was something the 
Catholic Church took from preexisting religions which it then adopted and modernised. 
I was surprised, when Rios Juarez revealed to me, that all those working in the preparation of 
this part of the Santo Domingo celebrations were Sandinistas. I was even more surprised 
when I interviewed the principal person responsible for the arrangement. He revealed the 
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Sandinista planning behind the event even more openly:
When we lost the elections in 1990, we decided as a party we needed to infiltrate all public 
spaces available to us. That also included the church and the Santo Domingo celebrations. 
So in anticipation of the cultural import of celebrations such as Halloween from the United
States, we wanted to create something altogether Nicaraguan. Cows are a traditional 
Nicaraguan animal, and we adopted that to the city and created the bull races.
The last part of this statement seems to be at least in part false, as already Lancaster (1988, 
pp. 40–42) reported on the usage of cow costumes during the Santo Domingo celebrations. 
However, it is appropriate in connection with this portrayal of the organisation of this bull race 
in the past, to reconsider the findings of Babb (2004) as it seems to have been how many 
foreign observers saw Nicaragua during the post-Sandinista years. According to her, the 
political life of the previously party controlled society had in the 1990s/early 2000s turned into 
a large amount of independent groups and organisations, each with their own narrowly 
defined agenda of identity politics coming into being. Her vision was of a Nicaragua in 
neoliberal ruins in which the Sandinistas had disappeared from power forever. Her projection 
of the future of Nicaragua was one in which there was ever more hunger and postmodern 
lifestyle and identity politics. This did not come true. As my former student and activist 
Douglas Augusto Varela Vilchez mentioned, at a time while he was working unofficially for the
MRS but officially for another NGO: “Nicaraguans who claim they are not into [party] politics –
they are lying!” Certainly the Nicaragua Babb describes just a few years earlier was a 
decidedly different Nicaragua than the one I saw in terms of political power and majorities. Of 
course, I can not know whether Babb (2004) correctly described what Nicaraguans thought at
the time, or whether she just did not manage to penetrate the social structure of the activist 
groups enough to realise what structures actually mattered at the time. Who knows – maybe 
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the idea of infiltration was something the Sandinistas got after the fact, when the FSLN was in
government again. 
Use of paid protesters?
While all the other examples point to activism based on wanting to try to change society on 
the part of the participants, examples exist of paid or forced protests. Most Nicaraguans I 
spoke to about the issue assumed government workers were forced to participate in 
pro-government protests. While this may be the case, it is my experience when talking to 
such workers, that the pressure to participate is not articulated directly, so it is hard to verify 
whether they were actually being pressured to participate or whether they imagine they were. 
There is a much more clear-cut example of paid protesters being used by the government. In 
this case, I also wonder if the protesters could not be said to have some influence through this
mean and get closer to achieve their own goals. 
Between August and the municipal elections of November of 2008, in Managua the rotondas 
were physically occupied by former banana workers. Simultaneously, the banana workers 
protested outside parliament for more than half a year for compensation due to work related 
injuries and damages. At first their protest was mounted under the MRS banner. But after 
what they explained to me as being extensive corruption of their initial leader, a member of 
the MRS or at least closely connected to them, was revealed, the FSLN took over the protest 
and the government provided them with food. 
I interviewed some of the leaders of the banana workers a little before the elections and they 
said they were under MRS leadership earlier, but now they were independent. I asked them 
what the vast number of red-and-black Sandinista flags were doing in the camp if they were 
independent, and they replied that “anyone is free to put up whatever party banner they 
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want.” I then asked why there were large government posters behind the food tent. They told 
me: “Well, it protects us from the rain, we found it down at the John Paul the Second plaza 
after [government] festivities.” 
In order to prevent the MRS and PLC from marching, these banana workers stood in all the 
rotondas of Managua starting in the summer of 2008. For this, they allegedly received C$100 
per day per worker (around $5 USD) to swing flags in favor of the CPCs and playing loud 
music. The banner they stood under, read ‘love is greater than hate’ – a quote of Rosario 
Murillo made in connection with the MRS protest in late spring 2008. The occupation of the 
rotondas lasted more than half a year, with some interruptions. At times, when the opposition 
was sufficiently violent, especially in the days after the elections, they were able to take 
control of the rotondas, at least one at a time. Arguably, those organised were used to 
achieve a goal rather than achieving a goal of their own. Their protest in front of the Liberally 
dominated parliament was in this way prolonged, as they had both a constant source of 
income and supply of food while camping out. In February 2011 Sandinista news media 
reported Ortega Saavedra had started handing out houses to these protesters (La Voz del 
Sandinismo 2011). 
Power without organising?
Organising in itself seems to be a fundamental principle of Nicaraguan society and few 
Sandinistas are not organised in some group or another. The few examples of not being 
organised I find are those working as street vendors in León, such as María Elena Bustillo. 
Not much direct organising takes place among them in León other than directing who is to 
stand where. Their ability to affect society, therefore, seems to be the most limited. The 
disorganisation also means they are left out of channels of receiving help from the state. At 
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one point of time, I explained to Bustillo what kinds of micro-credits are available from the 
government. They generally involve several people getting together to apply for a loan in a 
group. “So if one of them just disappears, the rest have to carry that!” was her disappointed 
reaction. Bustillo expected the FSLN to give more power to the poor in general. As it turns 
out, power is only accessible to the organised citizen. 
Bustillo made me take a photo of a rotten beam in her house and write a postcard to hand to 
Ortega Saavedra in her name the first time I came to Nicaragua. Another time, when 
changing municipal governments from one FSLN mayor to the next FSLN mayor, I witnessed 
how Bustillo and those she hangs around talked about the personal tragedy of losing a 
contact in the government who “always was good to [them].” For her and others in that 
situation, who feel an allegiance to Sandinismo and the Ortega Saavedra government, the 
relationship to the government seemed to be more connected to the caudillo principle, in 
which a relationship to a government person with access to money and power would give 
them certain privileges. 
Political activist education
The understanding of the collective nature of political pressure and the idea that one needs to
make use of all the opportunities available at any given time, is quite ingrained in Sandinista 
philosophy. It was well exemplified in the reaction to the municipal elections of 2008, when not
only party leaders, but grassroot Sandinista followers became involved in disclaiming charges
of voter fraud. 
A large part of the different understandings of whether they have been cheated or not is likely 
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due to the difference in political education and culture of Liberals and Sandinistas. The whole 
setup was explained to me by Díaz: In Nicaragua at each election center, there are at least 
three people sitting at the table: a president, a vice-president and a secretary. These are 
supposed to be from different parties, and the local chapter of the Consejo Supremo Electoral
(CSE), which also is made up of people from different parties and whose national leadership 
is appointed by parliament. In addition, each party is allowed to send one observer to witness 
what takes place at each electoral center. Each of those officially appointed to sit at the 
electoral center decide upon a number on the morning of the election. They do not announce 
the number to others until the electoral proceedings of the day begin. Before any ballot is 
given out, each of these persons needs to write their number on the ballot. The president and 
vice-president have to sign it. “There are six ways to make a ballot not count,” Díaz explained 
to me. A circumstance under which one might decide to cheat could be if a personal neighbor 
would enter the election center, and one knew the neighbor always voted for another party 
than one’s own, so before handing the ballot to the neighbor, one would make sure to 
invalidate it, so that the vote would not count. The six ways include signing with a false name, 
not signing at all, putting down the wrong number, etc. What all these have in common is they
cannot be done unless none of the others present take notice. There seems to be quite a 
difference in understanding as what constitutes cheating. One young Sandinista girl from 
Estelí explained it to me this way:
See, you will typically have like a 57-year-old man representing the FSLN. He has 
participated in this many times before. The Liberals will be represented by a 17 year old 
who joined the day before.
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Gómez Morales later on explained that same process to me:
See, I went there, but I had my son around, so that he could learn how all the procedures 
worked.
At the same time, I was told of several Sandinista voters who had shown friends of mine that 
they had indeed proof that they had voted twice. This did not seem to constitute a problem to 
them, as long as all the procedures had been followed. When I sat outside municipal 
headquarters of the FSLN León during one of the days just after the elections, one of the 
older activists told me:
I just don’t understand how they can talk about cheating. When I see that something isn’t 
right with a ballot, I know to put down my ID card on the table and the table is 
automatically closed until those from the CSE arrive and resolve the conflict.
The CSE did not receive many complaints about cheating that day, as Liberal observers had 
likely not known the proper procedures and had even signed off the result before naming their
concerns to campaign headquarters. As this example shows, the moral behind these actions 
seems to be that, within the Sandinista logic, it is the responsibility of the group/party, not the 
individual, to ensure the individual voice gets heard by educating the individual member. 
Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we saw how different Sandinista groups of different kinds work mostly 
autonomously with only vague ideological points connecting all the party’s members. We also 
saw how political alliances on single issues are part of the Sandinista repertoire of politics and
how this gives some limited possibilities for non-Sandinistas to take part in Sandinista 
processes of decision making. This does not always mean an even power sharing with the 
cooperating group. Thereafter we saw how wide the repertoire of politics for Sandinistas is 
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today, but that all of those who successfully exert power follow group-based approaches. 
It is not difficult to understand, then, that such a wide range of political activity leads to a 
wide-ranging inclusion of individuals who all entertain a feeling of ownership, a generally high 
level of participation, and that it permits trying out different approaches by different groups. 
The socioeconomic characteristics of individuals and groups may offer some explanation for 
the specific way in which they engage politically. These characteristics are seldom questioned
and generally taken as a given. The explanations only go as far as explaining why the 
individual Sandinistas do what they do, given their position within Nicaraguan society in 
combination with their adherence to Sandinista ideology. In this sense, the Sandinismo of the 
21st century seems to be much in line with the project of a Socialism for the 21st Century. 
Simultaneously this chapter cannot explain all that is happening during the government of 
Ortega Saavedra in terms of the transformation of power structures. The neoliberal trade 
policies through the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(DR-CAFTA) and the conditions the International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt levies upon the 
country have not changed much since 2007, in spite of all the Sandinistas who exert power in 
some way. These and similar conditions are often taken for granted and not considered much 
further, by either Nicaraguans or foreigners. Additionally, there may be an appropriation of 
large amounts of oil revenues by individual FSLN leaders—a claim which the right-wing press
makes repetitively but so far has not been able to substantiate. This would hinder the free and
independent development of Nicaragua the way it seems Sandinista ideology envisions it. 
Such differences between Sandinistas can also be seen at a lower level where they do not 
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necessarily mean difference in access to funds, but still are quite apparent.
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Chapter 11
Historic relations to Eastern Europe
The preceding chapters showed how my informants, and especially the FSLN Sandinistas 
among them, saw almost exclusively other Nicaraguans as central in political events that 
happened in the past or present. This seemed to be quite systematic. We have seen how this 
understanding of history, which puts Nicaraguan actors at the center stage of history, is 
effectively used to mobilise a diverse net of groups who all see themselves as acting in the 
name of Sandinismo. This net reaches far beyond President José Daniel Ortega Saavedra 
and a few people around him. Although a great percentage of the population may mobilise to 
participate in a general struggle for social change, their effect is somewhat limited. The wealth
of the two oligarch families seems impossible to touch under all types of governments. So 
instead of judging the Sandinista government by how well it manages to redistribute wealth, 
Sandinistas judge their own policies by where they could lead, or could have led, if they were 
allowed to continue. 
This chapter shows, how my informants see the historical relationship between Nicaragua 
and Eastern Europe, and that it influences the current understanding of history of my 
informants. It gives yet another cause for which the Sandinista movement can mobilise. The 
historical uniqueness of the Nicaraguan case means, the current tactics and strategies of the 
Sandinistas cannot necessarily be applied in any of Nicaragua's Latin American allies (for 
example: employing positive reference to memories of the Soviet Union), even though many 
other countries find themselves in a similar situation economically. The relationship to Eastern
Europe is explained by presenting some of the personal stories of those Sandinistas who 
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went to a school of political leadership in the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR, 
German Democratic Republic). The majority of these students presented their time in East 
Germany as having had a lasting effect on their view of politics. This chapter shows how 
some of them are in positions of political power whereby they are likely to shape the policies 
of the current government.
Nicaraguan particularities in the current global system
Besides economic issues, Nicaraguan dependency on other powers is complex terrain. Some
of the cultural aspects survived from the previous phase of economic cooperation with the 
Soviet Union, and Sandinistas now seek to convert that into renewed economic links. 
Economic links to the United States were already in place by 2006. When these led the 
country into a global crisis, Nicaraguan actors could only influence how the crisis was 
managed in Nicaragua. No-one in Nicaragua could decide upon its existence nor strength. 
The global capitalist interdependence has a direct effect on Nicaraguan daily life which hardly 
can be influenced by any Nicaraguan government policies. The current financial crisis 
(2008–), which has clearly affected Nicaragua, made the Nicaraguan lack of influence clear 
once more. The Nicaraguan government can only decide where it will cut spending, not 
whether it will do so. On 22 January 2009, the presidential decree to confront the financial 
crisis was revealed (La Voz del Sandinismo 2009). According to it, government workers who 
made under C$20,000 a year (roughly $1000 USD) would continue to enjoy wage increases 
while those earning more would not, no vacant positions would be filled during the first nine 
months of the year, and the working day for public employees would end at 1pm, among other
things. All this was part of a reaction to a lower influx of money. 
Most Sandinistas believe the United States is directly responsible for the current crisis. 
284
According to some voices in the media, the crisis is stronger in Nicaragua than anywhere else
in the world (AFP 2009) yet according to many of the agriculture experts at the NGO Servicio 
de Información Mesoamericano sobre Agricultura Sostenible (SIMAS), in 2009 the crisis did 
not show in many parts of the country. Denis Cáceres explained this:
Well see, there are many areas where there is no substantial flow of money, but where there 
is a considerable amount of food security, simply because the people grow it themselves.
Subsistence farming has been the target for many of the government programs, such as 
‘Hambre Cero.’ According to Cáceres and his colleagues, it may not make the country rich, 
but to a certain extent, it makes farmers more independent. 
It is not just Nicaragua which is unable to do much about the current increase in global 
dependency and the trend towards privatisation going with it (Amin 2004). The socialist 
governments of Latin America are not all the same – the somewhat limited changes to the 
economy under Brazil’s Lula is not as radical a change from politics as usual as Venezuela’s 
Hugo Chavez’s Project for a Socialism of the 21st Century. The socialism of Cuba is 
represented by an administration that is the same as during Soviet days, and the Cuban 
political and economic system has only changed to a limited extend since the 1980s (Wilm 
2010). Nicaragua is different from other countries, in that it is the only one which experienced 
10 years as a Soviet-allied country with a mixed economy during the 1980s and afterward 
much of the same neoliberal reforms as most other Latin American countries. It now tries to 
reestablish the revolution temporarily ended in 1990. 
In Nicaragua people who are not Sandinistas and have more right-wing views on internal 
Nicaraguan issues, oftentimes see the state of world capitalism surprisingly critically. At the 
same time, the aid which comes from other countries to the Ortega Saavedra government, 
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does not only originate in countries with Leftist governments. Today Nicaragua receives help 
from and cooperates with Iran (Morrissey 2007), Libya (Castro 2007)32 and Russia. One main 
reason for the support they receive from these countries seems to be the country’s strong 
position against the influence of the United States in Latin America. The military protection 
and political links offered by these countries are combined with economic aid and 
development projects. Even some more right-wing groups within the third world are working 
with the Ortega Saavedra government. 
The extent to which classic or western concepts are questioned is different in Nicaragua than 
many other places. In some parts of the periphery, the ‘colonisation of the mind,’ understood 
as the import of concepts, ideas and moral standards from the center, is questioned. This 
includes the idea of western rationality – also world views such as historical materialism are 
questioned as being too Euro centered (Quijano 2000). This is true in several Middle Eastern 
countries, where religious groups, rather than socialist ones, now make up the main part of 
resistance against western influence. This is not the case in Nicaragua. Here, the rhetoric and
concepts of socialism most closely resemble those of Eastern European 
socialism/communism. These concepts were largely learned during Soviet times by 
Nicaraguan students studying there. Nicaragua does not seem to have followed global trends 
in this sense. Many international radical analysts, such as Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, 
thought in the 1990s that this ‘old Left’ was gone forever. Wallerstein stated the following in 
1997:
Let us ponder the political consequences of the world economic difficulties of the period 
1970–[95]. First and foremost, it has meant the serious discrediting of the Old Left, the 
32 In the 2011 NATO attack against Libya, Nicaragua was one of the most openly pronounced supporters of Libya and even
offered to represent the country within the United Nations. Yet it is probable that due to the war the delivery of aid by 
Libya was ended.
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erstwhile anti-systemic movements – the national liberation movements in the ex-colonial 
world, the populist movements in Latin America, but also the Communist parties in Europe 
(east and west) and the social-democratic/labor movements in western Europe and North 
America. Most of them have felt that, in order to survive electorally, they needed to become
even more centrist than before. Their mass appeal has, as a result, seriously diminished, 
and their self-confidence has declined to the same degree. In any case, they can scarcely 
any longer serve as guarantors of Liberal reformism for impatient and impoverished 
populations. They are, therefore, unable to serve as a mechanism of control (previously the 
principal mechanism of control) of the political reactions of such populations, many of 
whom have turned elsewhere – to political apathy (which, however, is always a temporary 
way-station), to fundamentalist movements of all kinds, and in some cases to neo-fascist 
movements. The point is that these populations have become volatile once again, and 
therefore, dangerous once again from the point of view of the privileged strata in the 
world-system. (Wallerstein 1997)
The level of apathy seems to be somewhat different in Nicaragua than many other places, 
and contrary to Wallerstein’s predictions, the calls for (state based) socialism are back. 
Among those stating some form of state socialism as their goal, globally there are differences 
as how one relates to previous experiments with socialism and specifically the Soviet Union. 
In the West and much of Latin America, there has always been a certain portion of Trotskyism
among the radical Left which viewed the Soviet Union as having lost its progressive mission 
in the 1920s (Chilcote 2009). In the case of Nicaragua, with the FSLN’s regimes 
comparatively not all that totalitarian character during the 1980s, most radical Soviet critics 
traditionally supported the Sandinista regime. Today, remarkably little criticism of anything 
related to the Soviet Union can be found among Sandinistas. 
Connections to a former center
Trade-wise, Nicaragua can be said to be more independent on the United States through the 
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growth of new trading partners in Latin America and Asia than it was in the years of Somoza 
or the first few years following electoral defeat in 1990. Given a classic Dependency Theory 
interpretation, in which economic links are decisive, this could explain the relative 
independence the country has maintained from the United States and to a lesser extent from 
Western Europe. 
What it does not explain is, why the Sandinista ideology as worded by government officials, 
and a substantial part of the population, is so hostile toward the United States, and at the 
same time so friendly to Russia. Russia has military potency, but in terms of trade, it has 
relatively little impact on Nicaragua. The main event that involved Russia during my stay in 
Nicaragua was the war in Georgia where Nicaragua supported Russia. Although the 
Nicaraguan involvement in that was only an action by Ortega Saavedra, it was clear among 
the Sandinistas the actions taken by Ortega Saavedra were something they strongly favored. 
The handing of the medal to the former East German minister, who at the time held no state 
power, seemed not to be done in connection with any now-existing power relation. The 
following shows how among many former Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc trained 
Sandinistas at various levels, continue to have a particularly powerful influence originating in 
their personal experiences in the 1980s when they went to Eastern Europe to study. It is this 
which mainly contributes to the special understanding of Russia in Nicaragua today. 
It has been argued, that the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc never represented any kind of 
center of accumulation in Dependency Theory sense. In the Nicaraguan perspective of things,
the fact that it had the importance it did trade-wise and its position as a center for study, could
make it look like a center. That is especially evident in the influence Eastern Europe has had 
through education. The use of western-style education by elites of peripheral countries is by 
288
many adherents of Dependency Theory seen as an integral part in the upkeep of the 
relationship between core and non-core (Quist 2001). Similarly in this sense, the relationship 
between Eastern Europe and the current Nicaragua has a lot to do with the education 
programs many Sandinista students received there in the 1980s. 
Shortly after the visit of the former minister of education of the DDR to Nicaragua, a former 
East German student of an international school of political cadres in East Germany in the 
1980s contacted me through a friend of mine in Berlin. The Nicaraguans were young 
Nicaraguan Sandinistas in line for taking over higher offices in the government and the party 
at the time of their travel. The East German student only had some false names of some of 
his co-students, but asked my help in finding his Nicaraguan classmates. Through the use of 
TV and radio, I eventually found a number of students who attended a year of study at the 
school. 
The students
When meeting the Nicaraguans who had studied at this school in the DDR, I tried to figure out
if and how their view on Eastern Europe and the country where they studied, the DDR, is still 
influenced by that time. In most cases, it does not seem to be a decisive factor whether they 
have a job or the type of job they have within the current government, when determining how 
they see the current government and the various political events that happen in Nicaragua. 
The formal interviews I made of these students were hugely different in terms of length and 
somewhat different in terms of contents. The amount of information they provided, and the 
type of information they were willing to volunteer, differed considerably. I adjusted my 
interview questions as I went along during each interview, to accommodate these differences.
Some of these informants gave no more information than what I heard before in the streets of 
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León. I choose here to mention some of the students I found, as their interviews gave me the 
most insight.
Ossiel Mendieta was among the first students to go to East Germany in the early 1980s. At 
that time, the revolution in Nicaragua was not particularly developed, so all participants 
received code names to use while in Germany, in case of a takeover by Contra forces. 
Mendieta contacted me after reading about my project of finding students from his school in 
the newspaper El Nuevo Diario. I met him within 15 minutes after he called me, as he 
happened to be in León at the time. Mendieta now has a restaurant in front of city parliament 
in Chinandega. He also makes money creating bracelets out of colored threads.
I met Mercedes Campos Montenegro in the village of Malpaisillo, just a few kilometers outside
of León. A former teacher in Germany wrote down her name and city even though they were 
encouraged not to interchange addresses. To update the addresses, I went to the voters’ 
registration office in León. After explaining my plans, they found the address of Campos 
Montenegro and that of several of her co-students. This service on their part was likely 
downright illegal, but there seemed to be an understanding among the Sandinista workers at 
the office that it was a service they provided to a fellow traveller representing the DDR. Like 
most, Campos Montenegro still lived in the same village she lived in during the 1980s. This 
facilitated finding the former students.
When I arrived in Malpaisillo on the bus, instead of trying to find the address, I asked the first 
policeman I spotted, to see if he could tell me where Mercedes Campos lived and he pointed 
me one block down a road. I knocked on the door, where Campos Montenegro sat with two 
young girls. I asked her, if she were the Mercedes Campos who went to study in East 
Germany. She did not seem to wonder how I would know that. She spoke to me as if she 
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found it to be the most natural thing in the world that a foreigner would come by asking her 
about that. Within minutes, she was ready to give me an account of how things were back 
then and what had changed since.
María Antonieta Blandón Montenegro is different from many of the other students in that she 
no longer lives in the same village as in the 1980s. I found her house in Matagalpa, in 
northern Nicaragua. With the new Ortega Saavedra government, she became “something like
a minister,” as her sister explained to me casually. The official title is ‘Directora Ejecutiva de la
Oficina de Ética Pública (OEP)’ where she is to monitor and audit the other ministries to 
prevent corruption. I talked to her several times later in Managua and followed her in some of 
her work talking to students at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua (UNAN) in 
Managua on codes of ethics. 
Also Guimar Aminta Arias was successful. When I first met her, she worked at customs in the 
city of Estelí. I hunted around town after her, and finally encountered her at a Sandinista 
meeting at departamento level. She did not have time right then to talk, and when I met her 
again a few weeks later, she had just taken over as president of the Instituto Nicaragüense de
Fomento Municipal (INIFOM) at national level in Managua. During the 16 years out of power 
she survived among other things through working for the Sandinista mayor of Estelí. 
She went to Germany with a group of ten students and was only 18 years old. She had been 
a member of the Juventud Sandinista (JS) since she was 12 years old and was one of the 
group’s founders. She joined because she wanted to teach as part of the literacy program. 
When she came back she started working with children, and anything to do with recreation. 
She volunteered for the army to fight the Contras. After the lost elections of 1990, she worked
in the ministry of education and secured a masters degree which was crucial in obtaining her 
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current position. During the years of opposition, she did not stop working with the Sandinista 
movement, and focused on an independent youth radio station in Estelí. She returned to work
in city government in 2000, after serving as campaign leader for the FSLN. During this time, 
she continued with her radio job in ‘civil society.’
Rogelio Antonio Selva Gonzales gave me a markedly different report of the time at the school
than all the others. Selva Gonzales was still a close friend of Aminta Arias, and he also lived 
in Estelí, but he now identified with the MRS. He worked in the ministry of interior in the 1980s
and in the early 1990s in the military, when it was still controlled by the Sandinistas. Being a 
Sandinista made it hard for him to get a job during the 1990s. He felt the only way to get 
around this was to renounce his FSLN affiliation. 
Francisco Blandón Robleto was a student the last year the school was held, 1989–90. He 
was also in Germany when the Berlin Wall came down. Until just before I met him, he was a 
lawyer in Matagalpa but had been named judge of the small village of Waslala, RAAN under 
the new Ortega Saavedra government. He saw no reason to hide his experiences in East 
Germany. Different from the others, he already worked at a higher level in the party 
apparatus. As a leading figure inside the JS in the early 1980s, he had direct contact with 
Egon Krenz, the leader of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth, FDJ, the East 
German partner organisation of the JS) up until 1983. On 18 October 1989, Egon Krenz was 
elected as head of state of East Germany, and Blandón Robleto claimed to have met him 
while he was in that position. 
Amada Alvarado Soza had more of a personal tragedy related to her visit to East Germany. I 
met Alvarado Soza’s family in Matagalpa, living further outside the center than Blandón 
Robleto. Alvarado Soza and her husband had purchased rights for a bus line which they 
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operate, and they previously worked as taxi drivers. In the early 1980s, Alvarado Soza was 
employed in a police capacity in Managua. A car accident during that time led to her being 
temporarily infertile. Treatment was available, but only in East Germany. So, in addition to the 
political training, Alvarado Soza was sent to East Germany to receive medical treatment. 
Tests were made, everything was prepared, and then the Berlin Wall came down. The school 
stopped in the middle of the year. It was offered that anyone who had the money could 
continue to study, but no one had the funds, and some groups like the Cubans had to leave 
immediately. Others, like Alvarado Soza, stayed and were sent out to harvest fruit in the 
country side until their scheduled trip home. Not hard to imagine, also Alvarado Soza sees 
East Germany very positively and West Germany as well as western-style capitalism 
decidedly negatively. 
Víctor Ruiz is another person I found in Estelí. He studied a great deal, including History, 
Economics and the law. When I met him, he worked in the Instituto Nicaragüense de 
Seguridad Social (INSS) and taught at a university. I found him during his lunch break at 
home. Ruiz is still a Sandinista, and he sees enormous advances with the current 
government. After I was with for some seconds, he immediately started lecturing on some of 
the new government programs in his sector. 
The importance of Eastern Europe for the Sandinista Revolution in the 1980s
Most Sandinistas I spoke to in the streets on random occasions talked about the Soviet Union
and its allies as supporters of the Sandinista Revolution. The relationship between the two 
was mostly portrayed as being between even partners. In their view, the cooperation between
Nicaraguan Sandinistas and other revolutionary groups around the world, was and is one of 
reciprocity without any one group having the upper hand. Among those who went and studied
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in East Germany, the relationship is at least partially seen as different because of a 
recognition that the Eastern European states were stronger than the Nicaraguan state. 
Instead of seeing the school as a place of interchange in which even partners would come 
together and share revolutionary ideas, the way one could imagine for it to happen if the 
relationship had been totally horizontal, the students recognised that the school with its study 
programs was created to spread a certain ideology. The most elaborate explanation I received
about this was from Mendieta. When I first met him, I explained the current status of the 
school they attended. He made it clear, he thought it was supremely valuable for ideological 
education to continue in East Germany. The school buildings had been sold, altogether the 
party only kept a few buildings scattered around East Germany, one of which was party 
headquarters in Berlin. “You are, however, still educating the recruits, right?” he wanted to 
know. I told him that, yes, there was a party youth organisation with a study program 
connected to it, but that it did not use the same program as back then. He commented:
Oh, I still have the books. I’ll donate them for you to make copies if that means you can use
them to start the program back up.
The idea of East Germany and the East German system as a place to copy and ally oneself 
with, seemed to be genuine as he continued along the same line after I turned off the camera 
at the end of one of our meetings:
It filled me with such joy when I saw that they gave the medal to Mrs Honecker there on 
July 19th, for all the help they gave us back then. That was well deserved.
The statements of Mendieta are quite typical for the ex-students I talked to. In part, their 
comments were likely shaped by their knowledge that I was affiliated with the successor of 
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the party that formerly ruled East Germany. Given that, in most cases, it was they who chose 
to contact me, and that they did represent numerous points of criticism of aspects both of the 
Nicaraguan government and the East German system, I conclude, that most of their 
statements genuinely represented their views. 
“See, these are things we learned over there at the school in East Germany,” Blandón 
Montenegro explained, before she listed some points of the revolutionary tactics and theory, 
that the Nicaraguan group she had been with brought from Germany. Again, the picture of 
East Germany was a positive one, in a way which would likely surprise most Germans. She 
turned out to have been a friend of the first East German who started me on the search, and, 
in connection with that, she pointed out how grateful she is that “Even though [our socialist 
East German class mates] have lost power, they are still trying to help us here.” 
Aminta Arias said that the experience in East Germany was understood differently by different
people participating without specifying further. She also said: “Altogether it was the 
cooperation from the Eastern bloc and East Germany that made the first phase of the 
revolution possible,” and the current ‘phase of the revolution’ would be very much formed by 
the education given back then to many of the leading cadres of the Sandinista movement. 
With that explanation, she is the one who seems to sum up the underlying idea of the 
statements of all the former students. 
The degree of positive views of the Soviet Union and socialist Eastern Europe seems not that 
different between the former students and the general Sandinista part of the population. A 
noticeable difference lies in the recognition by the former students, that the socialist ideology 
of the time, which the Sandinistas shared with Eastern Europe, did not flow as egalitarian or 
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originate only in Nicaragua, the way it seems to many Sandinistas. 
Comparison between Nicaragua and DDR
One of the obvious advantages in determining the relation between Nicaragua and the rest of 
the world, for those who have been abroad, is the ability to compare the state they went to 
with Nicaragua. The comparison most students made combined ideological leadership with 
material wealth. At one of the meetings, Mendieta realised that I and a Norwegian friend, who 
visited me, had never experienced East Germany. Then he explained what it had been like:
In East Germany, everybody had read that book [Das Kapital]. When you boarded a bus, 
the bus driver would have read it. And the guy checking the tickets. And the person sitting 
next to you.
A little later, he continued describing East Germany, but this time his description had turned 
more to the material rather than ideological sides of the country:
The Democratic Germany was a country where the people had just about everything. There
was not one wish the people had that the government did not fulfil. …East Germans had 
almost more than the West Germans.
Ruiz recognised that the standard of living in East Germany after 1990 was higher than that of
Nicaragua. In common with most Sandinistas, both of the MRS and the FSLN, these former 
students such as Mendieta expressed an overall positive view of Eastern European socialism.
However, different from others who have not seen any of these countries, there seems to be 
more of an admiration of these countries, and a recognition, that they had reached another 
level of development than Nicaragua, both ideologically and materially. 
The difference between Nicaragua and the DDR was also explained by some of the former 
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students in concrete material terms related to themselves. Campos Montenegro spent 
considerable time explaining that after several years of unemployment during the years of 
neoliberalism, she obtained employment as a teacher at a Christian school for which she had 
to become a Christian, with a salary of $40 USD per month. She pointed out how hard it was 
to obtain this employment. Then she compared her wage to the $400 USD per month stipend 
she was given by the DDR government while studying there. 
While most Nicaraguans seemed quite aware of the differences in wages between Western 
Europe/the United States and Nicaragua, I cannot recall the theme of wages coming up in 
connection with discussing Eastern Europe in the 1980s in the same war as with Campos 
Montenegro. There seems to be some recognition, that Eastern Europe had the ability to 
send material products and economic help to Nicaragua in a way Nicaragua was not able. 
From this, it can be derived, that a certain realisation of the differences between how 
economics is present also among those Sandinistas who did not leave Nicaragua. The 
difference seems to be mostly in the views of the relationship between the two in ideological 
terms. 
Experiences with the fall of the wall and views on changes of Eastern Europe
The fall of the Berlin wall and the change away from socialism in Eastern Europe, are today 
seen as positive events in the history of that region of the world by most westerners, no 
matter what ideology they may follow. Given the positive view Sandinistas seem to have of 
Eastern European socialism, I thought it intriguing to ask those of the former students who 
had some experiences with either the fall of the Berlin wall or who had experiences with East 
Germany afterward, about their view of the disappearance of East Germany. The Sandinistas 
generally see the destruction of East Germany as a loss for the German people. From those 
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who had experienced the time of the system change in the DDR, I had expected to hear a 
somewhat different view, but this was not the case. For example, Campos Montenegro was 
still employed by the city under the first mayor after 1990. As part of that job she was able to 
go to Spain and from there on to Germany once more in 1992. She summed up her 
experiences at that time in just one sentence: “It was a very sad sight – all that poverty and 
trash that was flying around.” 
While I have heard many people in East Germany—and some in West Germany—speak 
negatively about the changeover to capitalism in East Germany, I cannot recall having heard 
any assessment of the situation in the early 1990s quite as negative by any German as how 
Campos Montenegro sees it. The view Campos Montenegro’s expressed of East Germany in 
1992, paints a picture of post-unification Germany similar to how other Nicaraguans who 
visited Germany during the same period presented it. It seems for them, progress in Europe is
directly connected to the DDR, and western-style capitalism is equal with a breakdown of 
society. 
Two of the former students, Alvarado Soza and Blandón Robleto, experienced the fall of the 
Berlin Wall directly during their time as students. The events surrounding that period, are 
generally described as a period of partying and happiness over the changeover among 
Germans. The Sandinista view of that period seems to be in line with their overall view of East
Germany. This may partially be explained by the somewhat limited understanding the 
students had of the German language and situation, and that they received a lot of 
information through the educators at the school. Alvarado Soza recalled the initial reaction by 
the school staff to the opening of the German-German border this way:
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[T]he first thing the teachers told us, was, that we should stay in the school, to prevent 
being attacked from neo-nazis. It was horrible. First we lost here [at national elections on 
16 February 1990] and then they also lost in East Germany [at national elections 18 
March 1990].
I am not in the position to say whether the possibility of attacks from neo-nazis was real or 
was an excuse by school staff to keep the students indoors. Had Alvarado Soza had the 
same access to the news and information the general German population had, her view of the
situation might have been somewhat different. 
A few months after the fall of the Berlin wall, and before the school year was over, the 
educational program at the school was suspended. The socialist East German authorities had
scheduled for Alvarado Soza to be operated on using the superior East German medical 
equipment. Under the new, non-socialist leadership, her operation was cancelled. Instead, 
she and some of the other students were sent to pick fruit during the first half of 1990 until 
their flight back to Nicaragua in the summer. Alvarado Soza referred to the period as “When 
we had lost” in a way that sounded as if it was a personal loss. Many other Nicaraguans who 
lost much less materially than Alvarado Soza, also refer to the period in the same manner. It 
seems to be an identification not only with the FSLN, but with the socialist government of East
Germany and the entire Soviet bloc. 
Blandón Robleto seems not to have been quite as restricted in his movements during those 
days. According to him, after the wall came down, there was nothing physically stopping the 
students from going to West Germany and even to neighboring countries as some of the 
students did. Blandón Robleto told me how he only went to West Berlin and how he did so 
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only for a short trip. When the Nicaraguan students were scheduled to go back to Nicaragua, 
Robleto Blandón left, even though he believed he could have stayed due to the general level 
of chaos. “Did you not even consider staying?” I asked him. “Well no, I had things and family 
here in Nicaragua” he answered me as if it would have been the strangest thing in the world 
to suggest. The emphasis in his explanation of his activities in 1989–90, lies in the opportunity
to be able to meet people with high ranks within the East German ruling party, rather than in 
the possibilities connected with experiencing West-German capitalism. 
Another Sandinista who also studied in Eastern Europe, but at a different school, decided to 
take up the question of the Berlin Wall after I ask what his experience in East Germany was 
like:
See, we as the Frente Sandinista are extremely glad that the Berlin wall has come down, 
because that means that all the educated Marxists from the East can stream over into the 
rest of Germany and educate the working class there. So we truly hope, that we will win 
again in Germany as well, and that the entire Germany then will join the socialist camp.
Whenever I heard a Sandinista talk about the events surrounding the fall of the Berlin wall, it 
was always fundamentally different from how I have known it in the German discourse. 
Instead of being a positive event in which a more democratic and liberating system wins over 
a more dictatorial regime, in the Nicaraguan Sandinista perspective it is the DDR that always 
was the better system. Much like Alvarado Soza, many Sandinistas who have never been in 
the DDR are readily willing to identify with its government of the 1980s, even though they may
not show the same level of interest in a country they had never seen. 
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Experiences after returning and the 16 years of neoliberalism
The former students told me of various parts of their life story after their return. Similar to 
many other Sandinistas and Nicaraguans in general, they did not stick to explaining their 
personal history, but gave a general overview of the history of the country. One particular 
period most Sandinistas seem to leave out of their personal life story, is the period 
surrounding the 1990 elections, which are often described as “then we lost the elections” or 
something to a similar effect. The periods left out differ from person to person. In the few 
cases I heard about what happened during that period, it was mostly a period of 
unemployment and personal depression. 
Several of the students who studied in the DDR in the early 1980s spent the later 1980s in 
either JS or in another part of the state. Most of them seem to have been through the 
physically hardest time before they went to East Germany. One exception is a student who 
joined the military service upon return and was still too shell-shocked to be interviewed in 
2009, and Blandón Montenegro who went and led the JS in the village of Rio Blanco and lost 
her right index finger in the confrontations with the Contras there. 
The stay in the DDR was, according to how the former students described it, influential for 
their careers, specifically during the 16 years of neoliberalism. According to Blandón 
Montenegro, it was the study program in East Germany which inspired her to study law in 
Nicaragua during some of the earlier years of neoliberalism. She then used her education 
during the last years in opposition defending landless farmers in cases concerning land 
occupations. Many of the others had similar career paths, but admittedly this was also 
common for Sandinistas who did not go to East Germany. 
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Among these former students, the years of neoliberalism were when most left the FSLN. The 
one student I interviewed about this was Selva Gonzales. He explained that for the first few 
years after 1990, Selva Gonzales was known not for his criticism, but for his staunch support 
of the FSLN. It was first when he could not find work for being known as an FSLN Sandinista, 
that he decided to change sides. Of all the students I spoke with, Selva Gonzales is the only 
one with direct criticism of the processes of the 1980s. He is today not part of any political, 
power exerting processes. I heard of at least one other case of a former student who switched
sides during this period, as she was the co-student of one of the interview partners. Although I
knew both her name and her whereabouts, I was never able to schedule an interview. There 
may be several other cases of former students who heard about my interview project who for 
similar reasons chose not to answer. The stay in East Germany seems not to have prevented 
anyone from switching political sides after their return. 
Among those former students still with the FSLN when I saw them in 2008/09 and who 
explained how the stay in the DDR significantly improved their career or ability to help, the 
stories as told may have been told different had I come in 2004/05. I first understood this 
when interviewing Ruiz. When Selva Gonzalez walked me to the house of Ruiz, I came 
unannounced and Ruiz started his self-presentation by listing an impressive number of things 
he had achieved, both within the state apparatus and academia. After a while, he finished the 
interview and left for work. Then his Nicaraguan wife explained to me, that her husband 
fathered a child with a German co-student while in East Germany. A few years ago, before the
Sandinista takeover, he was asked to travel to Germany and get to know her, by a German 
TV show. “Because he had no job, he felt ashamed of not being able to give her anything,” his
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wife said to me. In the end, he did not go. Had the same happened at the time I came by, his 
wife was sure that he would have made the trip. 
The extensive filtering of personal life stories by those telling them, and the fact that I hardly 
managed to find any former students who changed party-allegiance, means, that I do not feel 
I can summarise much of how the experience shaped the average former DDR student and 
what they did in the following years. Those who stayed being Sandinistas did and do have a 
noticeable impact. As mentioned, among the total of under 100 students who went to this 
school in the DDR, several of them obtained high positions within the new Sandinista state 
and for a relatively high percentage of them as Blandón Montenegro pointed out, the study in 
Germany inspired them to continue with further studies and get more involved in Sandinista 
politics upon their return. 
Views on the current government
Aminta Arias focused a lot on the importance the connection to the DDR and the rest of 
Eastern Europe had in defining development goals for the Sandinistas that the current 
government still sees as valid. Her personal experience in the DDR seems to be conflated 
with that of the general influence the Eastern bloc had on the FSLN. In connection with that 
Aminta Arias mentions that she thinks, it is vital to “recover our own identity, as part of a 
historic struggle.” Some of the most crucial development factors for her are high literacy rates 
and access to credit for people to produce. She thinks that the literacy rate is an indicator of 
the level of development and that the level can be used to measure how valuable certain 
development strategies are:
When we left office, we had around 12% of illiteracy. When we returned it was at 37% – 
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almost 40%!33 For us, that in itself is an indicator of development – at least people are able 
to read and write.
Different from the first Sandinista government, Aminta Arias believes certain hindrances 
during the first Sandinista government made it impossible to achieve these goals:
The first part of the revolution happened during a war. In times of war, no government can 
work; it’s impossible to work on planning development.
That is different now, and she sees possibilities. One of the main misconceptions she listed 
about development during the ‘16 years of neoliberalism’ and the times “which we are still 
living” was that development means reaching western society:
We are a poor country… We need a much simpler model […] It has to be local and with a 
lot of emphasis on the productive sector.
For Aminta Arias, relevant indicators for development are education and access to health 
care (see illustration p. 150), rather than what type of cars or mobile phones people carry. 
Eastern Europe during the 1980s seems to be closer to where Nicaragua ultimately is to 
develop rather than current western society, according to what Aminta Arias told me. 
The positive view on the current government also extended to some of those who have not 
found a job with the new Sandinista government, such as Campos Montenegro. The first thing
she focused on, when I interviewed her, was that she still is a Sandinista. She felt a bit sad for
not being employed in the public sector, but she said she believes in the current Ortega 
Saavedra government and that there now would be massive changes and employment 
opportunities even if these may not be available to her. She mentioned various examples of 
people from either party background who had found employment since Ortega Saavedra 
33 While I cannot confirm the figures she cites, the direction seems to be similar to what international organizations 
indicate (Nicaragua Network 2009a).
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came to power again. “It’s simply a lot more open now.” According to her, in the previous 
years, it was hard to impossible to find employment for people known to have Sandinista 
tendencies. Now she explained, that she believed it would be a lot easier for her daughters to 
gain entrance to university than it had been in the past. Campos Montenegro seems to be 
one of those worst off of the ex-students in economic terms. Yet up until 2008, she continued 
to be active in the election campaign of the FSLN in Malpaisillo. 
Blandón Montenegro’s career path was decidedly different from that of Campos Montenegro. 
Blandón Montenegro’s work for the government in Managua, with responsibilities equal to a 
minister, must have taken up most of her time. Additionally, there was her spare time activity 
during weekends, when she worked giving legal advice to landless farmers in Matagalpa. This
seemed to be more relevant to her, and in line with her explanation that her work in Managua 
is not terribly attractive for someone who is used to be a political activist. It is essential to 
note, that she did not criticise the work of the Ortega Saavedra government; it was only 
herself, who she seemed to say was wrongly placed in that kind of job. Blandón Montenegro 
claimed that her goals as an activist were strongly formed by her stay in the DDR, and that 
they continued to be the reason why she chose to work as an activist. 
Not all the former students have a positive view of the current government. As mentioned, the
selection of interview partners is likely skewed by those who no longer wish to identify with 
the FSLN are also less likely to engage in talking about the period in which they were 
politically active with that party. The one person who does not mind expressing his views 
although he has switched away from the FSLN, Selva Gonzales, was not shy in describing 
what was wrong with the Nicaraguan government. Similarly to most Liberals and MRS 
Sandinistas, he thought Nicaragua was moving in the direction of a dictatorship. He told me, 
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that he handed out fliers against Ortega Saavedra recently, and that he believed that it was 
the reason he was charged on an otherwise unrelated issue. Also Selva Gonzales claimed to 
have acquired political ideals in East Germany and that these continued to be valuable for 
him. Different from the other students, these ideals led him now to oppose the Ortega 
Saavedra government. 
Most of the former students agreed that the time in East Germany was influential in forming 
their ideals as political beings. Some seemed to see this personal relation mirrored the 
relationship between the DDR and Nicaragua as countries. Aminta Arias stated this directly. 
Predictions for Germany
Together with the view of the DDR in the past, most Sandinistas have a rather unusual view of
what is likely to happen in Germany’s future. That is also true for the former DDR students. 
Mendieta told me and my friend from Norway the following prediction about Germany’s future:
I think it is simply not likely that the Germans will allow going back to capitalism again, at 
least for a long time after having read that book [Das Kapital].
Blandón Montenegro rounded up my first meeting with her with this:
I am sure that you guys will also win again in Germany soon, because the German people 
are a fighting people.
The view of the former students does not seem to be noticeably different from that of many 
other Sandinistas on this issue. It is one of the most significant conclusions I arrived at. Who 
influenced who in this case in their views is hard to discover, given that it seems to be such a 
prevalent view in Nicaragua, much more so than anywhere in the former DDR. 
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The experience in East Germany in perspective
The students I interviewed formed part of a small group of less than 100 students who went to
that school. Their perspective is only saying something about a generalised Nicaraguan view 
to a limited extend. The number of Nicaraguans who went to Eastern Europe or Cuba for 
study purposes is somewhat larger. While I looked for students in León, I stopped at the 
FSLN departamento office, to ask whether they know anyone who went and received the 
following answer by the person responsible for propaganda: “Oh, about half of León has gone
to Germany at some point of time.” That figure is exaggerated, but among those involved in 
Sandinista politics actively, it was never difficult to find someone who studied in one of the 
allied countries during the 1980s. On the day when I confronted the FSLN members in León 
in connection with the medal to the former East German minister of education Margot 
Honecker, they quickly found someone sitting around who had been in East Germany, to 
present to me as an expert on the matter. He was just a person waiting in the front room, but 
he was readily available to defend the former ally. He started out telling me how they went to 
East Germany and how they saw snow for the first time and how welcome they were, and 
then made the statement about the Berlin wall having been a hinder for the spread of ideology
from East Germany that I mentioned above. 
Blandón Montenegro and Mendieta’s idea of a possible revival of Eastern European socialism
can be found among many other Sandinistas. They believe the development Nicaragua has 
gone through, with a loss of power of the socialist forces in 1990s and then a reversal almost 
two decades later can be redone many places, including Germany. They also believe it would 
be desirable for this to take place. In this sense, many Sandinistas seem to have a world view
in which the movements in and history of Nicaragua is connected with and an essential part of
the general history of the world, including that of Eastern Europe. Speaking to other 
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Nicaraguans, also those who never left the country, the Soviet Union is seen as beneficial to 
the world by those positive to the Sandinistas, and negative by those opposed to the 
Sandinistas. Even though Sandinismo is seen as a decidedly independent and national 
project, a clear connection between the ex-Soviet Union and Sandinismo seems to exist. 
Where this idea about Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union originated for the general 
Sandinista population is hard to define. Students who went abroad and talked about their 
experiences likely formed one of several parts. Somehow the difference in which part in the 
Nicaraguan-Eastern European connection was on the receiving end of ideological education 
and who was spreading an ideology, seems to be less clear for many Sandinistas who 
received information about their allies abroad as second hand information. 
Dependence on Russia?
From the above interviews and the economic analysis, it is quite clear the political and 
cultural/social closeness to Russia is not a direct reflection of current trade links, but rather of 
past economic realities and personal learning experiences. The current understanding of the 
world, with such a central focus on the Soviet Union/Russia, is most of all the result of power 
constellations as they existed 20–30 years ago. That was the time when most adults made 
their political affiliations. It is also a period that stood out from the periods before and after it 
for all political groups in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas seem to have spread among themselves
an idea that there was a more or less nonhierarchical relationship between themselves and 
their allies abroad. The popular discontent internally within Eastern European with their 
regimes during the 1980s, is almost never communicated. 
Although many Sandinistas see things this way, it does not automatically follow that the trials 
of Ortega Saavedra to ally Nicaragua with Russia again are an expression of this. We cannot 
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know whether Ortega Saavedra and his advisers have the same idea about the world as most
Sandinistas and whether the government’s politics are substantially influenced by this. 
Another reason could be that the current expansion in relations towards Russia is a conscious
Nicaraguan trial of diversifying its relations to other countries. Ortega Saavedra could just 
make use of pre-existing sentiments. It is impossible to determine this as an anthropologist, if 
one does not have direct access to all of Ortega Saavedra’s meeting. I did not have access to
any of his meetings nor did I ever speak to Ortega Saavedra in person. In any case, the 
freedom to build relations with Russia is likely originating in the fact that the United States 
does not have the dominance it previously had over the region. 
Concluding remarks
We have seen that there is a particular Nicaraguan interpretation of world events, also those 
taking place in Europe which is mirrored by those students who went to study there during the
1980s. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies did represent for several of the 
students who went there, a center of ideological diffusion they still believe has influenced 
much of their current doings. Several of them have gained valuable posts within the current 
Sandinista run government. While the Soviet Union may not have been a center in the 
Dependency Theory sense, as a center for the accumulation of material wealth, the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact countries had a similar effect in terms of the production of 
ideology and allegiance through its relations with Nicaragua during the 1980s. 
This does not explain why Nicaragua objectively has different options than other peripheral 
countries in a similar situation, but it may give some indications as why the options available 
to Nicaragua are perceived as being different by Nicaraguans. It is the past relation to an 
ideological center that, although the center may be nonexistent today, has had a lasting effect 
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on Nicaraguan ideas about the world and the repertoire of possible actions Sandinistas 
believe are available to themselves. 
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Conclusion
The previous chapters dealt with understanding the perspective of my Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional (FSLN) informants on Nicaragua. It was demonstrated historical agency 
tends to be interpreted as residing in Nicaraguan hands both in the past and currently. In 
many occasions, views from outside of Nicaragua would instead likely identify some historical 
agency which is foreign and which has influenced Nicaraguan reality. Furthermore, a marked 
difference between the interpretation by different groups I spoke to of symbolic-political acts 
has been shown. In the chapters on economics, we saw that the economical plans and 
realities that existed during the time of past regimes are judged in different ways, and that it 
seems there is flexibility permitted in what economic policies one proposes for the current 
situation. Whereas Sandinismo internationally may be seen as synonymous with a certain 
type of socialist planning and the opposition with free-market capitalism, the differences in 
economic preferences among those informants identifying with these different political groups 
is not as sharp. Indeed, the economic policies one proposes or economic class one belongs 
to does not seem to be directly linked with political affiliation, although the FSLN is the party 
that in their rhetoric most directly addresses the poorer layers of society. The difference in 
how governments in the past were judged by my informants is related to whether one looks at
the actual existing economic reality during its time, or whether one focuses on what plans for 
economic development a given government had. The second view provides for the history of 
a certain government to be seen as positive, even though their proposed goal never 
materialises. This is specifically true for the FSLN government of the 1980s. 
In the following chapters, we looked at the dynamics of Sandinista politics and the interaction 
with events happening abroad. The development of Sandinista political activities takes place 
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constantly. To a high degree such activities are either the response to, or of the origin of 
international involvement. The level of influence that actors from abroad have on Nicaragua 
tends to be downplayed. As part of this description of political activity, it has been shown that 
the repertoire of Sandinista activities is wide-ranging and generally a collective process is 
involved, not exclusively controlled by one entity such as the President. 
We have seen that the Sandinista perspective of world politics at times is quite different from 
European perspectives. This can likely be explained through the unique historical past of 
Nicaragua and Sandinismo. It is this particular Nicaraguan history, connected with Nicaraguan
understandings of global geo-politics and the dynamics of leftist groups in power, which allow 
Nicaragua to divert from the policies available to countries in a similar situation. There seems 
to have developed a particular type of understanding of freedom of historical agency within 
certain layers of FSLN activists and possibly Nicaragua in general, which is compatible with 
the overall framework of Dependency Theory, although mostly in a simplified non--academic 
way. 
One possible interpretation of Dependency Theory leads to a world view which effectively 
makes any historical agency for individuals impossible. Actors within countries such as 
Nicaragua, which is peripheral and does not produce anything of great importance, cannot 
possibly influence their own situation. This is not the view most of my FSLN Sandinista 
informants seem to have. The understanding that these bring forward, although not 
formulated explicitly, seems to have been more in line with the Egyptian Dependency Theorist
Samir Amin. He believes in the possibility of changing the current worldwide setup 
fundamentally, and he usually ends his analysis with a call for action, directed towards third 
world countries. Similarly to my FSLN Sandinista informants, his view of the trajectory of third 
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world socialists has changed somewhat in recent decades. In Class and Nation Amin 
declared autonomous capitalism in the countries of the periphery is impossible. Therefore, the
national liberation movements should be seen as part of the development of socialism on a 
world scale rather than part of regional development of capitalism (Amin 1980, p. 131). Ten 
years later, in “The social movements in the periphery,” he declared the national liberation 
fronts’ dead with their promise of nothing beyond national independence not being enough for
the masses of the south, who feel everyday exploitation by capitalism (Amin 1990, pp. 
97–98). Another 14 years later, in The Liberal Virus, he called for renewed politicisation in the 
global South and the building of new Internationals and creating links with Europe to organise 
against the ‘neo-nazis’ in the United States government Amin (2004). 
A similar development seems to have happened within the groups of FSLN Sandinista 
activists I looked at. In 1980, they had great hopes of achieving socialism with the help of the 
FSLN. By 1990, they had lost all hopes they could achieve much of anything independently at
a governmental level, and involved themselves instead in various social struggles. After the 
turn of the millennium, however, once again the belief in leftist internationalism grew. The view
of Amin (2004) does not spell out what possibilities for historical agency exist in this latest 
historical phase, in which the national liberation front FSLN did not disappear as predicted 
and instead is back in power with the backing of other third world countries rather than the 
Soviet Union and without having turned entirely into a system-abiding party. What limits for 
political changes and maneuvers exist today, seems to be something that is being discovered 
in everyday practice, not only be the government, but by many smaller groups of Sandinistas. 
There does not seem to exist the same type of theoretical framework such as that upon which
Carlos Fonseca Amador and the Sandinistas before 1979 used to legitimise their 
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revolutionary project and argue for its viability. Even though material development indicators 
largely have improved since the 1980s, there seems to be a consensus among most of my 
Sandinista informants—possibly except for some of their intellectual leaders—that they no 
longer see it as viable to create an economic system markedly different from capitalism as it 
exists everywhere else in the immediate future. This can likely be attributed to the 
disappearance of the Soviet bloc and possibly as a long-term reaction to the war of the 
1980s. 
What this research has shown is that although Nicaraguan society is deeply divided in 
Sandinistas and non-Sandinistas, for many of my informants originating in different political 
camps, the differences are largely based upon views of the concrete actions that happened in
the past and there seems to be some overlap on the idea of what possibilities are open for 
Nicaragua. Also Liberal informants seem to have taken up many of the Sandinista ideas that 
permit a greater historical agency on the part of Nicaraguans in shaping the future of 
Nicaragua, although to a certain degree the opposite is true, and some Sandinistas seem to 
be not very enthusiastic about social experiments. 
What the research has also shown is, the Sandinista movement is not democratic-centralist 
political party as is common many places in Europe, in which an internal democratic process 
regulates the forming of most party-endorsed policies, nor is it a small cheerleader-group 
around President José Daniel Ortega Saavedra. Instead, it is a network of semi-independent 
groups of various sizes, with some overlap of personnel. The determination of Sandinista 
policy seems to happen in an ad-hoc fashion. When conflicts exist, they play out in the open 
in Nicaraguan daily life, and at times reach the point of physical fights. This structure seems 
to allow for extreme broad participation in political processes for people from very different 
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backgrounds, including economical class and age. 
The pressure on Ortega Saavedra that exists within the FSLN does not originate from only 
one direction. While it is true that many of the policies of the current government were drafted 
by urban professionals, such as those relating to poverty reduction, other policies, such as 
those maneuvering around the question of therapeutic abortion, seem to be unpopular first 
and foremost among these same urban professionals. The totality of all government policies 
seems to be a compromise of the different groups that make up the Sandinista movement.
Contributions to Anthropology
Anthropologists who have studied issues related to the new Sandinismo in recent years have,
as mentioned in the introduction, generally focused on very specific, individual aspects of 
Sandinismo and policies of the current government. While these studies often are able to give
a very detailed picture of any one such aspect, something which also has helped me in 
gaining an initial understanding of various aspects, the contribution of this research must be 
seen first and foremost in the contribution to the understanding of the Sandinista totality – 
how views of history and economic theory tie together with political practice and identity. 
Had I looked only at the literacy program or only at the therapeutic abortion issue when trying 
to answer the research questions posed, I would have concluded with a simple binary answer
of the Sandinistas either doing almost the same as during the 1980s (which the population 
may or may not want) or having turned into a reactionary group of ultra-orthodox Catholics. 
The aspect of political alliances within Sandinismo and with groups outside of Sandinismo 
would have been lost. Equally, the understanding of the importance of organising within 
formal and informal groups at various levels connected with Sandinismo in order to obtain 
political influence for the individual would not have been understood. With this, I do not seek 
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to disqualify the validity of the studies of individual aspects of policies, but I do show they can 
fruitfully be augmented with studies that focus on the totality of the movement. 
In comparison to the work of other anthropologists who tried to interpret Sandinismo in its 
entirety, such as Lancaster (1988) or Babb (2004), I come to somewhat different conclusions. 
I do not seek to disqualify the contributions of these, yet I believe to have shown through this 
thesis that aspects which did not form the prime focus for these studies are important. 
Lancaster, who saw the revolutionary ideology of Sandinismo as being legitimised mainly 
through the tradition of popular national saints, may have under-estimated the importance the 
international situation had on making the Sandinista revolution possible in the first place. 
Babb, who seems to have thought she was witnessing the withering away of Sandinismo prior
to 2006, may have underestimated both the possibility that Sandinismo could return to a 
position of presidential power given material support from a new foreign source and the 
political activists she saw possibly were not completely open about how much they saw their 
activities as being part of Sandinismo. As this study has shown, foreign influences are seldom
pronounced by Sandinistas when explaining their own history and at least the way many 
Sandinistas portray, their activities as activists during the 1990s were secretly also part of 
their overall plan as Sandinistas. 
It is conceivable that two researchers in the same field, studying the phenomenon could study
in the same country at the same time, and drawn radically different conclusions.  Without 
having followed both of these researchers every step of their ways, watched over these 
already highly educated professionals, it is impossible to say which is right and which is 
wrong.  Most likely neither is a hundred percent right nor a hundred percent wrong. The 
backgrounds and personalities each brings to their fieldwork cannot but help color the 
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conclusions they draw.  It might be important whether they are male or female, and from what 
type of economic background they arrived at their fieldwork.  This would most likely be true 
even if they used the same informants, because by its very nature, all social sciences have a 
certain subjectivity to them. No two people react the same with others. The professional 
researcher makes allowances for his biases as I have done; nevertheless, it is incumbent 
upon every researcher to evaluate who is talking straight with him and who is not.  This 
subjective quality is even true for the natural sciences where opposing viewpoints and 
philosophical approaches rage for decades or longer, and are often never conclusively 
decided for either side.  Particle theory as opposed to Wave Theory in physics would be a 
good example of this.  Someone reading the thesis may feel the researcher was "fed a line" 
by some, and that he or she did not take others seriously enough, basing his judgment on 
experiences when he conducted his own field work in Nicaragua.  This would be a grievous 
error, because the one constant is change.  Furthermore, it would be a slight to either 
candidate to question their fieldwork from afar, belittling all the time and effort the researchers 
have invested in becoming professionals.
I am hesitant to say this research contributed to general anthropological models that can be 
used in other places. The Nicaraguan circumstances seem too unique to make such a claim. 
However, contributing to the understanding of the Sandinista movement seems to be of 
relevance to warrant writing this thesis. Subsequent research in other areas will have to be 
conducted in order to determine whether the model of the FSLN is similar to that of other 
parties in other countries. If one wants to see a contribution to general anthropology in this, it 
would have to be that this thesis comments on the general practice of only studying very 
small-scale aspects of social movements, parties and policies and can be used as an 
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argument to augment these with similar studies that try to understand the totality of being 
connected with a particular movement or political party. 
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Glossary
AC - The Alternativa por el Cambio (Alternative for Change) is a small Nicaraguan party 
which in the 2011 elections was one of several small parties that formed part of an 
alliance led by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). 
ALBA - The Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América (Bolivarian 
Alternative for the people of our America) is an alternative trade- and cultural network 
between Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Commonwealth of Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Albanisa - ALBA de Nicaragua, S.A. (ALBA of Nicaragua) is a Nicaraguan privately held 
company that handles the Nicaraguan side of the economic parts of the Alternativa 
Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América (ALBA) agreement. 
Government-critics claim that this is a major source of enrichment of the leadership of 
the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). Pro-government commentators 
often claim that Albanisa has been set up to circumvent the Liberal majority in 
parliament and restrictions set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the use of 
public funds. 
ALN - The Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (Liberal Nicaraguan Alliance) is a Liberal party 
formed in 2005 by Eduardo Montealegre Rivas and other members of the Partido 
Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) who were in disagreement with the leadership of the 
PLC. 
AMNLAE - The Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenes Luisa Amanda Espinoza (Association 
of Nicaraguan Women Luisa Amanda Espinoza) is a famous Sandinista women 
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organisation. 
ATC - Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo (Association of Rural Workers) 
BANIC - Banco Nicaragüense de Industria y Comercio (Nicaraguan Bank of Industry and 
Commerce) 
BD - The Banca Democratica (Democratic Bench) was formed by Eduardo Montealegre 
Rivas after the 2008 municipal elections. Montealegre had run as a candidate for the 
Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) but decided to form his own fraction in the 
national parliament and city council of Managua after the elections. 
BIS - The Bank for International Settlements is an international bank that controls loans to 
central banks. 
BRD - The Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) was the official name
of West Germany until 1990, since then the official name of the entire current German 
state. 
caudillo - A caudillo (strong-man) is a term used to describe a type of political-military leader 
in Latin America. Caudillos are by definition authoritarian and they are often seen as a 
father-figure by the public. 
CDSs - The Comités de Defensa Sandinista (Committee for Defense of Sandinismo) were an 
organisation in the 1980s which formed local committees in neighborhoods of all of 
Nicaragua during the 1980s which aimed to hinder Contras from sabotage. Critics 
claim that it at times acted like the East German Staatssicherheit (StaSi). 
CEPAL - The Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean) is a United Nations Institution that is known for its
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adoption of Dependency Theory in the years after the Second World War (WWII). 
CIA - The Central Intelligence Agency is an agency of the US government which aims to 
collect foreign intelligence. 
CIPRES - The Centro para la Promoción, la Investigación y el Desarollo Rural y Social 
(Center for Promotion, Investigation and Rural and Social Development) is an NGO 
which has worked close with the current Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 
government in designing several of its agriculture-related policies. CIPRES is allegedly 
mainly composed of Sandinistas who stopped working in the state after the 
1990-elections. 
CLSs - The Consejos de Liderazgo Sandinista (Sandinista Leadership Councils) make out 
the lowest level of leadership within the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional. 
CLSs can be found in neighborhoods all throughout the country. 
CMEA - The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance was the economic network of the Soviet 
Union and its allies. 
CONPES - The Consejo Nacional de Planificación Económica y Social (National Council for 
Economic and Social Planning) is a Nicaraguan government institution. 
Contras - The Contras (Counter-revolutionary) is a term that designates all the groups who 
took up arms against the Sandinista-dominated government in the 1980s. Nowadays 
former Contras more often use the term Resistencia about themselves. 
Cordoba is the official currency of Nicaragua. The exchange rate to the US Dollar has been 
around 20:1 in the period 2007--11. 
CPCs - The Consejos de Poder Ciudadano (Councils for Citizen Power) make out an 
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organisation which aims to organise direct democracy in Nicaragua. It was started by 
President José Daniel Ortega Saavedra of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional (FSLN) in 2007.
CPoC - The Communist Party of China has been the ruling party of the People's Republic of 
China, the larger of the two Chinas, since 1949. It bears the name ‘communist’ for 
historic reasons. Very few radicals outside of China see it as representing a program 
that would lead toward communism. 
CSE - The Consejo Supremo Electoral (Highest Election Council) is a Nicaraguan 
government institution which organises elections. 
CSJ - Corte Suprema de Justicia (Highest Court of Justice) 
CUUN--León - Centro Universitario de la Universidad Nacional--León (University Center of 
the National University, León) 
DDR - The Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic) was East 
Germany, the Soviet-allied part of Germany during the time of the Cold War (CW) up 
until 1990. 
DR-CAFTA - The Dominican Republic--Central American Free Trade Agreement is a free 
trade agreement between the United States and Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Honduras Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. Nicaragua joined the DR-CAFTA in
2006. 
ENABAS - The Empresa Nicaragüense de Alimentos Básicos (Nicaraguan Company for 
Basic Food Items) is a state-owned company used in the 1980s to organise cheap 
food for poor Nicaraguans in times of crisis. It is again used by the current government.
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EPZ - An Export Production Zone is an area which is regulated by special laws (unfavorable 
to labor unions) and with specially low tax codes. EPZs have in recent years been 
established in many third world countries with the aim to bring cash to the country. 
FADCANIC - The Fundación para la Autonomía y el Desarollo de la Costa Atlántica de 
Nicaragua (Foundation for the Autonomy and Development of the Atlantic coast of 
Nicaragua) is an NGO that works with development projects on the Nicaraguan Atlantic
coast. 
FDJ - The Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth) was the socialist youth organisation 
of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR)
FIDEG - The Fundación Internacional para el Desafío Económico Global (International 
Foundation for the Global Economic Challenges) is a Nicaraguan NGO formed in 
1990. It has a self-declared goal of creating alternative economic development plans 
for Nicaragua that focus upon combining economic growth with diminishing economic 
differences and keeping in mind questions of democracy, gender and the environment. 
The annual study on economic development and poverty FIDEG has published in 2010
and 2011 were financed through Dutch and Swiss aid.
FLN - The Frente de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Front) was the name of the of 
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) 1961--63. 
FMLN - The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front) is a sister-party of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 
(FSLN) in El Salvador.
foco strategy - The foco strategy (focus strategy) is a strategy that originated with Ernesto 
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Guevara and the Cuban revolution. Its concern was how to organise for a revolution. 
Instead of waiting to start an insurrection until one had organised a large amount of 
factory workers in the cities to be able to confront the military and political leadership of
the country through the mass of people involved, instead the strategy stated that one 
should initially attack in certain strategic points with small and mobile paramilitary 
guerrilla units. These attacks should then develop into the ‘focus’ of the movement of 
discontent with the regime among the general population. The way the strategy seems 
to have been understood a lot of places, including Nicaragua at least initially, was that 
attacks needed to be organised and launched from the countryside.
FSLN - The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front) 
has been the main Sandinista party since 1963. 
GDP - The Gross Domestic Product is the market value of all final goods and services 
produced within a country in a given period. 
GNI - The Gross National Income is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), plus income 
received from abroad, minus payments made to receivers abroad within a certain 
period. 
ICJ - The International Court of Justice in Den Haag, Netherlands is the main judicial part of 
the United Nations and its decisions are in theory binding. 
IDB - The Inter-American Development Bank is a bank that has given multilateral loans to 
countries in the Caribbean and Latin America since 1959. 
IEEPA - The International Emergency Economic Powers Act is a 1977 US law which gives the
US President the right to regulate commerce in the case of an emergency. 
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IES - The Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo (Institute for the Study of Sandinismo) was an 
institute that existed in the 1980s and which had an aim of investigating and 
documenting everything available related to Augusto Nicolás Calderón Sandino. 
IMF - The International Monetary Fund is a bank that gives multilateral loans which is known 
for its harsh conditions of privatisation towards indebted countries. 
INIFOM - The Instituto Nicaragüense de Fomento Municipal (Nicaraguan Institute for 
Municipal Development) is an institute whose mission it is to aid local governments in 
achieving development and independence. 
INSS - Instituto Nicaragüense de Seguridad Social (Nicaraguan Institute for Social Security) 
ISA - The Ingenio San Antonio (San Antonio Plant) is Nicaragua's largest sugar plantation, 
which belongs to Nicaragua Sugar Estates Limited which in turn is part of the Grupo 
Pellas (GP). 
latifundio - A latifundio is a large farm of over 500 hectares. It is part of a very common 
structure of agriculture in Latin America. 
MAGFOR - The Ministerio Agropecuario y Forestal (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) has 
been the name of the ministry dealing with agriculture since 1998. It underwent many 
administrative changes for the past 4 decades. 
MCCA - The Mercado Común Centroamericano (Common Central American Market) is a 
1960 trade agreement between Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica. The market was in part non-operational during the 1980s. 
MICE - The Ministerio de Comercio Exterior (Ministry of Foreign Trade) was given 
responsibilities to control foreign trade during the 1980s. 
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MINED - Ministerio de Educación (Ministry of Education) 
minifundio - A minifundio is a small farm of under 5 hectares. It is part of a very common 
structure of agriculture in Latin America. 
MINSA - Ministerio de Salud (Ministry of Health) 
MpN - The Movimiento por Nicaragua (Movement for Nicaragua) is a right-wing NGO that 
organises protest marches under the banner ‘pro-democracy’ as they claim that the 
current government is anti-democratic. 
MpRS - The Movimiento por el Rescate del Sandinismo (Movement for Rescue of 
Sandinismo) is a group of Sandinistas who are not happy with the control of President 
José Daniel Ortega Saavedra of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). 
During the years 2006--09, they formed an alliance with or were part of the Movimiento
Renovador Sandinista (MRS). Different from the MRS, the members of the MpRS have
a goal of taking power in the FSLN. They are seen as standing to the left of the MRS in
economic questions. 
MRS - The Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (Movement for Sandinista Renovation) is a 
political party formed in 1994 which has given up on class-war as part of its program 
and sees itself in a tradition with European social democratic parties. It claims to be 
more democratic than the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) and to be 
in favor of the establishment of a right of therapeutic abortion. 
NGO - Non-governmental organisation is a term usually used for organisations if they work on
a nonprofit basis and do some work that under other circumstances could have been 
done by a government entity. 
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OEP - The Oficina de Ética Pública (Office of Public Ethics) is a government institution which 
aims to monitor corruption within the public sector. 
PDVSA - Petróleos de Venezuela, S. A. (Petroleum of Venezuela) is the state-owned oil 
company of Venezuela. 
Petrocaribe is a treaty between countries of the Caribbean, South America and Central 
America, all of which are accessible by water, with Venezuela to collaborate on energy 
issues and obtain oil at discounted prices. Petrocaribe has some different members 
than the Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América (ALBA) and 
membership seems to have less ideological implications than what membership of the 
ALBA means. At times, there seems to be some confusion as to which treaty is being 
used between countries with dual membership in ALBA and Petrocaribe. Current 
members of Petrocaribe are Antigua and Barbuda, Honduras, Bahamas, Jamaica, 
Belice, Nicaragua, Cuba, Dominican Republic, The Commonwealth of Dominica, San 
Cristobal and Nieves, Granada, San Vicente and the Granadinas, Guatemala, Santa 
Lucía, Guyana, Suriname, Haiti and Venezuela. 
PLC - The Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (Liberal Constitutionalist Party) has been the 
main Liberal parties since the late 1990s. 
PLI - The Partido Liberal Independiente (Independent Liberal Party) is a Liberal party which is
mostly known for having been formed in opposition to the Somoza-regime in 1944. 
Eduardo Montealegre Rivas called for his supporters to join this party after the 2008 
municipal elections. 
PPP Int. $ - International Dollars are not a real currency. It is a measurement used by 
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international organisations. The value of 1 PPP Int. $ in any country is defined as the 
amount of local currencies that has the same purchasing power as USD1$ in the 
United States.
PRI - The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) is a party in 
Mexico which held the presidency between the 1930s and the year 2000. It is known 
amongst leftists as a political party which started as idealistic and radical and ended as
corrupt and conservative. 
PRN - The Partido Resistencia Nicaragüense (Party of the Nicaraguan Resistance) is a party 
which represents those who were Contras in the 1980s. 
PSN - The Partido Socialista Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Socialist Party) was up to the 
founding of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) the party of most 
Nicaraguan radicals. During this period, it held contact with the Soviet Union and 
several of the later members of the FSLN started their political career in the PSN. 
During the 1979 insurrection, parts of the FSLN cooperated with PSN. In 1990, the 
PSN formed part of the anti-Sandinista opposition group Unidad Nicaragüense 
Opositora (UNO). 
RAAN - The Región Autónoma del Atlántico Norte (Autonomous Region of the Atlantic, 
North) is a region bordering the northern part of the Atlantic coast which enjoys certain 
rights of political autonomy from the administration in Managua. It was established in 
1986, but the autonomy has not been respected at all times since. 
RAAS - The Región Autónoma del Atlántico Sur (Autonomous Region of the Atlantic, South) 
is a region bordering the mid-southern Atlantic coast which enjoys certain rights of 
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political autonomy from the administration in Managua. It was established in 1986, but 
the autonomy has not been respected at all times since. 
Resistencia (Resistance) is another term for Contras, preferred by many former Contra 
fighters. 
revolutionary insurrection - The revolutionary insurrection is Sandinista terminology the war 
between Sandinistas and Somoza's forces up to the point of the triumph of the 
revolution. See also Sandinista revolution. 
rotonda (roundabout) - The roundabouts of Managua were constructed in the 1990s and 
have obtained strategic importance for political groups who try to control the capital 
physically. 
Sandinista revolution - The Sandinista revolution has in the Sandinista view gone on since 
the start of the Sandinista movement. The start is put somewhere after 1961 and 
before 1979 and a lot, but not all, Sandinistas see the revolution as still continuing. 
Those who do not see it as still going on, mostly believe that the revolution ended in 
the later 1980s or with the electoral defeat in 1990. The Sandinista understanding of 
this term is at times contrary to the terminology used by many foreigners, who use it 
only to define the actions in the year 1979 that led to the overthrow of the Somoza 
dictatorship and up to the point of Sandinista take-over. The point of take-over of power
is in the Sandinista terminology called the triumph of the revolution. The war between 
Sandinistas and Somoza regime are called the revolutionary insurrection. I have 
chosen to stick to the terms as they are used by those Sandinistas who see the 
revolution as still in process. 
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SAP - Structural Adjustment Programs are programs by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) that are to govern the politics of indebted countries. SAPs are notorious for 
ordering privatisations of publicly owned goods. 
SED - The Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) was 
a party governing the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR) until 1990. The SED 
was started by Communists and Social-democrats after the Second World War (WWII).
SIMAS - Servicio de Información Mesoamericano sobre Agricultura Sostenible 
(Mesoamerican Information Service about Sustainable Agriculture) is a 
Managua-based NGO advising about sustainable agriculture and the use of open 
source software to aid the agriculture sector. 
StaSi - The Staatssicherheit (State Security) was the secret police of the Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik (DDR). The StaSi is mainly known for its policies of excessive
spying on the population of the DDR, which created an overall climate of distrust. 
therapeutic abortion is abortion in case only either the life of the mother or the fetus can be 
saved. A right for abortion under these circumstances existed for 100 years in the 
Nicaraguan constitution until it was removed in 2006. 
triumph of the revolution - The triumph of the revolution is in Sandinista terminology the 
point when the Somoza regime was defeated by Sandinistas in summer 1979. See 
also Sandinista revolution. 
UABJO - Universidad Autónoma “Benito Juárez” de Oaxaca (“Benito Juárez” Autonomous 
University of Oaxaca)
UCA - The Universidad Centroamericana (Central American University) is the most famous 
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private university of Managua. The UCA receives public funding. 
UdeM León - Universidad de Managua, León (University of Managua, León campus) 
UNAG - Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos (National Union of Farmers and 
Ranchers) 
UNAN - The Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua (National Autonomous University 
of Nicaragua) is the most prestigious public university in Nicaragua. 
UNAN-León - The Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua, León (National 
Autonomous University of Nicaragua, León campus) is the unit of the Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua in León. The UNAN--León enjoys certain institutional
independence from the main university in Managua. 
UNEN - The Unión Nacional de Estudiantes de Nicaragua (National Student Union of 
Nicaragua) is the central organisation representing all Nicaraguan students. 
UNESCO - United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation 
UNO - The Unidad Nicaragüense Opositora (United Nicaraguan Opposition) was an electoral 
alliance of 14 parties, mostly from the political right, who won the 1990 presidential 
elections. 
USC - The US Congress is the parliament of the United States, consisting of the two 
chambers US House of Representatives (USHR) and the US Senate. 
USCPI-U - The US Urban Consumer Price Index is a measure of inflation for all urban 
consumers in the US. Official statistics over the USPCI-U are released annually by the 
US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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USD - The US Dollar is the official currency of the United States of America. It is extensively 
used in Central America. El Salvador uses the USD as official currency. In Nicaragua, 
professionals, as well as others with high income, oftentimes receive their wages in 
USD rather than the national currency Cordoba. 
USD05 are USD adjusted for inflation to 2005 levels, using the US Urban Consumer Price 
Index (USCPI-U). 
USHR - The US House of Representatives is one of two chambers of the US Congress 
(USC). Elections are separate from elections for President of the United States, and at 
times some political disagreement exists between the two. 
voto duro (hard vote) - A Sandinista who votes for the Frente Sandinista de Liberación 
Nacional (FSLN) even when he disagrees with the politics of the leadership, is counted
as someone giving a voto duro. 
voto oculto (hidden vote) - A person who does not want to disclose to pollsters who he voted
for at elections is seen as part of the voto oculto and Nicaraguan pollsters assume the 
person voted for a different party than the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 
(FSLN). 
WB - The World Bank is a foundation which spreads western development policies. 
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